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League of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Stevens Mission
to Russia
In May 1917 President Woodrow Wilson sent a commission 
of five railroad experts to Russia with instructions to 
assist in rehabilitating the broken-down Trans-Siberian 
Railway, Russia’s main link to the western allies. Organ­
ized just two months after the overthrow of the Tsar and 
one month after America's intervention in World War One, 
this mission represented an important aspect of Wilson's 
policy toward the Provisional Government during the short 
summer of Russian liberalism in 1917.
The Stevens Mission was foiled in its primary objective; 
it had little effect in staving off a collapse of Russia's 
railways. Its recommended locomotive shipments failed to 
reach Russia in decisive numbers, while the technical assis­
tance which the commission offered, particularly the intro­
duction of American methods of operation on the Trans-Siber­
ian, met with resistance from the Provisional Government, 
since proposed changes involved a confrontation between 
government and the railwaymen's union. In the midst of 
a burgeoning labor movement during the Russian Revolution, 
the Provisional Government lacked the power to impose its 
will on the railway lines.
The Stevens Mission was more successful in its subsequent 
role, as a deterrent to Allied intervention. By September 
the British and French were pressing for foreign control 
of the railways. Wilson recognized that such drastic meas­
ures, violating Russia's right to self-determination, would 
be fatal to the Provisional Government. By obscuring the 
limits of American railroad assistance, he placated the 
Allies and shielded Russia from intervention until after 
the Bolshevik Revolution.
The main sources used in this study were the records of 
the Department of State, the War College Division and the 
Stevens Mission, all at the National Archives, and the pri­
vate papers of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, Secretary 
of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing, and other participants, housed at the Library of 
Congress, and the published papers of Wilson. The Russian 
diary of George Gibbs was useful, and Jacqueline D. St. 
John's PhD dissertation, "John F. Stevens: American Assis­
tance to Russian and Siberian Railroads" was an invaluable 
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A Note on Technicalities
Through 1917 the Russians followed the Julian, or 
"old-style" calendar, which lagged thirteen days behind the 
West's Gregorian, or "new-style" calendar. Because the 
Americans in Russia are the main concern, all dates are 
given according to the new style. All Russian words are 
transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, 
with two exceptions, Kerensky and Tolstoy, whose names are 
rendered as they are most familiar. Petrograd, Russia's 
capital until 1918, was St. Petersburg before 1914, and was 
renamed Leningrad in 1924. Helsingfors is the Swedish 
rendition of Helsinki, and was employed in 1917 when Finland 
was still part of the Russian empire. The city of 




Two potent events in the spring of 1917, the March 
Revolution in Russia and the intervention of the United 
States in the First World War three weeks later, together 
mark one of the great divides in world history. Europe,
gutted by war, was in eclipse. The United States was 
embarking on its crusade to make the world safe for 
democracy. Russia, in a revolutionary ferment, was being 
stirred by another vision, an even more messianic ideology. 
In that union of events began the great ideological rivalry 
of modern times.
America's relations with the new Russia were at first 
cordial and appreciative. The overthrow of the tsarist 
regime removed the main impediment to a redefinition of the 
European war as a world war of peoples against kings,
democracy against autocracy. President Woodrow Wilson 
declared Russia to be "a fit partner for a League of Honor." 
Russia's Provisional Government, headed by liberals who were 
pledged to hold national elections for a constituent
assembly, sought to weld Russia into a democracy. A
democratic Russia was crucial to the reconstructed world 
order that Wilson wanted from the war. From the moment that 
the Russian Revolution began, however, Wilson was confronted 
by a dilemma. The war had exhausted and demoralized Russia; 
war was a poor midwife for democracy. Wilson wanted to
1
encourage internal political stability in Russia and assist 
her nascent forces of democracy. But as a war leader, he 
had to ensure Russia's participation in the war as a 
military ally of the United States. The two policies were 
potentially at cross-purposes, and Wilson was aware of it.
It is a commonplace to condemn the Allies, the United 
States included, for failing to release Russia from the war 
in 1917, before the Bolshevik Revolution. The governments of 
Britain, France and Italy, and the Wilson Administration, so 
the argument runs, were blind to the consequences of pushing 
Russia relentlessly for an offensive in 1917, of demanding 
her adherence to past treaty obligations, of allowing no 
stint in her war effort against the Central Powers. Too 
often, historians have readily associated Wilson with this 
colossal mistake. They have assumed that the President's 
quest for democracy in Russia reinforced his desire that 
Russia should make no separate peace. Writes one historian, 
"In Wilson and most of America, the wish inspired the 
thought...Russia had not only become a democratic nation, 
she would now also become a formidable military ally. In 
Wilson's mind, democracy in Russia and continuing the war 
were inextricably linked."^ There is no documentary evidence 
that Wilson thought in these terms about Russia. Wilson left 
scant written record of his views on the problems of Russia 
staying in or getting out of the war, and his attitude must 
be deduced from circumstantial evidence and the drift of his
3
other policy decisions on Russia in 1917.
It is misleading to think of Wilson ever being 
confronted by a simple yes or no proposition about whether 
or not he could sanction a Russian separate peace. 
Throughout 1917 his Russian policy had to be flexible to 
accomodate developments in Russia. His policy had to take 
into account numerous contingencies, in addition to the 
current situation. There were internal threats from both 
the Right and the Left, as well as the danger of military 
defeat on the eastern front. Moreover, the question of
Russia leaving the war involved not one but several possible
scenarios. There was the possibility of military defeat and 
surrender. There was a possibility of a negotiated 
settlement between Germany and Russia: then Russia’s terms 
would depend on such imponderables as the military 
situation, the disposition of the Allies, and mediation by
other powers. There was some possibility of a comprehensive 
negotiated peace —  both the socialists' Stockholm 
Conference and the Pope's Peace Proposal were efforts in
this direction. Only one thing was certain, Russia's exit 
from the war would be a process rather than an event. The 
"immediate" consequence for the West, the transfer of German 
divisions from the eastern front to the western front, would 
take even longer. For Wilson, the problem of releasing 
Russia from the war was not a question of flipping a switch, 
but a question of facilitating a process. The main contours
4
of Wilson's policy toward the Provisional Government in 1917 
suggest that he was more willing to allow Russia's 
withdrawal from the war than he has generally been given 
credit for.
Wilson's Russian policy in the spring of 1917 centered 
around two missions which he sent simultaneously to the 
Provisional Government. One, the Root Mission, he sent to 
convey the United States' sympathy for the Russians' 
democratic revolution. The other, the Stevens Railroad 
Mission, he sent to offer technical and material assistance 
with the aim of improving the Russian war effort. The two 
missions were distinct because they reflected conflicting 
policy goals: it was doubtful that the new leaders in Russia 
could both expand their popular mandate and redouble the war 
effort. Awaiting developments and a clearer picture of the 
Russian situation, the President pursued both policy goals 
at once.
By late summer the Russians' need for peace had become 
more apparent. Their July Offensive had collapsed, and the 
government was weakened by a series of cabinet crises and an 
attempted coup from the Right. The Stevens Mission, 
meanwhile, had made little progress in rehabilitating the 
railways. To improve the supply situation, it was now 
clear, the United States would have to go beyond advising, 
and take over operation of the railways. The British and 
the French, anxious to hold Russia in the war, pressed for
5
intervention on the railways. Wilson prevented it. He 
jettisoned railroad assistance and concentrated on the main 
goal of supporting the Provisional Government against the 
threat of foreign intervention.
Wilson found a partial resolution to his dilemma in the 
promotion of Russia’s right to self-determination. He acted 
as though his best chance for buttressing the forces of 
democracy in Russia were to shield the Provisional 
Government from coercion by the British and French. He was 
willing that Russia withdraw from the war if the internal 
political situation demanded it. The Stevens Mission, his 
main resource for bolstering the Russians' war effort, was 
limited strictly to advising the government. True to the 
principle of self-determination, he refused to escalate 
American involvement on the Russian railways.
CHAPTER ONE
"A FIT PARTNER FOR A LEAGUE OF HONOR"
For the American people March 1917 was a month of grim 
reckoning. The President's attempt to mediate an end to the 
holocaust in Europe had failed. German U-boats, after a 
year's reprieve, were once more prowling the Atlantic, and 
American merchant ships were getting torpedoed on the high 
seas. The President's last effort at averting war, arming 
the ships against submarine attacks, was failing too, for 
the Atlantic crossing was too dangerous and exports were 
fast piling up in the East Coast ports. Many Americans were 
persuaded that the United States had no choice but to 
intervene in the European war on the side of Britain, 
France, Italy, and a most unlikely ally, tsarist Russia.^
It was on March 16, 1917 that Americans learned of the 
overthrow of the Tsar. The bread lines in Petrograd that 
bloomed into strikes and riots, the refusal of the Duma (the 
parliament) to disband, the mutiny of the Petrograd garrison 
—  these received little attention in the American press 
until the tsar abdicated, on March 15, in his railway car 
enroute from the front to the capital. Petrograd, Americans 
now learned, was in the hands of the insurgents. The Tsar's 
ministry, charged with corruption, incompetence, and 
treachery, had been swept from office. Members of the Duma 
had formed a national cabinet, the Provisional Government,
6
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with Prince L'vov as President. The new leaders of Russia, 
mostly constitutional monarchists and liberal democrats, 
were pledged to hold national elections for a constituent 
assembly.^
For those Americans who harbored misgivings about
aligning their country with tsarist Russia, the Russian
Revolution could not have happened at a more auspicious
moment. Russia, said one newspaper editor, had been "a
deadly blight" on the Allied cause. Why should Americans,
as the Springfield Republican observed, "prefer the Russian
Caesar to the German Caesar?" Now, to the relief of
millions, it could be said with some conviction that this
terrible war was a struggle of peoples against kings. The
revolution in Russia, wrote the editor of the Dallas News,
"gives a political and spiritual unity to the alliance of
Germany*s enemies that has hitherto been lacking, for the
reason that democracy was in league with autocracy."
Imperial Russia, in the American mind, had long been the
3very symbol of despotism.
A small but influential sector of the American public 
had been intransigent toward intervening in the war on the 
side of tsarist Russia. Jewish-Americans, many of whom were 
Russian-born and had fled the Tsar's pogroms, took heart 
when the new leaders of Russia promised to dismantle the 
official anti-Semitism of the old regime; abruptly, they 
dropped their hostility to the Allied cause. Polish- and
8
Scandinavian-Americans also had opposed intervention because 
Russia was the traditional enemy of their homelands. The
revolution softened their suspicions of Russia's territorial
. . . 4ambitions in the war.
As the American people and the press groped for an
understanding of the great events transpiring in Russia,
their initial attitude toward the Provisional Government was
strongly influenced by Russian-American organizations such
as the Friends of Russian Freedom. These groups fostered
hopes that the revolution would revitalize the Russian war
effort, making Russia a stronger ally. They encouraged
Americans to think that Russia would progress rapidly toward
democracy. The zemstvos, or provincial councils in Russia,
were given special attention, described in one newspaper
analysis as "a skeleton upon which popular government can
easily be built up." This was a mirage. The zemstvos were
overshadowed by the soviets, or revolutionary councils of
workers and soldiers, which sprang up in all the
municipalities and in the units of the Russian Army. The
soviets represented the toilers of Russia, to the exclusion
of other social classes? their rise brought into bold relief
the existence of deep class divisions. But the American
public, with the aid of Russian-American liberals and
Russian specialists, saw what it wanted to see, a Russia
that had thrown off its chains and was destined to join the
5world's democracies.
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Samuel N. Harper, a professor and pioneer of Russian 
studies at the University of Chicago, was contacted by the 
State Department to interpret what was happening in Russia. 
Harper received a telegram on the day of the Tsar's 
abdication, requesting his views of the new ministers in the 
Provisional Government. Having been to Russia the previous 
summer, the professor was acquainted with most of the 
personalities in the new cabinet and described each one's 
abilities and party affiliations. He concluded with an
optimistic forecast: the "aim of [the] Revolution...is to 
create conditions that would make it possible for Russia to 
bring into force all her strength. Means therefore more 
effective prosecution of war and war until victory." This 
message was passed on for the President's perusal on March 
16.6
President Woodrow Wilson had another source of advice 
in his friend Charles R. Crane, a wealthy, progressive 
businessman with a "romantic" interest in Russia
(principally in Russian Orthodox Church music and icons) 
that had repeatedly taken him back to that country. Crane 
was Harper's patron, having funded the chair in Russian
studies at the University of Chicago. His son was the 
secretary of state's private secretary. Crane, however, had 
little more than a sentimental understanding of Russian
society and history, for his frequent trips had given him 
many contacts in the social elites of Petrograd and Moscow
10
7but scant exposure to the new forces welling up m  Russia.
Wilson may or may not have been misled by the judgments 
of these men. There is almost no record of the President's 
early thoughts on this momentous event. There are a few 
hints, such as Wilson's off-handed joke in a cabinet meeting 
March 23, that the new government "ought to be good because 
it has a professor [Foreign Minister Paul Miliukov] at the 
head." Wilson also repeated Crane's opinion that the new 
leaders "were men of ability and had the confidence of 
Russia." Wilson had every reason to share the American 
public's relief that the autocratic regime had been toppled, 
and he supported the efforts of his secretary of state to 
extend United States recognition to the Provisional 
Government promptly. Indeed, the President expressed 
delight that the United States was the first nation to 
recognize the new Russian Government, a day ahead of the
oBritish and the French.
Yet he questioned the ability of the Provisional 
Government to hold power. The immediate concern was that 
there would be counterrevolution. Soon, some dispatches 
coming to the State Department indicated that extreme 
radicals in Russia might menace the new government too. 
Russia's staying power in the war was also in doubt. It was 
not at all clear that the Russian people would suffer the 
war any more for an ideological crusade against German 
autocracy than they had for the imperialist ambitions of the
11
Tsar's council. Wilson remarked to an interviewer one month 
after the revolution that the position of Russia was very 
uncertain: now, he cautioned, the Russians might find the
war incompatible with their efforts to build a democracy.
9They might insist on a separate peace.
Wilson was a moralist. He has been accused of naivete, 
inflexibility, a penchant for self-delusion, and hypocrisy 
all ungratifying traits associated with excessive 
moralism. But in gauging the situation in Russia, Wilson's 
moral vision made him an astute observer. He was deeply 
sensitive to the war-weariness of the Russian people, 
because it touched his own revulsion toward the war. For 
two and a half years he had condemned the European war —  
its causes, purposes, savagery. He had predicated American 
neutrality on the moral principle that the United States 
alone could bring sanity and "disinterestedness" to the 
peace table. But his efforts to mediate a "peace without 
victory" failed. He was fated to lead the nation into war. 
As a war leader, he had to suppress his abhorrence of the 
conflict; he could not even afford to express ambivalence. 
Under these wrenching circumstances, Wilson naturally 
empathized with the ambivalence of the Russian people. He 
projected his own moral reservations onto Russia's 
war-weariness. The new Russia, he observed, might find the 
war "an intolerable evil." Once the United States had 
entered the conflict, it was in the national interest to
12
hold Russia in the war, yet Wilson would remain sensitive to 
the Russians' longing for peace.
At the same time that the Wilson Administration was
formulating a response to the March Revolution, the 
President was grappling with his decision for war. These 
two great seminal events —  the Russian Revolution and 
America's intervention in World War One —  could not have 
crowded closer together in the President's schedule. On
March 17, Wilson's close advisor, Colonel Edward M. House, 
urged him to recognize the Provisional Government. On March 
18, Wilson received word of the sinking of three American 
merchant ships by German submarines. On March 19, Secretary 
of State Robert Lansing met with Wilson and recommended that 
the psychological moment for intervention was at hand, 
because its moral impact would strengthen the Russian 
liberals and perhaps even cause a revolution in Germany.
Lansing wrote to House that the President had to be
persuaded; would House "put his shoulder to the wheel?" On
the next day, March 20, occurred the momentous cabinet
meeting, when Wilson discovered that the opinion of his
cabinet was unanimously for w a r . ^
The crisis over Germany's recent submarine attacks
demanded that Wilson call a session of Congress, and he now 
wanted the cabinet's advice on what action he should 
propose. He went around the table, asking each member to 
speak his mind. Secretary of the Treasury William G.
McAdoo, who would soon figure prominently in the United 
States' relations with the new government in Russia, 
believed that war with Germany had become inevitable; to 
delay would only risk the appearance of being dragged into 
the war by the American people, instead of leading them in. 
The secretaries of agriculture and commerce both agreed with 
McAdoo, suggesting that the American Navy and financial 
assistance to the Allies would be enough to defeat Germany. 
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker thought the nation should 
enter the war with all its vigor; preparations should be 
made for sending an American army to Europe. Lansing then 
spoke, urging the President to convene Congress at once and 
request a declaration of war. He reiterated that the 
revolution in Russia had removed the one objection to 
defining the war as a struggle between democracy and 
absolutism, making the present time especially propitious 
for intervention. The President replied that he could not 
include Russia's revolution in his address to Congress. When 
Lansing pressed him for this, Wilson only answered 
"possibly." He went on around the cabinet, listening to the 
slow, measured words of his secretary of labor, and emphatic 
recommendations for war from his attorney general, 
postmaster general and secretary of the interior. Finally, 
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, previously the 
staunchest opponent of the war, told the President that he 
saw no other course. "I had hoped and prayed this cup would
14
pass," Daniels wrote in his diary afterward. The "President
/12was solemn, very sad!!"
Wilson set to work on his war speech to Congress, one
of the two or three most important speeches of his
presidency. His task was to define America's purpose.
Could he lead a reluctant, divided people into this
bloodiest of wars on the narrow basis of defending the
United States' freedom of the seas? Could he justify
intervention for the broader, but untraditional reason of
maintaining a balance of power in Europe? Or should he make
the American intervention a crusade for democracy, hailing
the revolution in Russia, and condemning the autocratic
government of Germany? If he chose the latter course, the
spectre of counterrevolution in Russia would shadow the
Allied cause, and victory would demand the overthrow of the
Kaiser in Germany. Wilson decided finally to accept these
risks and idealize the Russian Revolution, not because he
was deceived, but because he had to inspire. He wrote:
Does not every American feel that assurance has 
been added to our hope for the future peace of the 
world by the wonderful and heartening things that 
have been happening within the last few weeks in 
Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best 
to have been always in fact democratic at heart, 
in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the 
intimate relationships of her people that spoke 
their natural instinct, their habitual attitude 
towards life. The autocracy that crowned the 
summit of her political structure, long as it had 
stood and terrible as was the reality of its 
power, was not in fact Russian in origin, 
character or purpose ? and now it has been shaken 
off and the great, generous Russian people have 
been added in all their naive majesty and might to
15
the forces fighting for freedom in the world, for 
justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for 
a League of Honour.
Wilson inserted this homage to Russia reluctantly. He 
wanted to tap the excited emotions of the American people 
and turn their sympathy for Russia into righteous support 
for the war. The American intervention still faced 
formidable, potentially dangerous, opposition? fully fifty 
members of the House of Representatives voted against the 
declaration of war. But his inspiring message bore a cost. 
It implied that the United States would tutor the new Russia 
in democracy. It strengthened the American people’s 
impression that Russia would be a faithful ally. These 
ideas would die hard.
While Wilson worked on his war speech in the closing 
days of March, his administration made more mundane 
preparations for war. It was understood that raising, 
equipping and transporting an American expeditionary force 
to fight on the western front would take months, even a 
year, and the immediate implication of the United States 
intervention was that Britain, France and Russia would be 
given whatever material and financial support America's 
great industrial base could lend them. An air of excitement 
gripped Washington as the government was flooded with 
suggestions of all kinds on how best the Americans could 
contribute to the Allied cause. A letter from Secretary of 
the Interior Franklin Lane to his son epitomized the mood of
16
those in Wilson's cabinet who had labored for weeks to get a
decision from the President:
The first thing is to let Russia and France have 
money. And the second thing, to see that Russia 
has munitions, of which they are short 
depending largely, too largely, upon Japan. I
shouldn't be surprised if we would operate the
Russian railroads. And ships, ships! How we do 
need ships, and there are none in the world.
Ships to England and to make the Russian
machine work.
The Russian railways were greatly overburdened and had
fallen desperately behind in the task of moving munitions,
railway supplies, and other materials purchased from the
Allies inland from the ports. The war had wrought havoc on
Russia's whole pattern of commerce. Blockaded in the Black
and Baltic Seas, with its entire European frontier cordoned
off by barbed wire and trenches, Russia's only access to the
Allied sea lanes was by a rickety, narrow gauge railway to
the port of Archangel on the White Sea, and by the 5,800
mile-long Trans-Siberian Railway to the Far Eastern port of
Vladivostok. Consular reports from Vladivostok described the
immense piles of stranded freight cramming the docks,
filling warehouses, and stacked out in the weather. The
French provided reports of a similar situation in 
15Archangel.
The idea of American assistance to the Russian railways 
sparked interest both in the United States and in Europe. In 
England, four members of the Committee of American 
Engineers, who claimed familiarity with the Russian
17
railways, offered their services to the State Department. 
From Sweden, Ambassador Roland Morris cabled Washington that 
a reliable source in Russia had suggested that the United 
States assist in constructing the new 600-mile Murman line 
to an ice-free port on Russia's Arctic Coast. In late March, 
the American ambassador in London, Walter Page, heard from a 
"private source" that the British were urging the 
Provisional Government to request American management of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, as a means of improving supply and 
the military outlook on the eastern front. Page was 
enthusiastic, particularly since American involvement on the 
Trans-Siberian Railway might be an "invaluable key" for the 
region's industrial development after the war. Lansing 
received Page's communication on March 31, and shared it 
with Secretary of War Newton D. Baker two days later.^
By then, however, the British had already implanted the 
idea through an unofficial source, a young American 
correspondent for The Times, Stanley Washburn. Washburn was 
passionately pro-Allied. He had covered the eastern front, 
reporting on the great retreat from Poland in 1915 and the 
Russians' costly Brusilov offensive the next year, for which 
the Russians had nicknamed him "Ambassador of the Russian 
Truth." He possessed an exceptional knowledge of Russia's 
supply problems. While recovering his health in a 
sanitorium on the East Coast in the spring of 1917, Washburn 
kept in close contact with his friend and employer Lord
18
Northcliffe, the powerful owner of The Times* Growing
restless as America's entry into the war drew near, Washburn
left the sanitorium for Washington on March 28, explaining
in a letter to Northcliffe that "such influence as I have
should be used immediately in the situation here." In the
capital, he contacted Daniel Willard, a railroad magnate and
the chairman of the Advisory Commission to the Council of
National Defense (CND). Willard promptly got him a hearing
17before the Council.
The CND dated from the President's preparedness 
initiatives in 1916; it comprised five members of the 
cabinet (the secretaries of war, the Navy, commerce, labor 
and interior) and an Advisory Commission of seven 
businessmen representing different sectors of the economy 
that had to be mobilized for war. Secretary of War Baker 
was its chairman.
Washburn addressed the CND in Baker's office on 
Saturday morning, March 31. By all accounts his 
recommendations had a galvanizing effect on his audience. 
He described the Russian supply situation and the dire need 
of getting traffic moving on the Trans-Siberian. The Germans 
threatened to drive on Petrograd, he said, and if Petrograd 
were lost, the Germans could soon menace the line to 
Archangel. Then the Russians' only source of help would be 
from the Americans across Siberia. The Allies were too 
pressed to send supplies, and their technical missions had
19
only earned the distrust of the Russians; now almost the
whole task of supplying Russia's imports would devolve on
19the United States.
The Council listened closely as The Times correspondent
detailed his plan for sending a railroad commission to
Russia. He thought a commission of at least five railroad
experts should cross the Pacific to Vladivostok and inspect
the entire line, from Vladivostok to Petrograd, by daylight
in a special train, assessing the needs of the railway for
locomotives, cars and railroad operators, all of which the
United States would supply. If the United States could take
over operation of the line, Washburn concluded, "I believe
20myself that we can double or treble its capacity."
Baker was impressed with Washburn's grasp of the 
situation. It was odd, he remarked to Willard afterwards, 
"that this young American should have become the Counsellor 
of Kings and the Associate of Ministers of State in ancient 
monarchies, but I confess after hearing him talk that his 
quick intelligence justifies the reliance which has 
obviously been placed upon him wherever he has gone." 
Washburn indeed had an extraordinary gift for making 
contacts: he corresponded regularly with Senator Hiram
Johnson; he was friendly with Secretary of the Interior 
Lane, as well as Daniel Willard; he knew the Russian General 
Staff and enjoyed a personal rapport with General Alexei 
Brusilov, with whom he had spoken frequently during the
20
Brusilov Offensive in 1916. Washburn's intimate friendship
with Lord Northcliffe put him in touch with well-placed
"British authorities."^
After the meeting, Baker went to the White House to
discuss it with the President. Wilson told him to consult
Lansing and inquire through the American ambassador in
Petrograd, David R. Francis, whether such a commission would
be welcome. Lansing was enthusiastic; he requested from
Washburn a list of suggestions in the event of American
intervention in the war. In the meantime, the American
22ambassador m  Russia was told to sound out the Russians.
Railroad assistance required credit for the Provisional 
Government from the United States Treasury. In two and a 
half years of war the Russians had already experienced a 
great demand for more railroad equipment, more than their 
own locomotive works could keep up with, and had purchased 
quantities from Baldwin Locomotive and other American 
companies. They were borrowing so heavily, however, that 
American financiers would not give credit directly to the 
Russian government. Instead, financier J. P. Morgan's huge 
syndicate of sixty American banks, which handled Allied 
purchases in the United States, extended credit to Russia 
through the British, who guaranteed the terms. By this 
method, the Tsarist government had purchased $22,000,000 of 
American railroad materials in 1915 and $20,000,000 in 1916. 
Once the United States entered the war, it was thought that
21
the Wilson Administration could remove these impediments by
taking over the role of Morgan's purchasing agency and
extending credit to Russia on an equal basis with the other
23Allied governments.
Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo vigorously supported
making loans to Russia. He believed that loans would help
steady the Provisional Government. "We have recognized the
new Government and we ought to do everything we possibly can
to sustain it," he wrote Lansing on March 29, "especially as
it is the result of an effort to establish democratic
institutions in Russia." With the President's approval,
McAdoo drafted legislation that gave him authority to make
loans to the Allies, and pushed it through the congressional
24committees m  early April.
The enthusiasm over railroad assistance in Washington 
was not matched in Petrograd; not until April 9 did the 
ambassador there get an official response, a telephone call 
to the embassy that the Russians would welcome an American
railroad commission. His brief cable ended, "Am sending
this promptly because Russia sorely needs improved 
transportation and no time should be lost." But another
message from Francis came two days later, admitting that he 
had still not obtained written consent, and that he had
learned confidentially that permission was granted 
reluctantly. Now he wrote discouragingly that a commission 
would require months to begin its investigation and summer
22
would be too far advanced. Over two weeks later another
cable from Francis offered his insights as to why the
Russian government hesitated to accept an American railroad
commission. The British ambassador, Francis explained, had
told two government ministers that the Trans-Siberian
Railway ought to be turned over to American operation, and
it had gone over very badly, the Russians objecting that
they could not allow the Americans "virtual control of the
railway." This was on April 8? the two Russian officials
were reporting the conversation to Francis over two weeks
later. Francis thought the Russians were complaining more
bitterly about British interference in their railway
problems than they were about a potential American
involvement. "You see their sensitiveness," he pointed out,
25"especially [toward] England."
As the Russians balked at reaching formal agreement on 
a railroad commission, a new idea was taking shape in the 
President's circle on how the United States could assist the 
Provisional Government. Wilson would send a diplomatic
mission, comprised of dignitaries and prominent 
representatives of American politics, business, labor and 
culture. This unusual procedure would demonstrate the 
importance of the Russian Revolution to the American people, 
and the desire of the United States for friendly relations 
with the new Russian democracy. The mission would have two 
objects in Russia: it would give prestige and encouragement
23
to the Provisional Government, and it would determine by
direct observation the government's stability and Russia's
26prospects in the war.
Wilson found the idea of a diplomatic mission more
engaging than railroad assistance, and he devoted
considerable time to selecting the right members. He
rejected Lansing's choice of Samuel Gompers, the president
of the American Federation of Labor, because he "would
hardly be influential in the present ruling circles of labor
at Petrograd." To represent labor, he finally settled on
James Duncan, the elderly vice-president of the AFL, and
Charles E. Russell, a young journalist and pro-war
socialist. As representatives of business, he chose Cyrus
H. McCormick, whose International Harvester Company had
large investments in Russia, his friend Charles R. Crane,
and Samuel R. Bertron, a New York banker. He included John
R. Mott of the Young Men's Christian Association and General
Hugh L. Scott, the Army's chief of staff. He asked Elihu
Root, an elder statesman and former secretary of state, to
27head the mission.
Root was controversial. He was well-known for his 
conservatism and his Wall Street connections? critics 
predicted that he would be poorly received by the socialists 
in Petrograd. Russian-Americans remembered Root for 
extraditing some Russian revolutionaries from the United 
States when he was head of the State Department; they now
24
promised to publicize this damaging incident in Russia.
Within Wilson's circle, Secretary of the Navy Daniels warned
against sending Root, whom he described as "a little brother
of the rich." But Lansing and McAdoo approved the
President's choice. Wilson stuck with Root, because he was
internationally known, and as a prominent Republican, his
28selection was a show of the President's bipartisanship.
When the State Department was unable to get Russian
approval of a railroad commission, Wilson considered
attaching a railroad expert to the Root Mission. He was
prepared to scrap Washburn's plan and combine the technical
and diplomatic missions. Secretary Lane recommended John F.
Stevens, the man who had engineered the Panama Canal in
1906-07. In Lane's view, Stevens was the "best qualified man
for the job in the United States.” Stevens seemed the
29obvious choice, and Wilson accepted Lane's recommendation.
Had Stevens been appointed to the Root Mission, his 
purpose in Russia would have been limited to the two goals 
of assessing the situation and giving moral support to the 
Provisional Government? material assistance would have been 
left pending. But as the President was working on the 
composition of the Root Mission, a breakthrough occurred in 
the negotiations over railroad assistance. The Russians 
offered a formal, written agreement stipulating their 
terms. Significantly, this was conveyed through the Russian 
embassy in Washington instead of through Francis in
25
Petrograd. Since Francis had been selected in 1916 mainly to
negotiate a new trade treaty with the Russian empire, he was
regarded by many Russians as a scout for American commercial
opportunities there. He freely admitted that the Russians
sometimes reproached him for having "too keen a scent for
commerce." The Provisional Government did not want American
railroad assistance to imply any special American privileges
30m  Siberia after the war.
The Russian terms emphasized material assistance.
There was no mention of American operation of the railway.
The commission would inspect the warehouses and locomotive
assembly and repair shops at Vladivostok and Harbin, the two
sites in the Far East where American locomotives were
constructed. The commission would study the operation of
the railway across Siberia and "give opinion." Finally, the
American engineers would investigate the possibilities for
constructing new repair shops, depots and double track; and
would expedite the necessary orders in the United States.
This communication was encouraging, but it did not give the
commission the initiative to reorganize the Trans-Siberian
Railway that the Americans desired. According to Washburn
and scattered reports from Russia, the main problem was the
31way the Russians ran the railway.
Francis reported that some Russian officials were 
considering giving the United States control of Vladivostok. 
The railroad commission would have jurisdiction over the
26
port facilities and train dispatching. Apparently the
British had a hand in pressuring the Russians to grant some
kind of formal agreement on Vladivostok. It was not without
precedent, they argued; Britain had special rights of
administration at the French port of Bordeaux, where many of
the supplies from the United States were landed. The
British thought the terms of this secret Anglo-French
convention would be useful to the Russians; they tried to
make them available, but the French were uncooperative.
Anyway, the Russians were unimpressed, for they resented the
manner in which the British had assumed authority in the
port of Archangel. Francis got a verbal commitment from the
minister of transport that Stevens would be "given absolute
control of Vladivostok terminals," but when he pressed him
32for something in writing, he was unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, Wilson reverted to the plan of sending a 
commission of engineers distinct from the Root Mission. Now 
there would be two missions, one diplomatic and one 
technical. Root was outraged. The separation of the two 
missions, he argued, would create confusion and diminish his 
influence. He wrote to Lansing that his mission "must 
discuss the transportation subject with the Russian 
Government [or] we will be discredited and of no account." 
Lansing was sympathetic and forwarded Root's letter to the 
President, with a letter of his own proposing two 
alternative definitions of the relationship between the two
27
missions. The first described the railroad experts as
"subsidiary” to the Root Mission? they would make their
recommendations through Root. The second plan instructed
Stevens to confer with Root, and authorized Stevens to
negotiate with the Russian government according to Root's
suggestions. Clearly, Lansing did not think Stevens
possessed the diplomatic skills to negotiate directly with
the Russians, independently of Root. But the President did
not share these concerns. He rejected both alternatives.
His reply to Lansing is revealing:
This is my understanding of the mission of the 
railway experts: it bears no resemblance to that 
of the Commission of which Mr. Root is to act as 
chairman. It is not going to ask what can the 
United States do for Russia? but only to say We 
have been sent to put ourselves at your disposal 
to do anything we can to assist in the working out 
of your transportation problem. They are to 
report nothing back to us. They are delegated to 
do nothing but serve Russia on the ground, i ^ s h e  
wishes to use them, as I understand she does.
In Wilson's mind the separation of the two missions was 
natural —  it reflected the two lines of American policy 
toward Russia, one to encourage democracy, the other to 
assist the Russian war effort. Significantly, he conceived 
a more narrowly circumscribed role for the Stevens Mission 
in Russia than either the British or their allies in the 
State Department who were trying to secure American control 
of Vladivostok had in mind. Whereas Lansing worried about 
Stevens' abilities to "negotiate" with the Provisional 
Government, Wilson envisioned the railroad experts simply
offering advice. On one level, Wilson's conception of the 
railroad commission appears naive, for railroad assistance 
had already encountered resistance from the Russians and if 
it were to accomplish anything, there was going to be some 
give and take —  negotiations. But in Wilson's view the 
commission had a moral purpose, to "serve Russia," and it 
would not be coercive. American railroad assistance would 
stay within the bounds of Russia's right to 
self-determination.
The Advisory Railroad Commission to Russia that was 
finally assembled in early May consisted of five engineers, 
two secretaries, two stenographers and a clerk. Once in 
Russia it would be joined by two interpreters. As far as 
Vladivostok, it would be accompanied by Stanley Washburn. 
(At Baker's request, the young correspondent was 
commissioned a major in the United States Cavalry; in 
Vladivostok he would transfer to the Root Mission.) 
Willard's advisory group unanimously approved the 
appointment of John F. Stevens as the commission's chairman, 
and selected the four other engineers to represent a range 
of technical expertise. Henry Miller was one of the 
nations's ablest operating engineers? William Darling was a 
specialist in locating and maintenance of way? George Gibbs
was an expert in equipment maintenance and repair shops; and
 ̂ . 3 4G^ofge Greiner was an eminent bridge engineer.
Stevens was perhaps the most esteemed engineer in the
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United States. At 64, he was vigorous and robust, with
silvered hair and mustache, and a weatherbeaten face.
Peculiarly self-deprecating before public audiences, Stevens
was hard-headed and contentious among his fellow engineers.
He attacked a job with energy and decision. He was moody —
taciturn, sometimes humorous, occasionally volcanic. His
temperament suited the rugged, masculine life of an
engineer, but it did not serve him well in Russia, where he
35would need patience, diplomacy and accountability.
Although Stevens had spent most of his career working 
for James J. Hill in the American and Canadian West, it was 
his work on the Panama Canal in 1906-07 that had made him 
nationally known. It was also that experience that 
recommended him for the task in Siberia. Appointed by 
President Theodore Roosevelt to rescue the beleagured 
American canal effort, Stevens had found a near state of 
panic in Panama. Three-fourths of the Americans there —  
about 500 technicians and skilled laborers —  had fled home 
to escape the yellow fever. The Panama Railroad was a 
shambles; from one overlook Stevens counted seven trains off 
the track. Supplies dumped at the port of Colon had been 
sitting idle for over a year. Stevens wrote, "I believe I 
faced about as discouraging a proposition as was ever 
presented to a construction engineer." To save the whole 
enterprise from collapse, he launched a complete 
reorganization of the canal zone. First he attacked the
30
yellow fever, having Panama City and Colon cleaned up, 
paved, given sewage systems and running water. He relaid 
the Panama Railroad with heavier rails, double-tracked it, 
and replaced the bridges. He brought in bigger locomotives 
and a new army of railroad workers. Not for six months did 
the steam shovels resume excavation. Stevens told the 
secretary of war, "As long as I am in charge of the 
work...the future will show its absolute wisdom." And it 
did.36
But in Panama Stevens could call on the vast resources
of the American government —  probably the most resources
ever at the disposal of a civil engineer. In Siberia he 
would encounter a broken-down railway whose economic and 
engineering woes were overshadowed by the effects of war and 
social revolution. Neither Stevens nor any other member of 
the commission was equipped to understand the social 
revolution into which he was entering. Russia's deep class 
divisions, autocratic political tradition, and state-imposed 
economic development were all outside the American 
experience. These Americans' attitudes were rooted in the 
nineteenth century gospel of opportunity. Their own 
illustrious engineering careers confirmed the virtues of 
hard work and initiative. The composition of their party 
seemed to verify America's freedom from class barriers: 
Miller, a boiler maker's apprentice at the age of seventeen,
Gibbs, college educated, the scion of an old and
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distinguished New England merchant family, and Stevens, a
country school teacher before he entered railroading, had
each found his own way up the ladder of the engineering
profession. As American representatives of that profession,
they were all endowed with strong, steadfast opinions on the
37proper relations of business, labor and government.
The commission called at the White House on May 8 to
confer with the President on their purpose in Russia. Wilson
greeted them in the Portrait Room at exactly twelve-thirty,
sat down in front of them and talked for half an hour. He
spoke in high, moral tones about their "duties," which he
stressed would be confined to advising and assisting the
Russians on the transportation situation. They were to
follow the Russians' agenda, advising "on such railway
matters as they might suggest." The commission was "neither
political nor diplomatic." It was only the previous day
that Wilson had written his conception of the mission to
Lansing; he had made up his mind that the railroad
commission was "entirely distinct from the Root Commission."
Stevens was still anxious to clarify this point, and pressed
Wilson for his assurances that only their commission would
have authority to discuss the railway situation with the
38Provisional Government.
Stevens came away from the meeting quite dissatisfied. 
He was unimpressed by the President's lofty rhetoric, he 
wanted definite instructions and prerogatives, and he was
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anxious about the commission's reception in Vladivostok.
Later, the chairman brooded over this meeting during a
conversation with the British ambassador in Tokyo. The
President, Stevens said, had given him "no instructions
except to offer his services to the Russian Government and
People and to render them every possible assistance in the
war against the Common Enemy." Wilson had allowed that
"money was to be no object in the work of the Commission;"
he had vaguely told Stevens to order by cable "everything
which seemed necessary." Stevens complained that apart from
these "general orders," he had "nothing to go on." Perhaps
feeling daunted as he perceived the skillful diplomacy that
his mission would call for, the chairman concluded, "my
business will be to do the work in Russia myself, and to
39make the Russians think that they are doing it."
Lansing, it is worth noting, had come around to his own
distinctive view of the purpose of the railroad commission.
While accepting the strict parameters that the President had
placed on the mission, Lansing's mind gravitated from
Wilson's abstract ideas to whatever concrete objectives it
seemed the commission might accomplish, and he recalled the
recommendations of Washburn. He wrote Francis:
It is believed that an examination of Russian 
railroads will disclose methods whereby we will be 
able to render immediate and valuable assistance.
It is not improbable, that with slight changes, 
equipment now being built for American railroads 
may be so changed as to fit the Russian gauge and 
requirements, and it is with that thoijgjit now in 
mind that the commission is being sent.
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The commission, however, would quickly determine that this 
was impracticable.
The Stevens Mission left Washington by train on May 9 
and traveled across the country to Vancouver, British 
Columbia where it boarded the steamship Empress of Asia for 
a drizzly three-day voyage to Yokohama, Japan. The ship's 
odd assortment of passengers portended the confusion in 
Russia. Many American businessmen were on board, blustering 
about the great commercial opportunities that were going to 
open up in Russia and Siberia after the war? their companies 
were sending them to investigate the markets. Occupying the 
second class compartments, numerous Russian-American 
immigrants were returning to their homeland, heady with 
socialism and eager to join the revolution. George Gibbs 
characterized them as the "fluent-talking, self-seeking 
kind, going home to stir up trouble and to grasp what they 
can from the rich....A good riddance for America, but bad 
for the 'New Russia.'" And Count Il'ya Tolstoy, son of the 
famous novelist and social critic, Leo Tolstoy, was on 
board, returning from a speaking tour in the United States. 
Old, crotchety, appalled by America's materialism, he was a 
living fossil of the Old Russia. He sat stiffly in his deck 
chair, but finally "thawed out," wrote Darling, "under 
Miller's talk and smiled.
CHAPTER TWO
ACROSS SIBERIA
The steamship Penza of the Russian Volunteer Fleet 
nosed into the deep-water harbor of the Golden Horn on the 
morning of May 31, nearing the end of her two-day run across 
the Sea of Japan. The Stevens Mission gathered on deck. A 
misting rain, surprisingly cold for May, was drifting like 
battle smoke around an island fortress at the mouth of the 
harbor; the unmanned guns gaped as the Penza moved quietly 
past. Vladivostok slid into view along the eastern shore of 
the Golden Horn. The city appeared through the drizzle as a 
pencil sketch, building facades smudged across an abrupt 
range of logged-off hills. The tall, white government 
buildings stood out from the surrounding wooden structures. 
Farther up on the hills a number of church domes were strung 
like pearls across the jumbled grey rooftops. Rows of naval 
barracks could be seen on the edge of the city.^
Three lines of railroad tracks, the terminus of the
Trans-Siberian Railway, occupied a bench of land along the
waterfront. The main switchyards were five miles north over
a range of low hills at First River. The Vladivostok train
station, with its great arched doorways and many steeples,
2was the most imposing government building in the city.
Like so much else in Russia, this city was conceived to 
answer the military needs of a far flung empire. Founded in
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1860, two years after the empire acquired the Amur and
Maritime Provinces, Vladivostok, or "Ruler of the East," was
a naval base and a garrison city for the protection of
Russian interests in the Far East. These two new provinces
lay like a talon hooked around the northeastern frontier of
Manchuria. The Maritime Province extended Russia's Pacific
Coast a thousand miles southward, nearly to the Korean
Peninsula. The Golden Horn, at the southernmost tip of the
Maritime Province, gave Russia a fine harbor and an ice-free
port. Soon a trans-Siberian railway had been proposed to
link European Russia with these dominions five thousand
miles to the east, and to open Manchuria to commercial
penetration by the Russians, but the enormous cost had
inhibited construction until the 1890s. Then a German-born
industrialist and minister of finance, Sergei Witte, had
developed a plan for building a railway with foreign
capital, and the Tsar had approved it. The prince imperial
was sent to Vladivostok by sea to lay the first stone of the
railway terminus. "Let a railroad be built across Siberia
in the shortest way possible," read the Tsar's edict. Thus,
on May 12, 1891, imperial Russia had embarked on one of the
3great engineering projects of modern times.
There was a large crowd awaiting the Stevens 
Commission. As the Penza was docking, the American engineers 
were joined on deck by several dozen Russian radicals 
returning from exile in the United States, their passage
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paid by the Provisional Government. It was an ominous sign
of the confusing political cross-currents in Russia that
these returning radicals mistook the commission's reception
for their own, and far from being welcomed ashore, were
interned on the ship. Subsequently they were given the
choice of enlisting immediately in the army and going to the
4front or working on the railway.
The noisy, milling crowd that met the Stevens
Commission was a jumble of three different delegations,
jostling one another for position at the foot of the
gangway. The first to emerge was the local executive
committee of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies,
or Soviet. The garrisoned troops were duly represented; most
of the committee members were soldiers. Their leader, a
stocky, bearded man wearing a rumpled frock coat and a red
arm band, made a brief speech expressing the people's
willingness to accept American assistance. He then
introduced a delegation of three, the military governor, the
mayor and an army general. These men of the old regime were
visibly embarrassed by the ragged reception, but proceeded
to make speeches of their own, before finally introducing
the third delegation, headed by Professor A. N. Mitinskii,
5representative of the Provisional Government in Petrograd.
Mitinskii was accompanied by a group of Americans: J. 
K. Caldwell, the consul in Vladivostok, Lieutenant E. 
Francis Riggs, the military attache to the embassy, and two
interpreters that the ambassador had promised Stevens. Riggs 
and the interpreters had come from the capital on the train 
with Mitinskii. The traffic manager of the government 
railways and the chief engineer of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway were also present. After the exchange of 
formalities Mitinskii whisked the American engineers off to 
their accomodations —  a special train made up of three 
sleepers, a diner, an observation car for Mitinskii and an 
office car for Stevens —  and then to a government boat for 
a tour of the three-mile long harbor, to inspect the 
mountains of freight awaiting rail shipment.
The Russians had made great efforts to move the 
materials along the shore in either direction from the city 
to keep the port facilities functioning. At the south end 
of the Golden Horn Chinese laborers were busily constructing 
godowns —  Oriental warehouses made of light screens —  to 
protect thousands of cotton bales exposed to the weather. 
The baled cotton was being removed from wharves at the north 
end of the bay where many tons of cotton had been destroyed 
by fire. Thousands of drums filled with nitrate fertilizer 
were being moved across the harbor by barge to reduce the 
fire hazard so close to the city. On the central wharves 
where the goods pouring in were still unorganized, enormous 
mounds of crates, drums, rolled barbed wire and steel rails 
were heaped onto barges, which extended out from the shore 
like a great logjam. On the west side of the Golden Horn,
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across the harbor from Vladivostok, the commission found 
sheds overflowing with explosives and artillery shells. 
Some munitions were covered with tarps ? others stood out in 
the rain. Much of this too had been moved away from the 
city after a nitrate fire in March had swept over a wharf 
loaded with munitions. As they circumnavigated the harbor 
the Russian port authorities enumerated the stockpiled 
materials: 34,000 tons of munitions and shells, 18,000 tons 
of explosives, 12,000 tons of copper, 86,000 tons of barbed 
wire, 43,000 tons of phosphates, 42,000 tons of cotton,
80,000 tons of railroad material, 209,000 tons of various 
other materials. As appalling as it was that Vladivostok 
continued to receive valuable shipments which merely piled 
up around the harbor, the commission concluded that this 
state of affairs was not the fault of the local 
administration in the port. The port authorities were doing 
a creditable job contending with the stranded freight. The
7underlying problems were clearly inland.
By the time Lieutenant Riggs briefed Stevens on the 
political situation in Petrograd and the status of his 
mission, Stevens was already growing leary of taking on 
responsibilities for administrating and clearing the port, 
for it was obvious that he could accomplish little at 
Vladivostok if the real bottleneck lay inland along the 
Trans-Siberian. Still, the chairman was curious to know 
where the Provisional Government wanted his commission to
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concentrate its efforts* At the time Riggs had left the 
capital, it seemed that the Ministry of Transport intended 
to give Stevens complete charge of the port's facilities. 
Mitinskii reportedly had word from the Provisional 
Government to accord the Americans "the same rights the 
English enjoy at Bordeaux," but shortly before his departure 
he had admitted that the Anglo-French agreement on Bordeaux 
could not be obtained and consequently the precise terms 
were still undefined. Interpreting the Russian attitude was 
quite difficult. The Russians might be dragging their feet, 
trying to forestall an American presence in Vladivostok. Or 
the Russians could be trying to focus attention on 
Vladivostok to limit the work of the commission to the 
administration of that port. In Riggs' view the Provisional 
Government did not want the commission's advice for the 
Trans-Siberian Railway or the rest of Russia's railways. 
Officially, the Russian authorities in Petrograd were 
persuaded that the congestion in Vladivostok resulted from 
disorganization in the port itself, not from the breakdown 
of operations along the railway. But this interpretation 
accorded too well with the Russians' diplomatic efforts to 
station the Stevens Commission in Vladivostok where they 
hoped it would act as a conduit for locomotive shipments 
from the United States.®
To verify that the railway terminals in the Far East 
were not the source of trouble, the commission went the next
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day to the switchyards at First River. The railway workers 
at Vladivostok loaded the boxcars in the port1s cramped 
yards and delivered them to First River where the trains 
were made up. They were loading as many as 300 boxcars per 
day for shipment out of Vladivostok, whereas only about one 
hundred cars were leaving First River each day. Moreover, 
the tonnage leaving by rail was nearly double the tonnage 
now coming into port. Plainly the port and the yards around 
Vladivostok were not clogging the flow of supplies to 
Russia; the limiting factor was the shortage of locomotives
9and cars that arrived from the west.
The crucial task of making up the trains and giving 
them destinations fell to the Soviet, the representatives of 
the local population. The Soviet's executive committee 
allotted what kinds of material would go west and in what 
quantities. The Soviet decided how far it would honor the 
requests of the Provisional Government, or how much food and 
fertilizer it would send instead of munitions and barbed 
wire. In the context of the revolution and the conduct of 
the war these were profoundly political questions. In June
the Soviet apportioned only about 15% of the boxcars for war
. . 10 supplies.
In their inspection tours and meetings with Mitinskii 
and the local railway officials the Americans found that 
they were dogged by a silent observer from the Soviet. 
Evidently the Soviet wanted to keep closely abreast of
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whatever the Americans proposed. The local population did 
not want an influx of American workers taking away their 
jobs or driving down their wages. There were mounting 
tensions already between the Russians and the large 
population of Chinese, Japanese and Koreans in the city. 
The suspicions of the Soviet reinforced the Americans' views 
that getting involved in the port's administration would be 
unwise. Gibbs wrote in his diary, "We would be certain to 
antagonize someone and to cause misunderstandings and bad 
feelings.
The commission's main concern while in Vladivostok was 
to expedite the construction of a Baldwin Locomotive 
assembly plant at the head of the harbor. The Russians 
planned to build three big houses, each with room for eight 
locomotives. Stevens visited the proposed site on his 
second day in the port. They had selected the site well; it 
had access to deep water berths and floating cranes in the 
harbor, and a tunnel, now being dug with Chinese labor, 
would connect -with the yards at First River. Stevens 
expressed concern that if the work on the tunnel were 
interrupted (there were reports that Russian workmen had 
begun obstructing Chinese labor around the port) the 
locomotive plants would be left high and dry. He also 
wanted assurances that the assembly shops would operate 
twenty-four hours per day. He informed the Russians that 
Baldwin Locomotive wanted to supply forty or fifty men to
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supervise the work of the plants, to which the Russians
agreed. Stevens promised to cable Baldwin for exact
12specifications on the construction of the engine houses.
On their last day in Vladivostok the railroad experts 
went back to First River to inspect a car assembly plant 
that dated from the first year of the war. Most of the 
rolling stock around Vladivostok was imported unassembled 
from the United States. The American cars were twice as long 
as the Russian cars, and one reason the Baldwin locomotives 
were so desirable was that they were bigger than the Russian 
locomotives which, when coupled with the American boxcars, 
had to haul uneconomically small trains. The plant dated 
from the first year of the war. It had been built hastily 
and was poorly laid out. But labor problems explained the 
car plant's low productivity. The Russian workers often put 
down their tools to make political speeches, the officials 
admitted, and production frequently stopped altogether while 
the workers attended meetings. Stevens later described the 
atmosphere at First River as "tense and ominous." To make 
matters worse, the officials themselves showed little 
interest in the Americans' advice. While discussing with 
them plans for expansion, Darling caught the Russians 
winking at each other. Gibbs had an inkling of corruption. 
A local lumber company had contracted to build a new sawmill 
and supply wood for boxcar construction. Gibbs argued that 
the project would divert resources from the hundreds of
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American cars that were already on hand awaiting assembly, 
but gave up when he discerned that there must "be some 
'deal1 on."^
On June 3, a Sunday, the railroad experts awoke to find
Root's ship, the old, converted cruiser U.S.S. Buffalo,
moored in the harbor. It had arrived before dawn, a day
earlier than expected. The day was the Feast of Trinity, an
important holiday, and all the Russian boats in harbor were
festooned with green pine boughs. A number of Chinese
fishing boats hovered around the Buffalo, seeking passengers
to ferry ashore. Due to the holiday and the ship's early
arrival, the Soviet's executive committee had not yet
assembled to receive the second American commission, so Root
14and his men waited on board.
Stanley Washburn now took leave of the railroad 
commission to join Root's party, as Secretary Baker had 
ordered. Stevens decided not to wait for Root to come 
ashore; there was enough confusion between the two missions 
already. Furthermore Professor Mitinskii was anxious to 
keep the railroad commission on schedule? he said it was 
very important that they get to Petrograd ahead of the Root 
Commission. Early in the morning their special train pulled 
out, skirted slowly around the east shore of the Golden 
Horn, and chugged up the first range of hills towards First 
River —  and the 5,800 miles of mountains, desert, taiga and 
steppes that lay beyond.
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In 1917 the Trans-Siberian Railway was in fact a chain 
of five railways from Vladivostok to the Ural Mountains. At 
the Urals, on the eastern rim of the Russian plain, the 
railway forked, one line going due west to Moscow, the other 
heading northwest to Petrograd. Spanning fourteen time zones 
from Vladivostok to Petrograd, the journey normally took ten 
to twelve days by the weekly express, or eighteen to 
twenty-two days on other trains. Even this stupendous 
distance from east to west does not reveal Siberia's 
vastness, for most of the way the railway skirts along 
Siberia's southern edge, crossing several great rivers that 
flow northward for thousands of miles to the Arctic Ocean. 
In 1917 the population of Siberia was limited almost 
entirely to a belt of arable land bordering the railway, and 
even here the marshy ground remains frozen into July. 
Northern latitudes that are habitable in Europe as far east 
as Petrograd turn to frozen wastes as they extend into 
Siberia. Vladivostok is on a latitude a thousand miles south 
of Petrograd. Thus the whole Trans-Siberian Railway, while 
wending north as well as west, contends with a severe winter
climate from one edge of the Eurasian continent to the
_ 15other.
The first leg of the journey was not through Siberia at 
all, but crossed Chinese territory through northern 
Manchuria. This was the Russian-owned Chinese Eastern 
Railway. An alternative route, the Ussuri Railway, followed
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the tortuous valleys of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers around 
the northern frontier of Manchuria, but Russia's possession 
of the Chinese Eastern rendered it unnecessary. This short 
cut through Chinese territory was vital not only to the 
Trans-Siberian Railway but also to Russia's international 
position in the Far East.
China's startling defeat at the hands of the Japanese 
in 1895 had left Vladivostok vulnerable, even after the 
completion of the Trans-Siberian that same year, and the 
Russians had looked for ways to build a direct railway line 
across Manchuria and make it their sphere of influence. In 
1896 the Russians pressured the weak Chinese government to 
accept an agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank, which gave 
the bank rights to construct a railway, in return for a 
defensive treaty. Gradually the Russians established 
complete control within the railway zone through their 
domination of the Russo-Chinese Bank and the Chinese Eastern 
Railway Company, both headquartered in the Manchurian city 
of Harbin. In early 1898 a second agreement arranged for the 
construction of a branch line from Harbin south to Port 
Arthur. This enlarged Russia's sphere of influence in 
Manchuria, and Port Arthur replaced Vladivostok as the home 
port of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Here at Port Arthur the 
Japanese launched their surprise attack on Russia's Far 
Eastern position in 1904. In the peace settlement of 1905 
(mediated by President Theodore Roosevelt at Portsmouth, New
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Hampshire —  a signal of America’s growing economic interest 
in the region) Russia relinquished its hold over Port Arthur 
and the branch line south from Harbin, but maintained 
control of the Chinese Eastern. Vladivostok once again 
became Russia's main naval base in the Far East.
While observing the rich cultivation of the land as 
their train proceeded into Manchuria, George Gibbs pondered 
the latent struggle between Russia and Japan over the region 
and thought it was "explicable." He described in his diary 
the rich, black soil and the crops of soy beans and sorghum 
adjacent to the railway. He saw nomadic Mongolian
tribesmen, the Buriats, driving their herds of cattle north
* . 16 for summer grazing.
The train pulled into Harbin at midday. The commission 
received a hearty welcome from the Russian military 
governor, General Dmitri Horvat, an enormous man with a 
cannonball head and a flowing, white beard. He was 
accompanied by some dignitaries from the Chinese government, 
impressively westernized in their long waistcoats and 
stovepipe hats, and a delegation of Buriat princes dressed 
in their colorful native garb. The commission inspected the 
large shops where most of the locomotives and cars imported 
from the United States were assembled. (Sadly, the American 
equipment had to be unloaded in Vladivostok, hauled by rail 
to Harbin, assembled, and driven back to Vladivostok to pick 
up its first load of westbound materials.) After treating
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the Americans to a sumptuous luncheon at the Chinese Eastern 
Railway Club, Horvat accompanied them on a sidewheel 
steamboat down the Sungari River for an examination of the 
long, girder railway bridge. This took them into the 
Chinese quarter of the city, separate from the large Russian 
colony, which inhabited land leased from the Chinese 
government. The Chinese sector was old, dusty and 
ramshackle. Along the banks of the river immense stocks of 
beans were piled in bags awaiting shipment downriver to the 
Amur. ̂  ̂
Before the commission got under way again Root's train
pulled in behind their own and they could not escape another
banquet and round of formalities. There were many Russian
generals at the Railway Club and Stevens delivered a "fine
speech," praising the operations of the Chinese Eastern.
Thus far the commission had seen nothing to deter such a
judgment. The engineers finally reboarded their train and
in fading light rattled out across the arid reaches of
18central Manchuria.
Early the next morning they crossed a low range of 
mountains. At the summit the track went through a two-mile 
tunnel guarded at each end by stone stockades, garrisoned 
against bandits. Around 1900 Chinese rebels and roving 
bandits had destroyed much of the Chinese Eastern despite 
the presence of thousands of Russian troops, which had been 
sent into Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion. More recently
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the Chinese had had border clashes with the Mongolians,
whose forces were trained and equipped by the Japanese. The
commission's train descended onto a dry, grassy plain dotted
with alkali patches, and rimmed in the distance by blue
hills. They saw caravans of camels, horses, cattle and
19sheep, and the conical tents of nomads.
At dusk they encountered the first congestion along the 
railway. Manchuria Station was a bleak little settlement on 
the Russian border, built around the customs house, a coal 
pit and the empty engine terminal for the Trans-Baikal 
Railway. Here, about 500 loaded boxcars stood abandoned on 
the sidings. Many were the American-type cars apparently 
loaded for the first time and stranded eight months 
earlier. The congestion was due to the junction of the two 
railways; the Trans-Baikal was not keeping up with the 
Chinese Eastern.^
On their third day they traveled through the 
mountainous region to the east of Lake Baikal, following a 
maze of steep, narrow river valleys in thick pine forest. 
The region was sparsely settled; small farms were hewn out 
of the woods and the occasional villages along the railway 
were clusters of log houses. The farming population 
depended largely on the various tributaries of the Amur to 
get its produce out; rail transport was too costly. 
Throughout all of eastern Siberia the only industry whose 
product bore the cost of transport to the markets of
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European Russia was Pacific fishing, although mining
development held promise for the future. Unlike in the
steppe and taiga regions of Siberia that still lay to the
west, the railway through this region had little commercial
use and had not stimulated much immigration. Its
21construction had been heavily subsidized.
The grand scheme of building a railway from ocean to 
ocean, advanced by the finance minister, Witte, had been 
based on more than the military incentive of securing 
Russia’s hold in the Far East. This enormous undertaking in 
the 1890s was one of the underpinnings of Russia's 
state-directed program of rapid industrialization, by which 
Russia sought to catch up with the West in the crucial 
indices of coal and pig iron production and steel 
manufacturing. The construction of the Trans-Siberian 
Railway was financed largely by French loans, which Russia 
repaid through its favorable trade balance, exporting grain, 
timber and other raw materials. Witte believed that 
Russia's trade surplus would be augmented by the growth of 
crops and the exploitation of mineral resources in Siberia 
as the railway went forward; hence it would help to pay for 
itself. The finance minister envisioned a vast scheme for 
the development of Siberia: Russia's industries would profit 
from the raw materials opened up by the railway, and 
Russia's surplus rural population could be induced through 
subsidies to resettle there, in turn creating a new market
22for Russian industry.
Because the Trans-Siberian Railway was driven across a
virtual wilderness, overreaching its commercial usefulness
for the immediate future, it was built with low technical
standards. The few large bridges, such as the one that the
commission inspected at Sungari, were an exception. These
permanent steel bridges, which impressed the Americans, were
built on huge wedge-shaped abutments that pointed upstream
to deflect the ice flows in the spring. (On the Ob and
Yenisei Rivers in central Siberia ferries in the summer and
rails laid across the ice in the winter had sufficed until
after the turn of the century.) Most of the bridges were
wooden, some barely capable of supporting the heavier
American-type locomotives. Besides the primitive bridges,
the commission found the ballasting to be poor in places;
water and coaling stations were crude, and gradients were
excessively steep, especially on the hilly terrain along the
Trans-Baikal Railway. Here they noted some steep 1.7% grades
that limited the freight trains to ten American-type boxcars
for three small 0-4-0 Russian locomotives, two ahead and one 
23pushing.
At Chita, the capital of the province, a rough city of
80,000 mostly oriental inhabitants, the engineers 
encountered the crudest facilities they had yet seen. The 
repair shops were old and poorly laid out, equipped only 
with light tools, a wheel and axle lathe and a small brass
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foundry. The roundhouse lacked cranes or a drop pit and
boiler washing was done with cold water. The facilities
could only perform light repairs. The engine house had all
the broken-down locomotives it could accomodate, while more
24disabled locomotives stood out in the weather.
Just outside Chita the railroad experts inspected a
coal pit. The primitive method of loading coal that they
observed here turned out to be the pattern for the whole
railway. The coal was simply piled on the ground and dumped
into the tender from small buckets that were lifted by a
hand-operated beam see-saw. The locomotives had to be
uncoupled from the train and run some distance off the line
into a coaling yard. The procedure used up two hours.
Darling also noted the poor quality of the brown lignite
coal both at Chita and at the open pit by Manchuria 
25Station.
The rough condition of the railway was in part a
consequence of the adverse terrain and the extreme winter 
temperatures. The water towers at each station along the 
Trans-Baikal were built on stilts with coal fire ovens 
beneath them, while the chutes were enclosed in wooden
tunnels that could be warmed with hot air. The permafrost 
in this section reached a depth of one to six feet. To
minimize the damage from frost heave the railway bed was
constructed of a thick layer of porous sand, and flanked by 
deep drainage ditches. On the soft bed the rails would
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frequently spring off the ties and have to be respiked. In
the summer the sandy roadbed made for a rough and dusty
. 26 ride.
From Chita the Trans-Baikal Railway climbed through
more thickly wooded mountains, followed the Ingoda River for
150 miles, crossed another range and descended into a broad
valley of the Khilok River surrounded by forested hills.
They were close to the divide between the Pacific and Arctic
Oceans. There were many small farms and herds of cattle but
few settlements. Gibbs was quite taken by the scenery and
spent most of the day on the rear platform. Darling was
reminded of the Pacific Northwest from his days with the
Northern Pacific. After another night they woke up along the
precipitous shoreline of Lake Baikal, a 400-mile long,
mile-deep lake. The last seventy miles of the Trans-Baikal
Railway went around the southern end of the lake. Built
along a shelf blasted out of the mountainside about
twenty-five feet above the lake level, it represented a real
feat of engineering, which had cost —  so the American
engineers were told —  about $200,000 per mile. From Lake
Baikal it was a short distance to the city of Irkutsk, the
27administrative center and so-called "Paris" of Siberia.
As the train pulled into the station platform it was 
mobbed by an awesome crowd of undisciplined soldiers, 
ex-convicts, political exiles and traders —  "the roughest 
looking men and women I ever saw," wrote Darling. They were
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only prevented from boarding by the armed guard of ten 
soldiers on Stevens' train. The Americans quickly learned 
that the soldiers all over Russia were boarding trains at 
will, crowding into the compartments, sleeping in the aisles 
or sitting on the roofs. As Darling observed disquietly, 
"The people all along the line believe themselves free and 
that means license." Freedom meant free services, and the 
railways had ceased asking for fares from the armed 
soldiers.
Irkutsk lay across the river from the railway station,
accessible only by a pontoon bridge. Many gaily colored
church domes dominated the old city's skyline. For the
first time since Vladivostok the architecture and people
were predominantly Russian. The local inhabitants wore long
coats, knee boots and sheepskin caps. As in Chita, the
American engineers observed a number of Austrian prisoners
working on the railway. These Austrian soldiers were not
29under guard but mingled freely with the local people.
While their train was recoaling the Root Commission 
arrived. The crowd gathered around the rear platform of 
Root's train where Duncan and Russell, the labor 
representative and the socialist, made speeches proclaiming 
America's enthusiasm for the democratic principles of the 
Russian Revolution. Their speeches received repeated 
applause. Stevens, meanwhile, called on Root. He was riding 
on the ex-Tsar's imperial train, and he showed Stevens the
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30desk at which the Tsar had signed his abdication.
Leaving Irkutsk, the train followed the Angara River
for another forty miles and then climbed out of the valley
onto rolling tablelands. They were entering the taiga —
the vast forest of small white birch and pines that
blanketed central Siberia. This region was spanned by the
Tomsk Railway, another privately owned line that had
received massive government subsidies for construction. The
hummocks and gullies of the taiga had posed special
challenges for the locating engineers, and Darling's
discerning eye found that their results were often poor. As
on the Trans-Baikal Railway, the steep ruling gradient
limited the length of trains to about twelve or fifteen
cars. One forty-two mile section crossed eighty-five
bridges and culverts. Cuttings and embankments were needed
over the whole distance from the Angara River to the Russian
steppe. In June the ground was only beginning to thaw; in
three months it would be marshy to a depth of two or three
feet. The freezing and -thawing played havoc on the rails,
and at the speed that Mitinskii insisted they go, their
. . 31train rocked violently over the bad joints.
About one hundred miles west of Irkutsk they came to 
the Cheremkova coal mines. These mines contained the first 
high-grade coal they had seen. The Russians were loading 
and shipping it out at the rate of about three hundred cars 
per day. This coal was westbound for European Russia. Here
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was a major source of the trouble on the whole
Trans-Siberian: most of the cars and motive power eastbound
from European Russia only got as far as Cheremkova; the
Tomsk Railway only allowed a trickle of cars and locomotives
through to the Trans-Baikal Railway. It was far more
profitable to load them with coal and turn them around. The
implications of this situation began to unfold when the
commission learned that a much bigger coal mine at Taiga, at
the west end of the Tomsk line, was shut down by a labor
strike. Evidently the Taiga mine ordinarily shipped coal
west to European Russia while the Cheremkova mines were the
main supplier of coal to points east. Now the Cheremkova
mines were having to fill the place of the Taiga mine and
ship coal in the other direction, across the length of the 
32Tomsk Railway.
The strike at Taiga was generating supply problems that 
pulsed along the entire length of the Trans-Siberian and 
even beyond the railway situation. For one thing, the 
coal-consuming industries of European Russia had to reach 
nearly a thousand miles deeper into Siberia to obtain their 
fuel. They could ill-afford the increased costs for 
transportation and the resulting shortages. The entire 
pattern of Russian coal production and distribution was 
already severely disrupted by the war. The northern cities 
(Minsk, Riga, Petrograd) had depended upon coal from Poland 
and Britain before August 1914. The German blockade and the
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retreat from Poland cut off these sources, leaving Russia
with just two principal sources of coal, the Donets Basin in
the Ukraine and the Taiga and Cheremkova mines in Siberia.
Increasingly, Russian industries were resorting to coal
33shipped all the way from central Siberia.
The westbound coal traffic from central Siberia
exacerbated another problem. Before the war there were
about ten to fifteen cars daily running between Vladivostok
and European Russia. This represented a balanced exchange of
westbound raw materials for eastbound finished products. In
1917 the cars operating on the Trans-Siberian Railway
numbered in the hundreds, and the imported westbound
materials could not be counterbalanced by eastbound exports
because the high freight rates over the long route made it
impossible. Consequently empty cars had to be hauled east.
As long as the Taiga and Cheremkova mines were shipping coal
east they were not holding up the flow of traffic, but when
they began to ship west to European Russia the coal began
competing for freight space with the stockpiled materials at 
34Vladivostok.
Finally, the shutdown at Taiga disrupted local 
operations on the Tomsk Railway. Ordinarily the Tomsk 
Railway delivered coal from Cheremkova a short distance to 
the Trans-Baikal Railway, and at the other end of the line 
from Taiga to the next line west, the Omsk Railway. Now it 
had the burden of transporting heavy loads of coal across
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almost the whole length of its rolling terrain, about ten 
cars to a locomotive. Thus the Tomsk Railway was not only 
hoarding engines and cars that were coming east from 
European Russia, but the heavy coal trains called for a 
concentration of locomotives, making the Tomsk sector a 
bottleneck for the motive power distributed across 
Siberia.^
Once in Petrograd Stevens would object strenuously to
the situation on the Tomsk Railway, arguing that it was
imperative for the Taiga mine to resume operation. He would
find the government fully aware of the problems associated
with coal traffic over the Tomsk Railway, but unwilling
nevertheless to act. The Provisional Government simply
lacked the political strength to break the strike, or the
revenue to settle it peacefully. The problem just
festered. The commission did not get a firsthand look at
the shutdown mine operation at Taiga. Possibly by design,
3 6their train passed Taiga during the night.
In the morning the commission reached Novo-Nikolaevsk,
an old city built around several big flour mills on the Ob 
River, which carried barges of grain from the rich farmland 
along the river to the south. This was the beginning of the 
steppe and the Omsk Railway. For the next two days, the
seventh and eighth days of their journey, their train raced 
across the flat steppe. The black earth was riddled by
navigable streams. Occasionally their train went through
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marshes where the sky would reel with great flocks of
waterfowl cartwheeling into the air. There were herds of
horses and cattle. This region had received most of the
three million peasants who migrated to Siberia after the
turn of the century. The land's abundance was evident at
all the small station platforms, where the peasants were
selling butter, eggs, bread and cheese. Western Siberia had
become one of the biggest grain-producing areas in Russia.
The land-owning peasants here had actually increased their
crop yield during three years of war, while the great landed
estates in the Ukraine, lacking cheap labor, had
languished. The producers in western Siberia were
relatively insulated from the effects of the blockade, which
had disrupted the Ukraine's normal pattern of exporting its
grain surpluses by way of the Black Sea. In the long run the
army absorbed the food surpluses that Russia had exported
before the war, and the peasants in June 1917 were generally
prospering. Like the production of coal, however, the
movement of grain within Russia was altered by the
blockade. This too increased the strategic importance of
the railway lines reaching into western Siberia,
37particularly the Omsk line.
The Omsk Railway terminated at Ekaterinburg, a city of 
70,000 near the eastern slope of the Ural Mountains. 
Ekaterinburg appeared more European, but the crowd at the 
station was a bizarre mixture of nationalities, from the
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Tartars dressed in their great coats and Astrakhan fur caps,
to the Russian peasants wearing woven grass shoes and
puttees made from gunny sacking, to the many Austrian
3 8prisoners, who looked incongruously prosperous.
Abandoned mining concerns dotting the Ural Mountains
were a prime example of the way railways had transformed the
economic geography of Russia. Once an important region for
iron ore production, mining had declined in the Urals since
the mid-nineteenth century, as the growth of railway lines
had tied Russia's industrial centers to alternative sources
of iron ore and coal in the Ukraine and Poland. The maze of
slow waterways that had borne ore from the Urals to Moscow
39could not compete with the railways.
Russia's dependence on railway transportation had 
evolved in connection with its growth of exports and imports 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and this too 
had momentous consequences when the war began in 1914. As 
the railway lines grew so did the proportion of Russia's 
foreign trade across land frontiers, at the expense largely 
of Russia's overseas trade with Britain. Germany displaced 
Britain as Russia's biggest trading partner, taking a third 
of Russia's exports and supplying nearly half of its imports 
in 1913. The railways in Russia were oriented to support 
this trade pattern. Thus the railways were especially 
vunerable to Germany's economic war on Russia after August 
1914.40
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There were still two more railway lines angling
northwest across the flat Russian plain from the Urals to
the capital, the Perm and the Northern. It took another
three days of fast running, first over open farm country and
then through two days of monotonous pine forest on the
approach to Petrograd. The engines on the Northern Railway
burned wood. Huge piles of chopped wood stood beside the
stations. There were frequent stretches of blackened trees
where sparks from the locomotives had ignited the forest.
At last they reached Petrograd, on the evening of June 13,
41eleven days after leaving Vladivostok.
The scene that greeted the American engineers at 
Nikolai Station was a stark contrast to the abundance that 
they had observed in western Siberia. The platform was
choked with refugees trying to get out of the city. Whole
families were gathered with all their possessions —  chairs, 
rugs, baskets of food and clothing, and their tea kettles —  
waiting days to get a train. Petrograd was starving for
trains. It needed coal for the factories and food for the
hungry population. Twenty percent of the factories here had 
closed down for lack of fuel. Bread lines had grown a block 
long. Since the revolution the capital had been granted a 
meager allowance of forty-six cars per day, mostly for 
freight cars with food. In practice the number of cars 
arriving each day averaged from thirty-two to thirty-six. 
This was barely half of what the city needed to feed
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•4- 14T 42itself.
Soldiers were conspicuous among the throng of people at 
the station. They strutted around wearing their rifles and 
cartridge belts, heeding no one. Having played a vital part 
in the March Revolution, the troops garrisoned in Petrograd 
had received a pledge from the Provisional Government that 
they would not be sent out of the capital; they were the 
guardians of the revolution. Refusing to drill, the 
soldiers milled throughout the city switching companies and 
regiments as they pleased, riding here and there on the 
street cars without paying fares, attending political 
meetings. The only drilling that one saw was that of the 
Workers' Volunteer Association, a militia of factory 
workers.^
Ambassador Francis came the short distance from the 
embassy to the Nikolai Station with his whole staff to greet 
the Stevens Commission. He was a short, stocky man with a 
clipped moustache, small black framed spectacles, and wisps 
of white hair crowning his round head. He and his entourage 
were accompanied by the corpulent minister of transport, N. 
V. Nekrasov, and a delegation of railway officials. Stevens 
read a prepared statement announcing the commission's intent 
to assist the Russian government in railway matters by 
placing at its disposal America's technical skill and 
industrial resources. The Americans were greeted by no 
popular demonstration, however, and they later learned that
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their arrival had not been advertised. Gibbs for one felt
disappointed, believing that the Russians had thrown away an
44opportunity to boost morale.
Following this tepid reception the commission was taken
to its accomodations in the crowded capital, an
embarrassingly shabby hotel near the station called,
ironically, the "Select." Francis apologized for its
character, explaining that the Russians had intended to
lodge them in the Winter Palace, but it was now reserved for
the Root Mission, while the Hotel de 1'Europe was
45overcrowded.
The railroad experts found Francis congenial and deeply 
interested in their mission when they talked with him the 
next day at the embassy. The ambassador, it seemed, 
occupied a rather peculiar position in the diplomatic life 
of Petrograd. Having left his family at home when he took 
the post in early 1916, Francis led a rather secluded life, 
preferring to invite people to the embassy instead of 
calling on the government officials himself at the Tauride 
Palace. Nor did he confer often with the Allied legations. 
In fact before the revolution and the American intervention, 
Francis had been snubbed by the Russian social elite and the 
French and British ambassadors. His liking for late night 
poker games and fine cigars, together with the gilded 
cuspidor which he had brought from the United States and 
toted from room to room at the embassy, made him a real
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oddity in the refined circle of diplomats and ministers of 
state. But since March, his aggressive role in granting 
American recognition of the new government and his pivotal 
role in negotiating loans for the Russians had given him 
greater access to the new leaders in Russia. His poor 
personal relations with Sir George Buchanan and Maurice 
Paleologue, his counterparts at the British and French 
embassies, now turned to his advantage, for the wily 
ambassador cultivated a special relationship between his 
embassy and the Provisional Government, while keeping his 
distance from the Allied embassies, which were conspicuously 
less approving of the March Revolution than were the 
Americans.^
The ambassador's folksy demeanor shined that evening 
when he packed the five railroad commissioners into his Ford 
touring car and took them on a drive along the Neva River. 
For Stevens, it was a chance to observe two Petrograds. One 
was the graceful city of canals, bridges and italianate 
architecture, buildings painted in soft pastels of yellow 
and red and blue, like the colors of the evening in this 
season of the "white nights." This was Russia's "Venice of 
the North," the imperial capital designed in detail by Peter 
the Great two centuries earlier. The other Petrograd was 
the city in revolution, with red banners festooning the 
public buildings, the ubiquitous soldiers, the overcrowding, 
and the shortages of food and fuel. Its population was
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swollen with refugees, army units, and peasants brought in 
to work in the new war industries. On the outskirts of this 
teeming city, where the Neva River approached the Gulf of 
Finland, Francis took the commissioners past rows of
palatial summer homes, boarded up since the revolution. The
(
day was June 14; by the Russians' Julian calendar it was
June 1. By either calendar the short summer of Russian
liberalism was well advanced, and the Stevens Mission had




The breakdown of transportation in Russia was a montage 
of problems produced by the war and revolution, Russia's 
backwardness and the clumsy bureaucracy of the old regime. 
The most fundamental difficulty was simply the inadequacy of 
the Russian rail network. The density of Russia's railway 
lines and the number of locomotives and cars relative to the 
country's expanse were far below that of Germany or France 
or even Austro-Hungary. The enormous strain of supplying an 
army of millions on a thousand-mile front for year after 
year was too much for the Russian railways to bear. From 
1913 to 1917 the volume of material transported by rail 
increased by over 50 percent. The volume of ordinary goods 
fell, while war materiel accounted for about 70 percent of 
rail traffic by 1917. Not only did industry and the urban 
population suffer from the military's domination of rail 
traffic, but the railways themselves were deprived of fuel, 
spare parts, and tools for their maintenance, while factory 
production of new locomotives and rolling stock declined 
after 1915.^
The needs of the military were the most immediate, if 
not the most decisive, source of trouble. When the war 
began, jurisdiction of the railways was divided between the 
Ministry of Transport in Petrograd and the military command
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at General Headquarters. The army took control of the
railways from Petrograd to the front, requisitioning
locomotives and rolling stock and passenger trains to carry
out the vast mobilization of troops along the front.
General Headquarters, or Stavka, lacked the technical
organization to run the railways efficiently and it made up
for its deficiencies by hoarding the cars and locomotives
that crossed into the military zone. Within months the
front became littered with boxcars converted into
bathhouses, laundries, shops and pharmacies. Entire trains
were turned into barracks. These abuses by the army
heightened the critical car shortage facing the Ministry of
2Transport and the railways m  the interior.
In 1915 the Russians conducted a strategic retreat from 
Poland. Stavka's plan was to repeat the scorched-earth 
"great retreat of 1812" and lure the Germans, like Napoleon, 
to their nemesis. Given the massive front, however, the 
historical analogy was absurd: the logistics of retreat were 
more exhausting for Russia than they were to the enemy. The
railways had to evacuate whole factories and warehouses and
thousands of refugees in addition to providing troop 
trains. This was even more burdensome than had been the 
mobilization in 1914. The ensuing shortages in the interior 
caused disruptions in the economy from which imperial Russia 
never recovered. Surpluses of unshipped coal in the Donets 
Basin, for example, drove numerous mines to shut down at the
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very time that Russia was giving up its important coal
fields in Poland. Similarly, the railways could not ship the
grain out of the Ukraine. The retreat from Poland took place
in the summer and fall of 1915, during the harvest. In
peace time the surplus grain in the Ukraine could be carried
by river transport to the Black Sea and exported, but due to
the blockade, this grain had to be shipped by rail to other
parts of Russia. When the railways failed, commercial crop
3production in the Ukraine declined.
In addition to the burden on transportation associated
with the supply of the army, the war disrupted the railways
in another way. The blockade wiped out Russia's trade with
Germany and Austria, and denied Russia its usual trade
routes through the Baltic and Black Seas. Even the material
it could acquire through neutral Sweden was sharply
curtailed, ironically, by the British blockade of Germany.
This left Russia with only two trade routes to the Allies:
Vladivostok and Archangel. Isolation was a vital factor in
the breakdown of transport, for the railways now had to
retrieve Russia's imports from the extremities of the
empire. Not only were the railways carrying more, they were
hauling their loads far greater distances as a result of the
blockade. Adding further to the strain on the railways,
4Russia's imports doubled during the war.
Even Russia's pattern of internal trade was disrupted 
by the blockade. Often the railways had to move goods which
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were formerly carried by sea or river transport. 
Petrograd's need for coal is a prime example. Before the 
war Petrograd consumed about 2,000,000 tons of coal each 
year, mostly from Britain by way of the Baltic Sea. After 
1915 all of Petrograd's coal had to come from the Donets 
Basin in the south. In 1915 it was estimated that 11,625 
coal cars were required to transport the coal from the 
Donets mines, but only 5,185 were supplied. The city was 
allotted 250 car loads each month, but in September 1915 
only forty-one car loads arrived; in October, eight; in
5November, none; and in December, fifty.
If Russia's backwardness, and the extraordinary strain 
produced by the war, were the root causes of the breakdown, 
the whole crisis was sharpened by a legacy of mismanagement 
under the imperial regime in the last half decade before the 
war. It was the scrimping government expenditures on 
locomotives and rolling stock that left Russia with such 
acute shortages by 1917. In 1908 it had come to light that 
the government-owned railways were operating at a loss while 
those under private management were turning a profit. 
Facing mounting criticism, and unwilling to raise passenger 
fares and freight rates, the government had cut back 
purchases of new locomotives and rolling stock. 
Expenditures were cut nearly in half between 1908 and 1910 
and by another third between 1910 and 1912. This had 
unforeseen consequences. While the government-owned
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locomotive works continued to receive orders, many privately 
owned factories were so hard hit by the cutbacks that they 
retooled and turned to other kinds of manufacturing. 
Meanwhile the government went ahead with an ambitious 
program of railway construction, increasing its expenditures 
in this area by about twenty percent in the same five year 
period. The volume of traffic grew at an even faster rate, 
from 78,850,000 tons in 1903 to 131,800,000 tons in 1913. In 
short, fewer locomotives and cars were hauling more goods 
over longer distances. The Ministry of Transport's 
economizing measures were illusory: the government railways 
were simply wearing out the equipment. Meanwhile, the 
ability of Russian industry to replace the locomotives and 
rolling stock was diminishing. When the government woke up 
to the situation in 1913 and reversed its policies, it was 
too late.^
After the March Revolution the railway situation was 
complicated by still another factor. When the tsarist 
government collapsed, the Ministry of Transport's 
centralized control perished with it, and nothing that the 
Provisional Government could do would restore the ministry's 
authority over the railways. On the first day of the 
revolution two railway engineers seized control of the 
Ministry of Transport and sent "Telegram 114" over the 
wires, calling on all railwaymen to form "line committees." 
Only orders made through the line committees were to be
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carried out. The intent was to protect the revolution by
politicizing the railwaymen and forcing the new government
to abide these revolutionary committees. But the line
committees quickly took the form of labor unions, usurping
the powers of the local company or government railway
officials. Instead of representing the interests of the
revolution, the committees represented the railwaymen's
economic interests. They assumed an antagonistic stance
toward the Provisional Government, denying the Ministry of
7Transport control over rail traffic.
The anarchy that spread along the Russian railways 
after the revolution was crucial because it impeded efforts 
at reorganization. The Stevens Mission could only work 
through the Ministry of Transport. Insofar as the revolution 
broke down the centralized administration of the railways, 
it frustrated the Stevens Mission too. Russia's 
transportation problems in 1917 were dire and fundamental, 
but the deterioration of the railways did not seem 
irreversible. The Russians had shown their fortitude in 
constructing over 5,500 miles of new lines during three 
years of war. If the same vigor could be brought to bear on 
the problems of organization and equipment shortages, some 
thought, the situation could be saved. But the collapse of 
centralized control prevented it. That was the significance 
of the line committees: they blocked action by the
government.
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The railwaymen's unions quickly emerged as a powerful 
and independent force. The railway workers were both 
numerous and strategically located. Within weeks of the 
sending of Telegram 114, the line committees began 
organizing one big union, an All-Russian Congress of Railway 
Unions. At its first meeting in April 201 union delegates 
elected an executive committee of fifteen. This group 
became known by its acronym, Vikzhel. Sitting in permanent 
session in Moscow, Vikzhel was able to wield more influence 
over all the Russian railways than its rival, the Ministry
pof Transport in Petrograd.
Even Vikzhel's authority was limited, however. The 
union's sources of strength —  the sheer number of 
railwaymen and the ability of a single line to create havoc 
by interrupting traffic for a few days —  tended to magnify 
the autonomy of local units at every level of its sprawling 
hierarchy. At its base, the union was organized around the 
knots of workers at terminals, repair shops, telegraph 
stations and junctions. Each one formed a local committee 
which acted on immediate issues such as hours and shifts and 
safety standards. The local committees sent delegates to 
the line committees, which exercised control over traffic 
operations. They in turn sent representatives to the 
All-Russian Congress of Railwaymen's Unions in Moscow. In 
practice, this large body in Moscow deferred to its 
executive committee, Vikzhel, but Vikzhel had to allow its
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9constituent organizations wide freedom of action.
Two days after the creation of Vikzhel, the Provisional 
Government had tried to check the process of
decentralization and reestablish some authority over the 
railways. By decree of the government, the Minister of
Transport was authorized to call for "provisional 
supervisory committees" on each line. In matters directly 
affecting the workers, such as wage disputes, the
provisional committees were to arbitrate between the defunct 
private or government management and the line committees. 
On all questions of traffic operation the provisional 
committees were to have full authority. Essentially the
government wanted to repeat the process started by Telegram 
114, this time with the workers' committees looking to 
Petrograd for direction, instead of to Vikzhel in Moscow. 
The government attempted to appease both the line committees 
and the private railway companies, admitting on one side 
that the workers were in control of the railways, while 
trying on the other side to resuscitate some company input. 
The provisional committees took hold only on some railway 
lines and with negligible results. The whole scheme 
revealed the timidity of the Provisional Government. In June 
the Ministry of Transport tried to mitigate its defeat with 
another circular; now it officially sanctioned the authority 
of Vikzhel and the line committees to control traffic 
operations. The provisional committees were quietly
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abandoned. When the private railway companies objected, the 
minister of transport responded by making a meaningless 
distinction between operation and administration, which he 
assured them was still in the hands of private management.^ 
Consistent with its reluctance to antagonize the
railwaymen's union, the Provisional Government downplayed 
the disorganization of the railways and stressed instead the 
need for locomotives and rolling stock. Reorganization
entailed an exertion of centralized authority which the 
Ministry of Transport simply did not possess, whereas more 
locomotives and cars would improve the capacity of the 
railways without involving any confrontation with labor. In 
presenting their case to the United States, the new leaders 
in the Ministry of Transport blamed the crisis on the 
short-sighted policies of the tsarist regime before the 
war. Their interpretation of the transportation crisis 
offered a simple and appealing solution: if American
industry could supply Russia's deficit of locomotives and
rolling stock, Russia's railways could be revived. Their
chief spokesman was George V. Lomonosov, a distinguished 
engineer who headed a Russian Railway Mission to the United 
States. The mission was sent to expedite the Russians' 
locomotive orders, and Lomonosov energetically publicized 
the Provisional Government's position. Russia needed 
"locomotives, locomotives and still more locomotives," he 
told his audiences. "Quite frankly, I say to you, our
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American friends, give us locomotives and we shall give you 
military success." Lomonosov's appealing formula was 
endorsed by the American press, for it not only promised 
victory, it held out the alluring prospect of an enormous 
market for American manufacturers.^^
The Wilson Administration was not so easily persuaded.
Aware that Russia's railway problems were complex, Wilson
sent the Stevens Mission to get firsthand knowledge of the
situation. Similarly, Lansing emphasized the fact-finding
purpose of the Root Mission. The Provisional Government
could not long conceal its weakness from the two American
missions. As the Stevens Mission began forming a different
view of the railway situation, the administration naturally
grew skeptical of the Russians' incessant call for
locomotives, and it soon recognized the inability of the
12Provisional Government to shape railway policy.
It would be misleading to characterize the weakness of 
the Provisional Government primarily as a failure to 
discipline the burgeoning union movement. Indeed, the 
railway unions were unique among the many unions that formed 
suddenly in 1917; all other trade unions were overshadowed 
by the rise of worker committees organized at the factory 
level, and even more by the formation of soviets in each 
community. The soviets represented the toilers of Russia, 
and though they brought together a spectrum of political 
parties, they were nevertheless imbued with a socialist
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vision at odds with the liberal vision of the Provisional
Government's ministers. Ostensibly the soviets were
represented collectively by the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets, but the Petrograd Soviet quickly emerged as the
13leader of soviet Russia.
In the early months of the revolution the Petrograd 
Soviet was dominated by moderate socialists. The 
doctrinaire Marxists among them argued that Russia could not 
progress immediately from its "feudal" state under the Tsar 
to socialism, that Russia must be governed for a time by a 
liberal capitalist regime; hence the Petrograd Soviet 
decided on the rather anomylous course of supporting the 
rule of its class enemies in the Provisional Government. 
This was the origin of the so-called "dual power" in Russia 
in 1917. The Provisional Government's authority was 
increasingly held in check by the Petrograd Soviet, for the 
latter really held the support of the masses. The most 
dramatic demonstration of this fact followed the Soviet's 
Order Number One, which instructed all units of the Russian 
Army to form revolutionary committees and obey the Soviet's 
orders ahead of those of the Provisional Government. Like 
Telegram 114 to the railwaymen, it was aimed at swiftly 
breaking up the old order to secure the revolution. By 
politicizing the soldiers and undermining discipline, it 
acted as a solvent on the army. As one member of the Soviet 
later explained it, the revolution had to destroy the old
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army, or the latter would have destroyed the revolution.
Order Number One succeeded in winning the allegiance of the
soldiers to the Soviet, thus swinging the balance of
political power behind the Petrograd Soviet instead of the
14Provisional Government.
While the Petrograd Soviet was reluctant to undertake 
the enormous tasks of governing Russia and waging the war, 
it soon became embroiled in a contest with the Provisional 
Government over direction of Russia's foreign policy, 
specifically the aims of the war. The war aims question 
became a vital international issue of the year 1917, forcing 
itself again and again into the relations between the 
Allies, disrupting the politics of Russia and threatening 
the internal stability of Britain and France. Although the 
war aims question did not affect directly the program of 
American railroad assistance to Russia, it was so crucial to 
Wilson's diplomacy with Russia and the other Allies, as well 
as to the course of the Russian Revolution, that it is 
necessary to sketch its development to provide some 
context.^
In late March the Soviet took a bold step in announcing 
to the world "that the time has come to start a decisive 
struggle against the grasping ambitions of the Governments 
of all countries; the time has come for the people to take 
into their own hands the decision of the question of war or 
peace." This was not only a challenge to the belligerent
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governments and their peoples, but more directly, an answer
to the Russian foreign minister's pledge one week earlier
that Russia would "sacredly observe the alliance" and
16"unswervingly carry out the agreements."
The question of war aims was already simmering, in part 
because of Wilson's attempt to mediate an end to the war in 
January by appealing to both the Allies and the Central 
Powers to state their terms. The war was a bloody 
stalemate, a holocaust, with seven million dead already and 
no end in sight. The war aims of the belligerents, many now 
thought, would determine how long this nightmare would go 
on; they must be made public. Therefore when the Petrograd 
Soviet and the Provisional Government began to vie with one 
another in formulating Russia's war aims —  and, by 
implication, its terms for peace with Germany —  the world 
listened with rapt attention. Initially two main positions 
developed. One side called for full support of the Allied 
cause, believing that the revolution could only succeed if 
Russia sided with the democracies against German autocracy. 
The other side argued that the imperialist causes and aims 
of the war were incompatible with Russia's democratic 
revolution, and furthermore Russia's exhaustion from the war 
was a worse threat to the success of the revolution; Russia 
must seek a negotiated peace through a revision of war 
aims. Their formula was a renunciation of imperialism: "no 
annexations and no indemnities." Not until V. I. Lenin
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returned from exile in the famous sealed train and announced
his "April Theses" did the Bolsheviks inject another
discordant note into the national debate. Lenin argued that
the imperialist war must be turned into class war throughout
Europe. The Bolsheviks must- take power in Russia, publish
the secret treaties, and incite the proletariat against its
imperialist governments. In order to seize power, Lenin
said, the Bolsheviks must first obtain a majority in the
Petrograd Soviet. Henceforth the Bolsheviks steadily
increased their representation in the Soviet by promising
peace and chopping away at the popular support of the
moderates, or "revolutionary defensists," who wanted a
17negotiated settlement.
The contest between the Provisional Government and the 
Soviet over the direction of foreign policy came to a head 
in early May when Foreign Minister Paul Miliukov published a 
note to the Allies assuring them that Russia would abide by 
all previous agreements. It was widely construed that 
Miliukov still coveted Russian control of the Turkish 
straits, an open breach of the Soviet's formula of "no 
annexations, no indemnities." Demonstrations erupted in the 
streets of the capital and the crisis was not ended until 
Miliukov had resigned and the Socialists were persuaded to 
form a coalition government with the liberals' Cadet party. 
The dominant member of the new government was Alexander 
Kerensky, a nominal socialist but a leading advocate of the
Allied cause. As the new Minister of War, Kerensky thought
he could rally the disspirited soldiers at the front with
his patriotic oratory and revive the war effort. The new
foreign minister was M. I. Tereshchenko, the former finance
minister who had negotiated the first $100,000,000 loan with
Francis in April. Together with Minister of Transport
Nekrasov the three young men, all in their early thirties,
formed an unofficial triumverate. While the coalition
government reflected a limited achievement of national
unity, the Bolsheviks, protesting that only six ministries
had been given to the socialists, immediately raised the
18divisive cry, "Down with the ten capitalist ministers."
This was the government that the Stevens Mission 
encountered in June. Nekrasov was absorbed in coalition 
politics and had little time for the Americans. He had 
played a key role in defusing the Miliukov crisis, 
negotiating a compromise rebuttal of Miliukov's foreign 
policy statement with a leader in the Soviet. The engineers 
would frequently find their conferences with him cut short 
when the minister rushed off to attend cabinet meetings. It 
was rumored that the commission had arrived just in time to 
save Nekrasov his job (explaining Mitinskii's haste in 
getting the Americans to Petrograd ahead of the Root 
Mission) yet Nekrasov seemed to regard the Americans mainly 
as a nuisance. Despite his initial charm and consideration 
for their work, they found him "long on promises and short
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on performance." An American journalist in Petrograd who
knew the work of the commission was less charitable,
describing Nekrasov as a "big, fat rosy-cheeked man" whose
"skill in wire-pulling was his sole qualification to become
a Minister. He didn't know his work, and his unreliability
was a scandal." Nekrasov had been a civil engineer and a
professor at Tomsk University prior to his involvement in 
19the Duma.
Nekrasov introduced the commission to the large staff 
at the Railway Department, which occupied a row of
government buildings along the Fontanka Canal. Here the 
American railroad experts came each morning to meet with the 
officials, to gather data and to compile their specialized 
reports. Their meetings with the Russians throughout June 
involved awkward, technical discussions through 
interpreters. Their work was slowed by the necessity of 
translating all the data —  versts into miles, poods into 
tons, Russian into English. They experienced frustrating 
delays from having to telegraph outlying areas for
information. The Americans found that their Russian
colleagues, all graduates of polytechnic colleges, were
overly sensitive to criticism; to get results they were
. . . 20obliged to mix praise with criticism.
Shortly after his arrival, Stevens became seriously ill 
from blood poisoning and had to enter the hospital. From 
his hospital bed he kept abreast of the commission's
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progress, while Miller took over as acting chairman. Miller
described to Stevens the long, hot meetings in which the
Russian officials continually steered them onto the most
minute details. When Francis visited Stevens, he found the
engineer very impatient to leave the hospital and assume
direction of the meetings. Stevens told the ambassador that
Miller was allowing their mission to drift; moreover he
sensed that Miller's abrupt manner was antagonizing the 
21Russians.
Stevens was right. Even in its meetings with Nekrasov
the commission was getting nowhere. Tension was running
high. Gibbs wrote angrily in his diary, "The Russian is the
greatest talker on earth and prefers to conduct even the
simplest inquiry in Committee [where] most matters get
talked to death, rather than acted upon." Gibbs later
decided that valuable time in June had been squandered
because the commission failed to apply itself forcefully to
the few major problems that needed urgent attention.
Instead, expecting more cooperation from the Russians, it
dissipated its energy on an array of recommendations large 
22and small.
In late June after a week of consultations, the 
engineers' recommendations began to fly like sparks from a 
welding torch. Gibbs made recommendations for the 
maintenance of locomotives and rolling stock. He proposed 
curtailing the production of passenger cars and converting
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the assembly lines into repair shops for the existing
freight cars. Repair shops had to be equipped for heavy
repairs, stocked with spare parts and bar iron and steel and
operated twenty-four hours a day. Ash pits should be dug
for the replacement of axles wherever the facilities lacked
cranes. Excessive tire wear on the engines had to be
remedied before winter. Gibbs estimated that the United
States needed to supply two thousand locomotives just to
replace the motive power that was on its way out of 
23service.
Miller sought to introduce American methods of
operation. On American railroads an engine crew turned over
the train to the next crew at the end of its shift and the
train continued. But on the Russian railways a crew stayed
with its own locomotive. An engine made short runs and
frequent turn arounds to conform to the working hours of its
crew. The loaded boxcars were unhitched from the engine and
picked up, it was hoped, by the next engine. The only
advantage of this system was that each crew took a keen
interest in the maintenance of its own engine. But the
turnarounds wasted time, whole trains of cars could be
abandoned, and engine crews occassionally could find no
cars, not even empties, for the return run. When the engine
was in the repair shops the crew was idle, and if the crew
24was sick the engine was taken out of service.
Despite the telegraph wires running the whole length of
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the line, there were no dispatchers or telephone operators; 
in fact Miller discovered there was virtually no operating 
department on the Trans-Siberian. An engine crew merely set 
out on its own, and though it had to try to conform to a 
time schedule, the train's rights on the railway were 
governed by the conductors and engineers. Miller proposed a 
complete reorganization of the methods of operation. Each 
railway line would be segmented into new divisions and each 
division would be furnished with all the personnel required 
for the American method of train dispatching: a division
superintendent, a dispatcher, train masters, travelling 
engineers, master mechanics and a telephone expert. 
Locomotives and crews would be pooled so that engine runs 
could be increased, in fact doubled, to the 300-mile length 
of a division. Miller estimated that the longer engine runs 
alone would increase the capacity of the railway by fifty 
percent.^
The commission believed that the capacity of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway could also be increased by upgrading 
the coaling and water stations. Wherever the mechanized 
coaling stations were missing their trolleys or pulleys, or 
the water tanks had broken pipes or lacked water cranes, 
these parts could be supplied by the United States. In 
addition the United States could send one mobile crane for 
each division for the removal of derailed cars. Stevens 
thought of the derelict cranes and locomotives along the
84
Panama Canal and cabled Willard that they should be donated
to the Russians to dispell suspicions that the Americans
were "trying to work off [a] lot [of] second rate material
2 6at high prices. Our Government can afford to do this."
Stevens thought of himself as a kind of purchasing
agent for the Russian government. He knew that his
recommendations would take precedence over the inflated
locomotive orders that the Provisional Government had placed
through its agent in New York. Stevens thought he could use
his huge, impending equipment order as a carrot to get the
Ministry of Transport to make organizational changes on the
railway. He worried that the Root Mission, if it touched on
the railway situation at all, would undercut his authority
and hamper his mission. He was perturbed, therefore, when
Root inquired about speeding up Russian orders by shipping
locomotives already in stock. Stevens replied that it was
"wholly impracticable," because converting them to the
Russian gauge was too difficult. He told Root that the
Wilson Administration would not be placing any locomotive
orders until his commission had made its recommendations.
Nekrasov had asked them to inspect the railways in the
Ukraine, and the commission would not be making its
recommendations until it had completed this tour.
27Meanwhile, he did not want Root interfering.
Stevens' carrot and stick approach did not work. The 
Russian officials responded to the commission's
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recommendations in an eight-page report on June 30. Its
contents were disappointing. On all questions of material
improvements the railway officials consented from the
standpoint of "technical realization only?" they left
pending the crucial matter of funding the purchases, and
Stevens was unable to place the orders. When pressed by the
Americans, they explained that the financial question was
beyond their scope, but they would submit the proposals to
Nekrasov for his consideration, and report in a week. On
the important matter of lengthening the engine runs, the
commission was completely stymied. Only the day before,
Nekrasov had indicated that the plan would be put into
effect at once, and the number of engine terminals would be
reduced from seventy to thirty-eight. Now the Russians
claimed that the short engine runs were necessary due to the
poor condition of the locomotives. They proposed that the
new divisions should be instituted after the arrival of the
American engines. This seemed like a smoke screen? the
Railway Department was afraid that the engine crews did not
2 8want to be separated from their engines.
Deeply disappointed by this report, Stevens concluded 
that their failure was a result of meddling by members of 
the Root Mission: evidently the Russians thought they could 
get the locomotives and cars without adopting any of the 
commission's recommendations. The next day, Stevens wrote 
an angry letter to Root, accusing him of interfering in
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transportation matters and undermining the railroad
commission's abilities to make improvements on the
Trans-Siberian. Non-interference was "the one and only thing
I asked assurance of from President Wilson," Stevens wrote
bitterly. "These are matters which must be handled with a
great deal of diplomacy and so far, I can say with a great
deal of confidence, the Commission has been handling them
very successfully." He warned, "Any attempted interference
by any other commission or member of any other commission
29would be a serious handicap" to the railroad commission.
The next day Stevens left the hospital to consult with 
the others on what was to be done. Valuable time had been 
lost, and they had only stirred up resistance from the 
officials at the Railway Department. The commission needed 
to galvanize the Russian officials and get some commitment 
from Washington. They decided not to wait for their 
inspection of the railways in the Ukraine to make 
recommendations for equipment purchases. Stevens drafted a 
message to Willard: "This whole nation [is] imbued with the 
one idea that additional engines and cars are necessary. 
[It is] expedient for moral effect [that] action be 
taken...." The next day he cabled Washington urging the 
government to order 40,000 freight cars and 2,00 0 
locomotives for Russia. In addition, he wanted 500 
locomotives sent specifically for the removal of the 
stockpiles from Vladivostok to Omsk. On July 4 Stevens
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announced these recommendations in a speech to the public. 
He cabled Willard through the State Department, "A prompt 
confirmation of this program by our government is vital to 
the Allied cause and the aims of the Commission. Answer. 
Stevens.1 ̂
It is not clear what member of the Root Mission, if
any, infringed on the responsibilities of the railroad
commission. Stanley Washburn was deeply concerned about the
deterioration of rail transport. When one Russian minister
asked him what he thought was the biggest danger to Russian
democracy, Washburn reportedly gestured out the window at a
bread line and said that the people, if they were still
going hungry in the winter, would ruin the democracy.
Russia had to get food to the cities. In July, Washburn
wrote letters to Baker, Willard, Lansing and Senator Hiram
Johnson, suggesting that the United States prepare a big
relief effort, sending food trucks into the Russian cities
31with "American Relief for Russia" painted on their sides.
Propaganda was the chief concern of the Root Mission. 
All members of the Root Mission were struck by the depth of 
the Russian people's disillusionment with the war and the 
demoralizing effect of German propaganda, which portrayed 
the Russian soldier as cannon fodder for the British. They 
were alarmed also by the ineffectiveness of their own 
efforts to publicize America's friendship and Wilson's 
liberal aims in the war. Root was making three and four
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speeches each day but they were not getting into the
newspapers; the mission was not reaching the Russian
people. Ironically, the most press coverage that Root
received was reportedly funded by German propaganda;
American political cartoons depicting him as the friend of
32Wall Street were reprinted in numerous leftist newspapers.
Washburn and Root agreed that an American propaganda
offensive was the best means of improving the situation in
Russia, more vital, perhaps, than railroad assistance. When
they visited Stavka, Washburn explained his plan to General
Brusilov, the commander-in-chief. The Americans would
circulate eight or ten motion picture crews behind the
front, accompanied by lectures and handbills describing the
United States' great industrial resources. Brusilov was
receptive. Upon returning to Petrograd, Root dispatched his
plan to Lansing, warning him that the soldiers in the
trenches, not the government, would decide finally whether
Russia would stay in the war. He thought the motion picture
33campaign would cost $5,000,000.
Both Stevens and Root were frustrated not to receive 
prompt endorsements of their requests from Washington. Nor 
were they informed why. To Root, Lansing said only that the 
State Department was studying the matter. Disappointed that 
he could not appoint a head of "publicity" in Russia and set 
his plan in motion, Root left Petrograd with his commission 
on July 8, intending to take his urgent case for propaganda
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directly to the President. Stevens was not told of the
status of his locomotive orders until July 14, when Willard
informed him that 500 locomotives and 10,000 cars had been
ordered. This was the amount that the Russians had
requested in May, and constituted only a quarter of the
amount Stevens had recommended. The other 1,500 locomotives
and 30,000 cars were "under consideration." Willard did not
even acknowledge the additional request for 500 locomotives
for the Trans-Siberian Railway. Moreover, Baldwin
Locomotive's new engine shops that Stevens had inspected in
Vladivostok might be unnecessary if the rest of the order
34was not filled.
Before receiving word of this disappointing setback, 
however, the commission set out on its inspection of the 
railways in the Ukraine. Stevens had not yet shaken his 
illness and reentered the hospital. The other four 
commissioners departed on July 5. Their route took them 
first to Moscow, the hub of Russia's rail net in the north, 
then on south to the coal producing region of the Donets 
Basin, and north again by way of Kiev and Mogilev for a 
visit to Stavka, which Washburn had arranged for them. At 
the time of their tour Russia was launching its much 
heralded offensive. In the Ukraine the engineers saw train 
loads of soldiers bound for the front. Their morale was 
high. They rode in boxcars strung with decorative pine 
boughs, and stood in the open doorways cheering the
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commission's train as it passed. At one station they met a
train of Ukrainian soldiers, who got off to gather around
the rear platform of the commission's train and cheer the
Americans. These soldiers carried banners that proclaimed
"Forward for Freedom of the Land!" and "Forward in the Name
of Peace and the Union of People for the Destruction of
Militarism!" This revolutionary ardor and patriotism was not
limited to the fresh recruits going to the front; at one
stop the commission was welcomed by a delegation of
railwaymen who offered the engineers flour and sugar as a
35token of their gratitude for American assistance.
The commissioners found other reasons to feel 
encouraged during their tour of the Ukrainian railways. 
Traveling on government-owned railways, the engineers were 
impressed by the condition of the facilities and the 
equipment. These lines were divided into divisions and were 
well-provided with repair shops and coaling stations. In 
Moscow an ambitiously conceived belt line around the city 
eliminated all congestion. Gibbs described one complex of 
repair shops on the North Donets Railway, built in 1916, as 
the "finest railway shops in Russia." Between Kiev and 
Mogilev they took a newly constructed line that paralleled 
the front. Though some of it was double-tracked, the second 
line was incomplete for lack of rails. Between Kursk and 
Kiev they traveled through one of the richest wheat 
producing areas in the world, the black earth region of
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southern Ukraine. This sea of grain was ready for harvest
and it seemed to Gibbs that Russia had "plenty of food in
4_ ..36 prospect.
The coal mines were another matter. The Donets mines
produced a high grade of coal, but the mining techniques
were far less mechanized than in the United States.
Production was limited by shortages of metal carts and
timbers for reinforcing the coal pits. The miners were
frequently striking for higher wages. Other mines were
closed by management because production costs had doubled
since the beginning of the war. Still, there were mountains
of coal awaiting shipment to the north. Less than a third
37of the coal mined in the Donets Basin was being shipped.
Approaching Kiev, the commission passed several Red
Cross trains bearing sick and wounded back from the front.
Though it was not yet publicized, the July Offensive had
already been stopped, ominously, after an advance of just
twenty miles. All the hopes for the offensive were pinned
on a change of spirit in the army as it took the initiative;
this had failed to happen. The encroaching military
catastrophe would have grave repercussions both for the
Provisonal Government and the railways, and it was a strange
coincidence that the Americans were forming their rather
hopeful impression on the very eve of this debacle; their
estimation of the situation here would be quickly overtaken 
38by events.
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The initial attack on July 1 had gone forward only
after a colossal artillery barrage (with big guns supplied
by the Allies that spring) had driven the enemy out of its
fixed positions. Even then regular units had to be led by
hand-picked "shock battalions" of patriotic- volunteers who
had been culled from the ranks in June. The shock battalions
were wiped out in the first two days of fighting while the
mass of soldiers following behind, finding the enemy
trenches too smashed up to hold securely against a
counterattack, turned back in whole regiments. The small
gains were achieved only because Brusilov had amassed an
overwhelming numerical superiority of troops. When the
commission arrived in Mogilev on July 11, they found the
General Staff in a state of nervous excitement, wondering
how long before German reinforcements would be brought up to
counterattack. The offensive had killed off the only
reliable men in the army. Holding the new positions were a
mass of undisciplined soldiers, most of them without unit
39designations or officers.
The small city of Mogilev occupied some bluffs 
overlooking the Dnieper River. A delegation of officers met 
the commissioners at the station and took them by motorcade 
to Brusilov's headquarters, which occupied a castle at the 
center of the city. Stevens had recovered, and had arrived 
from Petrograd ahead of them. Brusilov, though busy 
conducting the offensive, received them courteously. The
93
general had entertained little hope for the success of the 
offensive and approached his work with quiet fatalism. But 
to the Americans he spoke bravely of the Russian army's 
advance and suggested that the reconstruction of the 
railways in the recovered territory would be an urgent task 
for the military. He asked the commission to discuss with
his staff the means of improving transportation in the
• t -4. 40military zone.
In the railway car of the adjutant general the Russian 
officers plied the engineers with maps showing the railway 
lines behind enemy lines which they expected to recapture. 
They handed over lists of equipment and railway supplies 
that the army needed. One repair shop that they wanted to 
build would occupy a site that still lay one hundred miles 
behind the Austrian lines! The commissioners were
flabbergasted by these generals' detachment from the supply 
problems in the interior. Stevens recalled that they asked 
for "some wholly impossible things," including an immediate 
shipment of American locomotives. Gibbs found their
requests "staggering" and likened the generals to children 
"waiting to be fed." They pressed lists of necessary
supplies on Stevens for him to convey to the Provisional 
Government —  everything from medical supplies to artillery 
pieces. When Stevens suggested that Darling stay behind to 
supervise railway construction in the wake of the offensive, 
the generals politely refused. As one Russian explained to
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them the next day, "Things were happening there that they
did not care to have advertised, especially the action of 
41the soldiers."
An unfortunate incident occurred on their return trip 
to Petrograd. At Vitebsk, Stevens was speaking to the crowd 
of soldiers at the station when two men boarded the forward 
car with the conductor. Stevens sent his interpreter to 
investigate and learned that it was Paul Miliukov, the 
discredited Cadet foreign minister, with an assistant, 
trying to get back to the capital. As the train was leaving 
the station, Miliukov's assistant made a speech from the 
car's platform in favor of the Cadet party. Stevens did not 
want to give the impression in Petrograd that the railroad 
commission supported the Cadet party, much less the 
imperialist war aims associated with Miliukov's name. The 
prudent thing to do, he thought, was to ask Miliukov to ride 
in the forward car under the auspices of the conductor and 
the train's crew. But the crew would have none of it? they 
stopped the train in a small town at midnight and put the 
former foreign minister off the train. It was a sign of the
deepening of the revolution that this man had become a
. . 42dangerous liability.
In Petrograd the atmosphere had grown tense as word 
filtered back from the front that Brusilov's offensive had 
failed to kindle patriotism in the ranks of the army. The 
Left Socialists in the Soviet were now demanding a socialist
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majority in the cabinet, while the Cadet ministers were 
threatening to resign. Returning to work at the Railway 
Department, the American engineers found the Russian railway 
officials deeply disturbed by the impending political 
crisis. Two Russian engineers who were appointed to oversee
changes on the Trans-Siberian Railway suddenly resigned, and
. . 43a third attempted suicide.
The city had grown leaner too. Bread lines were longer
and restaurants were boarded up. Even the American
engineers were becoming preoccupied with finding enough to
eat. They had all lost weight. Most meat they could find
was tainted, the vegetables were old, the staple, black
bread was "one of the horrors of the war." Gibbs kept a
prized bag of oatmeal in his hotel room. On their second
morning back in Petrograd they woke up to find the hotel
staff on strike. While foraging in the hotel kitchen Gibbs
and the commission's disbursing officer got into a scuffle
with three striking hotel porters. The quiet city seemed
44about to explode, and the tension was wearing on everyone.
On July 16 the political crisis erupted. All the Cadet 
ministers resigned, and Kerensky refused to organize a new 
cabinet unless he was given a free hand to choose men from 
all parties. The next day rioting began. After a brief 
foray to the Railway Department the commissioners returned 
to their hotel. From their upstairs windows they observed 
armored cars and trucks with machine guns mounted on them
96
driving up and down the street. Groups of soldiers passed
under the windows but it was unclear whether they were
Bolshevik or loyal to the government. During the night
there was an exchange of rifle fire outside the hotel, while
in the distance, blaring car horns answered the sputter of
machine guns. In the morning the streets were quiet, but in
the early afternoon the shooting started again. The
American engineers were largely confined to their hotel. On
the third day of fighting they had to forego a much
anticipated meal at the embassy. There was a fierce
skirmish between the rioters and Cossacks near the American
embassy that evening, and in the morning, as Gibbs walked to
the embassy, he saw twenty-six dead horses dragged from a
street intersection. Finally, Kerensky resorted to loyal
troops from outside the capital. The troops recaptured the
insurgents' stronghold at the Peter and Paul Fortress, and
after some last, desultory gunfire around the Winter Palace
45that evening, the rebellion had ended.
The commission's work was suspended through the 
rebellion, and when it was over they learned that A. 
Liverovskii had replaced Nekrasov as minister of transport 
in Kerensky's new cabinet. He was a stout, middle-aged man 
with a waxed moustache. Stevens found him cordial, and 
hoped that he would be more cooperative than his 
predecessor. The commission submitted a comprehensive list 
of proposals for the lines in the Ukraine and across
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Siberia. While focusing on the two crucial matters of
redirecting coal traffic in Siberia and lengthening engine
runs, the report included all the commission's minor
recommendations as well. Liverovskii requested a few days
46to look them over.
When the commission met with the Railway Department 
five days later on July 24, it quickly became apparent that 
the new minister was using the same dilatory tactics as 
Nekrasov. The Americans realized too late their mistake in 
submitting the whole report instead of the two items that 
most mattered. For three days the commission found itself 
engaged in wearisome discussions over water stations, 
clinker pits, coal and wood chutes. The time for discussing 
these details had long since passed. At the front, the army 
had begun to break up? soon whole regiments of deserters 
commandeered trains, jamming the railways. In Siberia, the 
capacity of the railway, according to one report, had 
dropped in half since the commission's inspection in June. 
In the cities, food and fuel shortages were becoming acute. 
Rampant inflation deterred peasants from selling their 
grain. Yet Stevens endured these fruitless meetings,
probably because he was trying still another tack in his
. . 47"diplomacy" with the new minister.
Invited to a dinner at the Ministry on the night of
July 24, Stevens delivered an ebullient speech praising the
abilities of the Russian engineers. The Americans had not
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come to Russia to teach them anything, the chairman said, 
only to help in any way they could with the war effort. The 
Russian engineers were, if anything, superior in technical 
training to their American colleagues. Darling was amused 
by this spectacle. He reported "uproarious cheering," and
recalled that for half an hour after the speech Stevens and
48the Russians took turns in lavishing praise on each other.
Gibbs, however, felt discouraged. He had begun 
thinking that their mission was "about finished;" it was 
useless and undignified to carry the work any further. 
After the third day of grueling discussions at the Railway 
Department, Gibbs submitted an angry letter to the chairman, 
asserting that the commission had become sidetracked by all 
these long-term improvements. Upgrading the facilities 
along the Trans-Siberian Railway would not influence the 
Russian war effort, Gibbs maintained, so it was not their 
concern. The President, Gibbs reminded Stevens, had not 
intended the commission to demand action on its 
recommendations. As for the reorganization of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway with American personnel, Gibbs did 
not think it would happen. "After the present protracted 
talking match between the engineers and ourselves is over, 
matters must go higher up," he wrote, where all the 
recommendations bearing on labor conditions would be
rejected for one technicality or another. Gibbs believed
49the commission had done all it could and ought to go home.
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As if to drive home the point of Gibbs' letter, the
Russians gave Stevens an 18-page report the next day
enumerating forty items that the commission and the Railway
Department had hashed out over the past three days. With
only slight modifications the Russians consented to all the
points except items number three and nineteen. These two
items, tucked discreetly away among all the other items of
general accord, concerned the two crucial matters of coal
50traffic on the Tomsk Railway and longer engine runs!
Meanwhile, aftershocks from the political upheaval in 
mid-July were still rumbling through the cabinet. 
Liverovskii stepped down from the Ministry of Transport and 
K. N. Vanifantiev took his place. Darling brooded in his 
diary, "We no sooner get in with one minister than he is out 
and another comes in; we cannot seem to get them started on 
the Vladivostok stuff; we have shown them how but they don't 
start.
Gibbs was fed up with Stevens as well as with the
Railway Department. Since their arrival in Petrograd he had
found the chairman rather imperious. Gibbs discovered an
ally in Francis, who was increasingly jealous of Stevens'
assignment in Russia. Francis questioned Stevens' tact with
the Russians, and once complained to Gibbs about Stevens'
several hot-tempered messages to Washington sent in code
52over Francis' signature.
Throughout this crisis Stevens would not concede
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defeat. On July 27 he obtained written consent from the
minister of transport to send for American railroad
specialists for the Trans-Siberian, even though the Russians
were still objecting to the longer engine runs. Stevens
cabled Willard, requesting the organization of a military
unit of 129 railroadmen to make up the new traffic
divisions, "these men merely to educate the Russians in
American operation." Rather than disband the commission,
Stevens proposed that Gibbs and Greiner return to Washington
to clear up the situation there, get the locomotive orders
moving and confirm that the railroad personnel were being
assembled. Stevens, Francis observed, was "impatient,
53perhaps defiant."
On August 3 Stevens wrote a harsh letter to the new
minister of transport, Vanifantiev. He attributed the 
"almost total collapse of the Siberian Railway" to the
"absolutely inexcusable manner in which coal is handled in 
western Siberia." "The remedy we know consists in opening up 
the mines near Tiaga [sic], and this should be done at once 
without any long drawn out conferences even if the strong 
arm of the military has to be employed." Stevens had been 
promised a hearing on this issue the next day at the
Ministry of Trade and Commerce, but he bluntly informed 
Vanifantiev that his commission would only discuss the coal 
situation in central Siberia, and he did not foresee any 
need for long discussions.^
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The meeting did not take place, for on that day
Kerensky resigned, plunging the government into another
crisis. Kerensky claimed that he could not govern as long
as the Cadets, the bourgeois element in his coalition 
government, had to submit to the will of the Soviet. 
Nekrasov called a meeting of the parties' central committees 
on the night of August 3-4 and the following day persuaded 
Kerensky to form a new cabinet. The government included
four Cadets to satisfy Kerensky's demand for national unity,
. . 55but the new coalition was not strong.
Stevens next turned his ire on the problem of engine
runs. In another terse letter to Vanifantiev, he rejected
the Railway Department's agenda and stated that the
commission would only discuss the length of engine runs, "a
favorable decision upon which it regards as vital to the
success of all its efforts." If the commission did not have
its way, he implied, its work would be through. The
Russians could not afford to wait for the American
locomotives and railroadmen, Stevens wrote, because they
would not arrive in time "to avert a crisis which now
threatens owing to the persistent delays of your railway
administration in adopting better methods." The longer
engine runs, Stevens insisted, "should begin at once with
5 6the staff as it now exists."
The next day Vanifantiev was subdued. For the first 
time his deputy, L A. Ustrugov, opened the meeting.
102
Ustrugov claimed that the longer engine runs were ruining
their locomotives. Wherever the Americans' recommendations
had been introduced, he insisted, the number of engines
pulled out of service for repair had increased
proportionally. On the Tomsk line, where the operating
methods were unchanged, the number of engines out of repair
had stayed the same. The time gained in longer hauls and
fewer turnarounds, Ustrugov said, was wiped out by the
increased need of repairs. In his estimation, the Russians
needed more locomotives before the American operating
57methods would be practical.
Stevens retorted that the repair shops were not running
to capacity. Keep them operating two or three shifts per
day, he said, and the harder wear and tear on the engines
could be sustained. If it were a question of repairs, he
added, the commission could send for American mechanics to
58instruct the Russian railwaymen in this area too.
Ustrugov objected that American mechanics would only
make the situation worse. Bolshevik agitators had
demoralized much of the labor on the Tomsk line, Ustrugov
told the commission, and the presence of American
59railroadmen would only add to the labor unrest.
Yet something had to be done, Stevens insisted, or the 
breakdown of this vital railway would be irreversible. The 
consequences of letting the situation drift were 
staggering. For Russia, Stevens said, the next five or six
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months would be decisive.
At last their negotiations had brought them to the root 
of the problem: the Provisional Government lacked the power, 
the will, the courage to confront labor on the Tomsk Railway 
line. Rehabilitating the Trans-Siberian Railway involved a 
showdown between the Ministry of Transport and the 
railwaymen's unions. Both action and inaction carried 
risks, and the American commission and the Ministry were 
weighing the risks on different scales. The commission's 
purpose, in Stevens' words, was "to improve railway
transportation in Russia in time to enable her to
successfully prosecute the war." For the Ministry of 
Transport, self-preservation, and the aim of steering the 
revolution between the shoals of counterrevolution and the 
extreme Left, took precedence. As if to punctuate the 
impasse, Miller observed that for two months now nothing had 
been done.^^
Ustrugov tried to be conciliatory. The American 
recommendations would be implemented on all lines except the 
Tomsk Railway, he assured them. He announced that he was to 
be appointed commissar of the whole Trans-Siberian system, 
and he would accompany the Americans to Vladivostok to see 
that the new operating methods were adopted. As for the
troublesome Tomsk Railway, he had some ideas of his own for
improving its capacity. He promised to increase the 
production of the Taiga mine and reverse the flow of coal
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62traffic between Taiga and Cheremkova.
After this meeting Stevens was still not satisfied. He
believed that orders for the reorganization of the railway
had to come from higher up or the Ministry of Transport
would continue to hedge on its promises. He asked Francis
to intercede for the commission, and the ambassador arranged
a meeting with Kerensky. On August 10 the five
commissioners, accompanied by Francis (who told Gibbs that
he was unwilling to let Stevens speak for the commission on
this occasion) called on Kerensky at the Winter Palace.
Kerensky had taken up residence in the Tsar's former
apartment in the northwest wing of the palace. Kerensky met
them in the Tsar's library, appearing, according to Gibbs,
6 3nervous and fatigued.
Francis stated the purpose of their visit and Kerensky 
showed some familiarity with the commission's 
recommendations. But Stevens, determined to get action, 
soon seized the initiative. He reminded Kerensky that the 
commission had been invited by the Russian government, and 
if its recommendations continued to be ignored such a
situation "might be regarded as an insult to Russia's
ally." According to Stevens' account, his "plain words, if 
not diplomatic, woke him up." It is hard to credit this
reaction by Kerensky, however, for the premier was used to
this kind of goading from his allies and resented it. ("Why 
did the French and British Governments seize every
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opportunity to sabotage the Provisional Government?" he
later asked in his memoirs.) Later that day the Americans
were informed by Foreign Minister Tereshchenko that Kerensky
had decided to place the railway under military control and
adopt all the commission’s recommendations. Ustrugov had
been confirmed as Commissar of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
Yet in practice, Ustrugov would not be able to effect much
change on the Tomsk Railway. Kerensky's promises were not
matched by deeds, and his reaction to Stevens’ "plain words"
64was probably less than candid.
Stevens and Francis were heartily encouraged, however.
After two months of agonizing negotiations the commission
had finally achieved a breakthrough. Francis thought the
Provisional Government was showing new resolve; it was
evident not only in Kerensky's determination to attack the
railway problems, but in his dismissal of General Brusilov
and his promotion of the "firmer" General Kornilov. "There
has been a great change in [the] official spirit here," he
wrote Lansing. The Russians were "now apparently
enthusiastic for American methods which we must make 
6 5successful."
Stevens made arrangements for Gibbs and Greiner to 
leave Russia, while he, Darling and Miller planned to stay 
and see that the American methods and personnel were 
introduced smoothly onto the Trans-Siberian Railway. Stevens 
had several reasons to dispatch Gibbs. The latter's July 2 7
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letter to the commission had been divisive and a blow to 
their morale. Gibbs had been in poor health for some weeks? 
in fact he had lost forty pounds while in Russia. And
s,
Stevens needed a spokesman for the mission in Washington.
Now that the Russians were acting, he was doubly anxious
about the pace of locomotive deliveries from the United
States. He discussed this with Gibbs in early August. Gibbs
wrote in his diary, "The whole scheme of our recommendations
is in a muddle and apparently nothing has been done toward
carrying out our promises." On August 14 Gibbs and Greiner
' left in a special car attached to the Trans-Siberian 
66express.
The next day Stevens finally received word from the
State Department, but the message did anything but answer
his questions about the fate of his railroad orders. It was
a statement from the President, through the secretary of
state, and it carried a startling reprimand:
The President appreciates very highly what Mr. 
Stevens and his associates are doing in Russia but 
thinks it wise to remind Mr. Stevens that it is 
important that the impression should not be 
created that he and his associates represent or 
speak for the Government of the United States. As 
the President explained to the Commission before 
they started, they were sent abroad merely to put 
themselves at the service of the Russian 
Government. Any assurances conveyed to the Russian 
people, therefore, as if authoritatively by the 
Commission would be a very grave mistake. The 
President does not wish in this way to discredit 
assurances already given but merely convey a 
very friendly caution for the future.
A different wind was blowing in Washington.
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John F. Stevens
The Stevens Mission meeting with Francis at the 
American embassy: (left to right) Henry Miller 
John Stevens, David Francis, William Darling
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Stranded rcateriais in Vladivostok's haroor
The harbor at Vladivostok
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A delegation of Chinese officials welcoming 
tne Stevens Mission to Harbin* Manchuria
German prisoners working on 
the Trans-Siberian Railway
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The Ob Bridge, Omsk Railway
A Trans-Siberian Railway guard
Ill
The Advisory Commission of Railroad Experts to Russia: 
(left to right) George Greiner, Henry Miller,
John F. Stevens, William L. Darling, George Gibbs
Elihu Root (left) and Stanley Washburn (center)




Russian log-burning locomotive in Siberia
Baldwin locomotive on the Chinese Eastern Railway
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Soldiers parading before the Winter Palace, Petrograd
Soldiers and workers demonstrating, Petrograd
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Murmansk from the harbor
Government troops leaving Petrograd 
to meet the advance of Kornilov
CHAPTER FOUR
WILSON AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Unlike Stevens in Russia, no single individual in the 
United States was charged with overseeing the program of 
railroad assistance for the Provisional Government. While 
Stevens was trying to clear the port of Vladivostok and get 
more traffic moving across Siberia, the whole project of 
railroad assistance was encountering colossal problems of 
production and supply in the United States. Ships had to be 
found for transporting the materials from the West Coast to 
Vladivostok; the American railroads had to carry the 
unassembled locomotives and cars west from the factories in 
the Northeast? credit for Russian purchases had to be 
negotiated and syphoned into special orders that would 
compete effectively with domestic demand for locomotives and 
rolling stock? and raw materials had to be procured to keep 
the locomotive factories producing at full capacity. 
Despite the bold predictions of The New York Times in April 
that Russian car and locomotive purchases could tally 
$2,000,000,000, the most limiting factor in the entire 
scheme was the capacity of American industry.^"
In 1917 the American economy was already geared up for 
war production, but it was heavily oriented toward the 
Atlantic trade with France and Britain. American shipping 
was concentrated in the Atlantic, while the relatively small
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volume of material sent to Vladivostok had been carried by
Japanese shipping lines. Assistance to Russia called for a
reapportionment of American tonnage from the Atlantic to the
Pacific just when Germany's resumption of unrestricted
submarine warfare in the Atlantic, coupled with the American
military build-up in France, made the transfer least
affordable. The need for shipping in the Pacific was so
desperate that twenty German merchant ships, confiscated in
the Philippines after their crews had managed to wreck their
engines, were towed to San Francisco in May to help in the
removal of 350,000 tons of material ordered by the Russian
2government and stranded m  ports on the West Coast.
Railroad assistance to Russia had to be imposed on a 
business community that was growing increasingly skeptical 
of the Russian market. While American exports to Russia had 
burgeoned since the outbreak of the war, sparking a great 
deal of speculation about the postwar economic relations 
between the two countries, American businessmen remained 
cautious. Even the railroad interests, who stood the most 
to gain from the loans to Russia, were exporting much 
greater quantities of equipment to France, where the United 
States railroad manufacturers were gaining, by one account, 
"a hold on a hitherto almost untouched territory." In 
Russia, by contrast, the amount of railroad material 
purchased in 1917 declined slightly from 1916 totals. 
American businessmen worried that Russia would face such an
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enormous debt after the war that to meet its interest 
payments it would have to increase exports and slash 
imports.^
Prior to April 1917, American war production was shaped 
by profit incentive. One consequence was a predilection of 
American manufacturers to sell to the British and French 
governments, while shunning the contracts sought by the 
Russian government. In three years of war the Allies had 
purchased billions of dollars worth of food, materials and 
munitions from the United States. The British and French had 
paid for it initially by selling their capital investments 
in American companies —  a strong inducement for those 
industries to give the British and French government 
contracts precedence. When they had sold off all their 
securities, the Allies exported their gold to the United 
States and borrowed against it, eventually generating a 
credit structure that was eight times the value of the 
gold. This huge movement of capital was handled in the 
United States by a syndicate of sixty banks headed by J. P. 
Morgan's National City Bank. The House of Morgan on Wall 
Street functioned as a clearing house for Allied contracts 
in American industries, an arrangement that prevented 
competition among the Allies while minimizing strains on the 
American economy. American loans of $96,000,000 to Russia 
were a paltry sum compared to those advanced to Britain and 
France. American financiers worried about the instability of
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the tsarist regime, the mounting Russian debt and the 
depreciation of the ruble, and negotiated their loans to 
Russia on highly speculative terms. By 1917, American banks
would not make any loans to Russia unless they were
. . 4underwritten by the British government.
Morgan's own bank had supplied about $86,000,000 to 
Russia through the British; Morgan had a keen interest, 
therefore, in promoting other American investments in 
Russia. His representatives dominated the American-Russian 
Chamber of Commerce, founded in January 1916. The Chamber 
acclaimed the growth of exports and tried to silence 
concerns about Russia's debt by heralding the trickle of raw 
materials from Siberia to the United States as a "sound 
nucleus" for the development of "a large reciprocal trade 
after the war." Other organizations joined in the 
campaign. The American International Corporation, 
established in 1915, sought to channel excess American 
capital into Russia, most notably through the New York Life 
Insurance Company, which had investments in twenty-three 
railway companies in Russia totaling $24,000,000. Some 
business periodicals sprang up to promote the Russian 
market; the Russian Review compared Russia's post-war 
prospects to the United States economy after the Civil War, 
when massive infusions of foreign capital had helped produce
5rapid industrial growth.
Despite all the fanfare, American business generally
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lacked confidence in the Russian economy, particularly after 
the March Revolution. More telling was the business 
community's skepticism surrounding the large rail and 
munitions orders that Bethlehem Steel Corporation undertook 
for the Russian government in February 1917. To generate 
funds with which to buy raw materials and labor for the huge 
production orders, Bethlehem Steel advertised its sale of 
$50,000,000 in bonds, offering as collateral $25,000,000 of 
the corporation's own bonds and $37,000,000 in British 
treasury notes. The bonds would not sell. Six months later 
in the late summer of 1917, having refinanced the project, 
Bethlehem Steel suffered more difficulties when rumors 
surfaced that the contract with Russia allowed for payment 
in rubles, without a guarantee in British securities. The 
corporation's president quickly denied the reports to head
goff a panic among Bethlehem Steel's stockholders.
The business community's reluctance to invest in Russia 
was reinforced by frustrations with the business culture 
there. Russia's vaunted program of wartime railway 
construction was yielding a series of disappointments for 
American firms by the end of 1916. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 
Allied Contracting Company, American Steel Export Company, 
United States Steel Products Company, American Locomotive 
Works and American Car and Foundry Company all filled orders 
for the Russian government, yet their hopes of actually 
building and supplying new railway lines in Russia eluded
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them. Many projects were considered, but the Russian 
capitalists, accustomed to steady economic expansion backed 
by the state, usually balked at the American investors'
speculative terms. Negotiations for an American-financed 
line from Moscow to the Donets Basin fell through in May 
1916; the following January reports that American
International Corporation was obtaining a $250,000,000 
contract option also came to nothing. When the Stevens 
Mission visited Japan in May 1917, it met with many American 
businessmen returning from Russia, including a 
representative of American Car and Foundry Company. Darling 
reported that the businessmen were "all sore and [could not]
7say a good word for conditions there."
By August American business had grown so wary of the
Russian economy that J. P. Morgan, worried about losing his
investments there, offered a deal to the State Department
for boosting the Russian economy. If it would call for
American subscriptions to the Russian liberty loan, then 
Morgan's bank would be the first to buy the Russian bonds. 
At the same time, the State Department was receiving letters 
from other American capitalists trying to withdraw their 
assets from Russian companies. The Provisional Government 
had frozen their assets and they were asking the State
gDepartment to intercede for them.
Clearly the climate of American business was not
conducive for Stevens' requests of large car and locomotive
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orders for Russia. Business was apathetic toward the Russian 
market, and the prospect of big Treasury loans to finance 
the Russian purchases only heightened their skepticism about 
Russia's postwar market. If the United States were to 
support the Russian war effort with railroad assistance, it 
would have to secure the cooperation of American industry 
through the Council of National Defense and its Advisory 
Commission, or failing that, establish a new agency that 
would be empowered to make industry produce whatever the 
government needed for the war.
The man in Wilson's administration who pressed hardest 
for financial and material support for Russia was Secretary 
of the Treasury William G. McAdoo. The United States 
intervention made McAdoo one of the most powerful men in 
government. Having steered the Bonds Bill through Congress 
in April, he became the arbiter of three billion dollars 
appropriated for foreign loans, with another four billion 
dollars promised in August. His control over loans brought 
him directly into contact with affairs of state. His 
decisions on loans to Russia, and his efforts to coordinate 
American war production with Allied purchasing, had a large 
impact on railroad assistance. He was sympathetic to the 
Russian Revolution, sharing Lansing's view that its 
ideological import might be decisive in bringing down the 
imperial regime in Germany. McAdoo also looked more 
favorably than most businessmen on American economic
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interests in Russia after the war. But in pushing the new
government agencies that would facilitate railroad
assistance to Russia, these thoughts were merely incidental
9for McAdoo. His motives were complex.
McAdoo was the most ambitious man in Wilson's 
entourage. He wanted to make his tenure at the Treasury 
Department a springboard for a presidential bid in 1920. 
When the United States entered the war, McAdoo sought to put 
himself squarely in the midst of decision-making for the war 
effort. He tried to build up the power of the Treasury at 
the expense of other executive departments. He urged the 
President in late April to put all matters of shipping under 
the control of the Shipping Board and have it "act in the 
closest possible cooperation with the Treasury Department." 
Two weeks later he was writing to the President that his 
proposed purchasing commission would not involve the 
Commerce Department "sufficiently to warrant joint 
operation?" instead, he would keep the Commerce Department 
informed. Two days later he sent a "confidential" letter to 
the President insisting that he must be better informed of 
the deliberations of the Council of National Defense. "In 
every country in Europe the Minister of Finance is one of 
the War Council," he pointed out. He thought he should be 
consulted "before we enter upon policies requiring enormous 
expenditures of money." McAdoo was willing to absorb some 
of the President's power too: the Bonds Act stipulated that
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the secretary confer with the President on loans to the 
Allies, but in practice McAdoo took to informing Wilson 
after the fact. In building up his power McAdoo stayed 
aloof from consultative bodies, preferring to make it 
necessary for Lansing, Baker and the other cabinet members 
to confer with the Treasury Department on all matters of 
money and war production.
McAdoo's plan was to organize the nation's resources, 
both financial and industrial, under the auspices of one 
agency attached to the Treasury Department and under his 
direction. The plan had merit. The economy demanded some 
coordination. There was wasteful competition between the 
Allies' needs and the American military build-up. There 
were shortages of raw materials for the factories. And the 
available shipping was not allocated efficiently. Morgan 
resigned his position as Britain's purchasing agent at the 
beginning of May, and for the next two months the 
administration explored options on how it would take hold of 
the economy. Secretary of War Baker, the head of the Food 
Administration, Herbert Hoover, and others joined McAdoo in 
discussing alternatives with the President. McAdoo's 
proposal went furthest in extending government control over 
war production, while Baker called for the least amount of 
interference in the economy. Government control was 
essential to an ambitious program of railroad assistance for 
Russia, and the obstacles that McAdoo faced in putting
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forward his plan were the same obstacles encountered by 
Stevens1 large locomotive orders."^
Before McAdoo had extended his first credit to Russia 
he was already running into resistance from the House of 
Morgan. On May 1, McAdoo announced the first loan to Russia, 
and he used the occasion to explain the intent of the Bonds 
Act to the public. "We are fighting a war against a common 
enemy," he declared. "We use money, whereas our Allies use 
men and munitions. We shall take the chances in fighting 
our part of the war with money, just as we should take our 
chances if we sent an army or our navy over there." He did 
not want anyone to think that the United States was gauging 
the ability of any government to repay what it borrowed. 
But the forthcoming loan to Russia was immediately 
criticized in a public statement by the Morgan-dominated 
American-Russian Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber warned 
that Russia already faced a crushing burden of debt after 
the war and would not be able to pay the interest on the 
foreign loans. The first solution to Russia's financial 
problem, said the Chamber, was to greatly increase its 
exports of raw materials in order to provide a favorable 
balance of trade. The United States' economic interests in 
Russia, the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce implied, 
would be ill-served by supplying government loans to Russia? 
instead American investors should be seeking development of 
mining and timber industries in Russia. Morgan obviously did
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not want the government competing with his own bank for
Russia's interest payments after the war. These dire
warnings, coming from the normally sanguine American-Russian
Chamber of Commerce, were a sign of growing resistance by
12businessmen to exports for Russia.
Meanwhile, McAdoo directed Ambassador Francis to 
negotiate terms for a loan. Tereshchenko, then the Russian 
finance minister, requested a staggering half billion 
dollars, on similar terms to the billion dollar loans that 
France and Britain had obtained through the House of Morgan. 
This sum equalled the entire monthly allowance appropriated 
by Congress for all the Allies, far more than the Treasury 
could bear. While trying to reach agreement on the size of 
the loan, their negotiations foundered on two other 
problems. Francis kept stressing that American assistance 
was contingent on Russia's commitment to the war. At one 
point Francis told Tereshchenko that he would not recommend 
loans without assurances that there would be no separate 
peace. The finance minister replied that there was "no 
possibility," and shortly afterwards Russian officials 
reported to Francis that discipline in the army was 
improving. For his part, Tereshchenko worried that their 
purchase orders would be held up behind British and French 
orders, as they had been in the past. Knowing that there 
was a backlog of orders in the American car and locomotive 
industries, he cabled Russia's purchasing agent in New York
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to "order immediately" 10,000 cars and 500 locomotives —
"terms of credit [would] be arranged later." This was
precisely the kind of competitive bidding that threatened to
make a shambles of American war production, but Tereshchenko
was anxious that the Russian orders receive due priority.
McAdoo, though sympathetic, did not want his hands tied with
specific promises when the administration was only beginning
to design the bureaucratic machinery for coordinating Allied
purchases. Through Francis, McAdoo indicated vaguely that
orders would be handled through a commission of the Treasury
Department. In mid-May, McAdoo recommended an initial credit
of $100,000,000 for Russia. In view of the $500,000,000
monthly allotment for foreign loans, this was a promising
13start, assuming that similar credits would follow.
McAdoo*s plans soon brought him up against the London 
Inter-Allied Supply Committee, which allocated transports 
among the Allies and the theaters of war. Not only were the 
British underwriting American loans to the other Allies, but 
they provided most of the transatlantic shipping. The 
committee in London, composed of representatives from all 
the Allied governments, ostensibly coordinated the supply of 
American war materials with the different Allies' needs. In 
practice, though, the British looked to the needs of the 
western front first, and the Russians had to accept whatever 
they could get. By 1917, J. P. Morgan's Allied purchasing 
agency was working almost exclusively through this
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organization. Morgan negotiated the contracts, determining
which American industries would produce for the Allies,
while the British, through the London Inter-Allied Supply
Committee, decided the destination of the war supplies.
Thus the Wilson Administration faced a supply structure that
employed American industrial resources in the interests of
British, rather than American strategy. Wherever these
diverged, McAdoo observed, the administration would have to
assert control over the distribution of war materials.
Though the British had pushed for American railroad
assistance to Russia in March and April, they were reluctant
to see the necessary shipping redeployed from the Atlantic
14to the Pacific.
While pushing his plans for a purchasing commission 
attached to the Treasury, McAdoo was looking for ways to 
overturn British domination of Allied shipping. He 
conferred with the Russian mission to the United States, 
headed by the Provisional Government's new ambassador, Boris 
Bakhmatev, and the military missions that had arrived in May 
from Britain, France and Italy, and he talked with Lansing. 
He concluded that the United States had to send a 
representative to the London Inter-Allied Supply Committee. 
This organization was the only one that assimilated all the 
Allies' needs on all fronts and assessed their relative 
importance. It controlled the payments to the United States 
and coordinated shipping. McAdoo wanted to replace the
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London Inter-Allied Supply Committee altogether, but if the
United States formed its own commission to coordinate
credits, purchasing and shipping, there would be confusion.
So he urged American representation on the committee as a
15first step toward eventually dominating it.
The desire to assist Russia provided a major impetus
for sending an American representative to London. E. Francis
Riggs, the military attache in Petrograd, pressed early for
American involvement in London, and General Scott of the
Root Mission, after returning from Russia, also expressed
concern that the British were not allotting enough ships for
American supplies to Russia. McAdoo saw an opportunity for
undermining Britain*s hold on the Inter-Allied Supply
Committee. He wrote Wilson on May 16, recommending "a
separate commission for Russia, whose headquarters [would]
be in Petrograd, composed of Russian and American
representatives alone, [to] deal solely with Russian
needs." The Russians, McAdoo explained, had contracted for
large quantities of material without any way of securing
ships, and now they had over a million tons of material
stranded in American warehouses awaiting transportation.
Wilson, however, was weighing an alternative plan advanced
by Secretary of War Baker, and did not act immediately on
16McAdoo's proposal.
Baker believed that McAdoo's plan to concentrate 
everything in one agency was overly ambitious. It was too
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much for one man, he argued, and the American people would
not accept an "economic tsar." Moreover, as chairman of the
Council of National Defense, Baker had more control over war
production than did any other cabinet member, and he saw
McAdoo trying to wrest power from the CND. Baker outlined
for Wilson a proposed War Industries Board, which would be
subordinate to the CND. To coordinate demand, the WIB would
include representatives of the Army, the Navy, and an agent
from the London Inter-Allied Supply Committee? to coordinate
supply it would have a chief of raw materials, a chief of
finished products and a chief of priorities. Baker sought
to preserve as far as possible a cooperative arrangement
17between the CND and business.
McAdoo argued that the CND had no teeth, no legal means 
of organizing the war industries. Nor was it structured to 
coordinate foreign and domestic purchases and head off 
competition between the needs of the United States military 
and those of the Allies. It was easy to see how the railroad 
orders for Russia could become bogged down in the absence of 
government control. Lansing's lame communication to Francis 
in mid-April disclosed that locomotive manufacturers had 
"consented to give precedence" to the Russian orders, while 
the railroads had "agreed to help" in getting the required 
raw materials to the plants and the finished orders to the 
ports, and "It is believed that all possible speed will be 
given to these orders." The CND had no executive power for
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requisitioning or setting quotas or prices. It was created
in 1916 as a clearinghouse for information on the economy,
and in McAdoo's opinion, it had outlived its usefulness and
18had to be replaced altogether by a more powerful agency.
The most serious limitation of Baker's proposed WIB, in
McAdoo's mind, was its lack of coordination between Allied
and American supply. It put the Allies in a supplicant role
toward American industry, while it left the British in
control of shipping, through the London Inter-Allied Supply
Committee. After touring the nation in June to promote
liberty bonds, McAdoo plied the President in July with his
plans for one big purchasing agency in Washington. His
agency would set equitable price controls, avoid
competition, and achieve some government control over the
market. Once the agency was established, the London
Inter-Allied Supply Committee could be transformed into an
advisory body, estimating supply needs for the different
fronts, ships required to move the supplies, and credit
needed by each government, and reporting to Washington. The
agency would be "one of the greatest steps we have taken
toward a proper organization and control of our own market,"
he urged, "and toward the orderly, efficient and economical
19purchase of war supplies."
Behind the bureaucratic power struggle between McAdoo 
and Baker, the two secretaries were seeking different broad 
objectives. McAdoo wanted the United States to replace
Britain as the financial leader of the world. In June and
July he suspended loans to Britain to demonstrate the power
of the Treasury and make the British more amenable to
Wilson's liberal aims for the peace. Among Wilson's goals
was a world system of free trade, which would obviate
tariffs and big navies. Russia, McAdoo believed, had to be
integrated into the community of free trade. There were
suggestions in high circles in both Britain and the United
States that Germany's past domination of the Russian market
would pass either to the British or the Americans. McAdoo
therefore viewed with suspicion an agreement between the
Allies in late 1916 that projected a tariff wall around
Germany after the war, ostensibly to prevent the Germans
from making a rapid economic recovery. Russia had been
coerced into the agreement, and McAdoo perceived that its
real thrust was against American, not German, economic
power. He believed that Britain was forging a colonial
trade relationship with Russia, contrary to the United
20States' desire for free trade.
As secretary of war, Baker's horizon was more 
immediate; he believed that the nation's resources must be 
focused primarily on the American military build-up in 
France. In April Baker was supportive of the plan to send a 
railroad commission to Russia, but as shortages of railroad 
equipment began to obstruct traffic both in the United 
States and France in the summer of 1917, Baker grew
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increasingly skeptical of the effectiveness of railroad
exports to Russia. General John J. Pershing, the commander
of the American Expeditionary Forces, had ordered a study of.
railway conditions in France, and in July it came to light
that the Americans would have to undertake "an immense
program of construction of new yards, terminals, multiple
tracks, cut-offs, regulating stations and other additions,"
while providing "personnel as well as locomotives and
cars." Pershing had called for a commission similar to the
Stevens Commission to conduct a thorough survey of yards,
buildings, rolling stock and repair equipment in northern
France. By August it was obvious that Stevens' request for
2,000 locomotives and 40,000 cars in Russia would stretch
American resources dangerously thin. Even General Scott of
the Root Mission acknowledged in his July 25 report to the
War College Division that locomotives were the riskiest form
of assistance to Russia: they would have to be written off
in the event of a separate peace, because the railroad
material had to precede other American * assistance and had to
be specially built for the Russian gauge? it could not be
diverted elsewhere if the situation deteriorated over the
21next several months.
Baker was concerned as well about the needs of American 
railroads. The Railroad War Board, an ad hoc committee 
attached to the CND, was commissioned in April to study the 
railroad situation. In its May 31 report, the Board
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determined that a shortage of rolling stock was afflicting
American railroads too. With the car-service rules revised
so that railroads could more freely share their rolling
stock, the situation was improved; but still, the Board
warned in its report to the CND, the railroads needed an
additional 150,000 cars. Since April 1, car manufacturers
had received domestic orders totaling just 104,917, because
many railroad companies had withdrawn from the market in the
face of competing orders from the governments of France and 
22Russia.
The railroads were under strain. In June the
Interstate Commerce Commission ruled against their request
for freight rate increases. Railroad labor, meanwhile,
persisted in its demands for higher wages to meet
inflation. Management pressed the Interstate Commerce
Commission throughout the summer for a new ruling. The
transportation crisis affected the American car
manufacturers, casting a pall over Russia's car and
locomotive orders. How could Stevens' orders for 40,000
cars and 2,000 locomotives be filled when the American roads
23faced a shortage of 150,000 cars?
Wilson tilted in favor of Baker's plan in July. He 
wanted the three chiefs of raw materials, finished products 
and priorities, together with Hoover as food administrator, 
to constitute the executive of the WIB, with McAdoo's Allied 
Purchasing Commission separate from and subordinate to the
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WIB. McAdoo expressed his sharp disappointment to Wilson: 
handling domestic and foreign purchases separately would 
reduce the Allied Purchasing Commission's "efficiency, power 
and prestige" for procuring the Allies' needs. The 
President's decision kept the WIB under Baker's control, in 
an advisory relationship to the War Department. Baker's 
triumph over McAdoo had profound consequences for locomotive 
shipments to Russia. It assured that France, not Russia, 
would receive the bulk of American locomotive and rolling 
stock exports. It reinforced the "western" strategic 
orientation of the War Department to concentrate American 
might in France, instead of dissipating it in various 
expeditionary forces to the Balkans, Turkey, north Russia 
and Siberia. Stevens' recommendations were foiled because 
Baker's WIB would not muster a concerted effort by the 
Shipping Board, the Treasury and the manufacturers to fill 
Stevens' orders.^
Subsequent pleas from the President's close advisor, 
Colonel House, to pour American resources into Russia were 
in vain. "We cannot devote too much attention to the 
Russian situation," House wrote to Wilson on July 23, "for 
it that fails us our troubles will be great and many....I am 
wondering if you cannot say a word to Denman [head of the 
Shipping Board] on the one hand, and McAdoo on the other, 
and send word to Willard. ..regarding the necessity for 
rolling stock." Another prod came from General Scott, who
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staunchly supported "risking immense sums of money on
Russia" since the "dangers attending her withdrawal [were]
too great for haggling." House suggested sending a
contingent of American troops to improve the Russians'
morale, an idea that was echoed by Root. But Wilson declined
to intercede with the WIB or the War Department. Without the
President's vigorous support, Stevens' orders were bound to
be winnowed by the War Department's influence over
25production and supply.
Once it was clear that United States industry could not 
provide locomotives and rolling stock to Russia on the 
massive scale envisioned by some in the spring, Stevens' 
recommendations became an embarrassment. His speech in 
Petrograd on July 4, promising huge quantities of 
locomotives and rolling stock, was reported in the American 
press and caused no immediate reaction from the State or 
Treasury Departments. It was first brought to the 
President's attention by Root, when he made his report in 
early August. A few days later Lansing sent Wilson a copy of 
Stevens' July 4 address, and charged Stevens with "assuming 
an authority and giving the Commission a diplomatic 
character which neither possesses." The pledge could not 
now be rescinded, Lansing advised, but Stevens must be told 
that he had "no authority to carry on negotiations or enter 
into agreements for the United States." Wilson agreed; his 
message to Stevens on August 15 closely followed Lansing's
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o cline of thought.
The President's message, admonishing Stevens not to
make further promises of material assistance, was not an
abandonment of Russian railroad assitance, but only a
refusal to escalate America's minimal commitment. Wilson
reiterated the original purpose of the commission, to "serve
Russia" and discover by what means the United States might
assist. Wilson's intent was to steady the program of
railroad assistance, which he had regarded as a minimal
commitment from the beginning. For Wilson, railroad
assistance was a technical matter bearing on the Russian war
effort and peripheral to the larger problem of sustaining
the forces of democracy in Russia. With the collapse of the
Russians' offensive in Julyr it was becoming evident to
Wilson that the Provisional Government lacked the people's
support to prosecute the war with vigor? the best that the
Provisional Government could do was hold the line against
Germany and hope for an end to the war before the situation
27m  Russia went to pieces.
The return of the Root Mission in late July reinforced 
his views. Root described the political unrest in Petrograd 
and the decay of the Russian Army and attributed them mainly 
to the demoralizing misrepresentations made by German 
propaganda. Root argued that the only way to affect the 
Russian war effort was through an American "publicity" 
campaign. He characterized Kerensky as a strong leader and
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urged Wilson to support the Provisional Government. Wilson 
accepted Root's appraisal of the Kerensky government, but he 
did not approve Root's publicity plan. Propaganda was 
effective in lowering morale, but it could not bolster it. 
Months later, after Wilson had consented reluctantly to a 
modest effort, he remarked that "spending money in Russia 
for propaganda was like pouring water in a bottomless
t  •) i t  2  8hole.
The main object of Wilson's Russian policy was to 
support the Provisional Government. Though weak, the 
Provisional Government was the obvious champion of a 
nationalistic, liberal vision for Russia's revolution. It 
was pledged to organize national elections for a constituent 
assembly, which would in turn give to Russia a democratic 
constitution. In the meantime, while conducting the war
i
against German imperialism, Kerensky was making heroic 
efforts to unite the social classes of Russia in a 
nationalist coalition. Since his decision in April to 
separate the Root Mission and the Stevens Mission, Wilson 
had distinguished between American sympathy for the Russian 
Revolution and American material assistance to the Russian 
war effort. Throughout 1917, Wilson was cautious not to 
place his policy on a collision course with the Russians' 
search for peace. This was consistent with his feeling that 
the Russians, "in setting up their new forms of Government 
and working out domestic reforms.. .would find the war an
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intolerable evil." He had not mired United States resources
in a huge program of railroad assistance, nor had the
Russians' received an inordinate amount of the Treasury's
loans. By August it was clear that pressing Kerensky too
hard to prosecute the war ran the risk of undermining his 
29government.
Stevens' effort to bring action on the Tomsk line in
Siberia was a case in point: was it in the interests of the
United States to force a dangerous confrontation between the
Provisional Government and labor, in order to get more
supplies from Vladivostok to the eastern front? The wisest
policy, Wilson believed, was to limit the locomotive
shipments to what the United States could afford to lose if
Russia quit the war, and more importantly, to restrict
American operation of the Russian railways to what the
Provisional Government definitely desired. The Russians'
wariness about allowing Americans to operate the
Trans-Siberian, or even the port facilities at Vladivostok,
showed that in their view, outside assistance was a
30double-edged sword.
Wilson was considering another means of assisting the 
Provisional Government: by a revision of war aims. It was 
possible that United States pressure, combined with the 
Russians' plea, could bring the western Allies behind a new 
declaration of war aims. By revising and publicizing the 
war aims of the Allies it was hoped that Kerensky's
140
"defensist" position could be strengthened —  the premier
could more easily fend off the Bolsheviks' charge that
Russian blood was being shed for the imperialist aims of
Britain and France, and he could raise the people's hopes
that the door had been opened to a negotiated settlement
with Germany, that peace was at hand. The war aims question
had burst upon Russian politics again in late July.
Throughout June the Provisional Government and the Soviet
had managed to patch their differences while the former
stood behind the Soviet's call for an international
conference among socialist party representatives at
Stockholm to discuss war aims. But the governments of the
United States, Britain and France had boycotted the
Stockholm Conference, refusing to issue visas to their
socialist citizens, and the Conference had been a bitter
disappointment for the moderate socialists in Russia. With
this latest great effort at ending the war discredited, the
coalition forged in May and June broke down. The sense of
helplessness was compounded by the collapse of the July
Offensive. In August it was clear that the Russians were
desperate for peace and disillusioned with the Allied
31cause.
Wilson had another reason to join with the Russians in 
calling for an Allied conference on war aims. He had led 
the United States into the war as an "Associated Power," 
keeping aloof from the Allies' agreements and secret
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treaties. He had announced in general terms the goals that
the United States was fighting for, but at some point he
would have to articulate them more firmly and begin to
mobilize public opinion in the Allied nations behind them,
in preparation for the eventual peace conference. Now the
President could use the Russian situation for leverage to
force open the international debate over war aims. Still
there were obstacles. Wilson was anxious to preserve the
status of the United States as an Associated Power; he
hesitated to tarnish what he regarded as the moral
superiority of the United States by involving it directly in
an inter-Allied conference. Moreover, the American military
build-up had not yet proceeded far enough to give the United
States the kind of leverage that might be needed to assert
some leadership over the Allied coalition. In August there
was only one American division in France. Other newly
trained divisions would not begin to arrive at the front for
months and Wilson could not expect to project significant
American military power in Europe until the following
summer. Wilson stressed the limits of American power in a
letter to House on July 21: "When the war is over we can
force [Britain and France] to our way of thinking, because
by that time they will, among other things, be financially
in our hands; but we cannot force them now." A diplomatic
offensive at this time, he reasoned, could be disastrously 
32premature.
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The western Allies were growing deeply apprehensive 
about the Russian situation and were skeptical that Kerensky 
could last, even if the Allies held a conference on war 
aims. Their best hope, they thought, was if Kerensky would 
become a war dictator, and as one conservative British 
newspaper put it, "save Russia with a whiff of shrapnel." 
It was a bleak indication of the Allies' resistance to war 
aims revision that Russia was not even invited to 
participate in an Allied conference on war strategy, which 
met in London at the beginning of August. British Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George opened the conference by 
proposing that the three governments of Britain, France and 
Italy send a "stern protest" to Kerensky over the chaos in 
the Russian Army. These proceedings highlighted the widening 
gulf between American interests in Russia and those of the 
western Allies. Whereas Wilson was primarily concerned with 
shoring up the forces of democracy in Russia, with a view to 
the new world order after the war, the leaders of Britain, 
France and Italy were more immediately concerned with 
maintaining the eastern front. They were willing to see 
counterrevolution in Russia if it would improve the Russian 
war effort.^
There were many people in Britain and France, 
particularly in the socialist opposition, who supported 
Wilson's aims and saw dangers in their own governments' 
policies. House conveyed a letter from Norman Angell, an
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important British intellectual, to the President, warning
that counterrevolution was apt to bring the Russians and the
Germans to the bargaining table. "We should have lost the
political and diplomatic advantage of a weak Russia and the
military advantage of a strong one," Angell wrote, urging
Wilson to propose a conference on war aims. House too
believed it was imperative to accomodate the Russian demand
for peace. "It is more important," House wrote Wilson,
"that Russia should weld herself into a virile republic than
it is that Germany should be beaten to her knees....With
Russia firmly established in democracy, German autocracy
would be compelled to yield to a representative government
34within a very few years."
Wilson also believed that the Right posed the biggest
threat to the forces of democracy in Russia, and he regarded
Kerensky's idealism and patriotism as a strong bulwark
against the forces of reaction. His secretary of state did
not share his estimate of Kerensky? Lansing perceived the
Russian leader as weak and too sympathetic to "the radical
element of the revolution." He was shocked by the optimism
of Root's report, saying that he could not trust Root's
views "without doing violence to my better judgment."
Nevertheless, Lansing accepted the administration policy,
writing in a memorandum on August 9,
As long as there is a possibility that [Root] is
right and I am wrong...I feel that we should do
all that we can to strengthen morally and
materially the existing government. If Mr. Root
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is wrong, nothing that we can do will stay the
current which is toward a period of disorder and
national impotency. All our efforts will amount 
to nothing; they will simply be chips swept along 
by the tide to be swallowed up by t^e calamity 
which seems to me in store for Russia.
The issue of war aims became acute when the Pope, on
August 1, called on all the belligerent governments to state
their war aims, as a first step to negotiating a peace
settlement. Germany complied, offering harsh terms. Wilson
deliberated whether to respond to the Pope's appeal or
ignore it. Lansing advised Wilson to ignore it; the Pope
was pro-Austrian and a declaration of war aims would weaken
the position of the Allies. House counseled the President to
respond, fearing privately that making no answer would be a
"colossal blunder," because of the impact it would have in 
36Russia.
It was while Wilson was considering a response to the 
Pope's Peace Proposal that a query arrived from the French 
government, asking for the President's position on the 
volatile issue of an Allied conference on war aims. The 
British and French governments were opposed to any such 
conference, not only because they wished to stand by the 
postwar territorial adjustments in their secret treaties, 
but because opening an official debate on war aims would 
unleash partisan debate at home; the political truce that 
the parties had observed since 1914 would be shattered. 
What if Kerensky demanded a conference on war aims? What 
would be the attitude of the United States, the French
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wanted to know. "If the Russian Government... should propose
a conference," Wilson wrote back, "the President does not
see how such a suggestion could be wisely rejected." There
was a democratic feeling everywhere, a burgeoning demand for
popular control of foreign policies, and the Allied
governments could not long withstand an open debate on the
war aims question. Wilson was not yet prepared to force the
issue, but he was willing to support the Provisional
37Government if Kerensky deemed a conference necessary.
The President dispatched his reply to the French on 
August 7. That same day, Wilson called a cabinet meeting to 
discuss the Russian railway situation. He was filled with 
doubts about the program of assistance. Stevens had failed, 
after five weeks of discussions with the Ministry of 
Transport, to win approval of his commission's
recommendations. If the Russians were unhappy with the
Stevens Mission, they were unable to provide information of 
their own either. When Ambassador Bakhmatev was asked for 
detailed estimates of their most pressing needs, he answered 
with vague and conflicting requests. "Please let us have 
$165,000,000," he had asked McAdoo recently. "If this is 
not done it will cause [a] misunderstanding." His request 
was accompanied by no lists, no particulars. How could the 
United States send locomotives and railroadmen to Russia 
when the Russian government refused to send for them? As 
long as the Russians evaded the recommendations of the
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38Stevens Mission, Wilson remained dubious.
Wilson was also disturbed by the attitude of the
British. He produced for his cabinet a report on the Russian 
railway situation written by the British ambassador in 
Petrograd, Sir George Buchanan. The report, written for the 
British Foreign Office, had been sent through their embassy 
in Washington to the State Department, and then to the 
President. Buchanan believed that "the real reason
underlying the whole of the disastrous situation [was] the 
deplorable state into which the means of transportation 
[had] fallen." The tracks, the locomotives, the rolling 
stock, Buchanan explained, were "all used up." The railway 
material being shipped from the United States would "fall 
far short" of what was needed. He proposed that the United 
States, with the approval of the Provisional Government, 
take over "the entire task of repairing rolling stock," for 
the chief problem now was to staff the repair shops with 
reliable labor. If the United States did not take over the 
railway administration and the repair shops, Buchanan 
argued, then the only other means of keeping the trains 
moving would be to "split up the Russian railways into 
sections of which each one would be taken in hand by one of 
the Allies." The Foreign Office had dispached Buchanan's 
report with a brief note allowing that the British 
considered American assistance preferable to Allied
assistance, because the United States was already involved
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and could more easily "reorganize the Russian railways on
the broadest lines." The implications were clear: the
Allies deemed the Russian railways so vital to the war
effort —  "of transcendant importance," they called it —
that they would act on it independently if the United States
did not. Representatives from Britain, France and Italy
were at that time convened in Paris to discuss
transportation, and the Russian railway situation was on 
39their agenda.
In August the two lines of Wilson's Russian policy 
began to fuse into one —  a clear, consistent respect for 
Russia's self-determination. Wilson's overriding concern in 
Russia was to stabilize the beleagured forces of democracy. 
The Stevens Mission, originally intended to explore means of 
getting American assistance to the eastern front, now 
assumed the more important, if subtler, function of 
forestalling an Allied intervention on the Russian 
railways. In September and October Wilson would use the 
Stevens Mission to head off a collision between the British 
and the Provisional Government over the operation of the 
railways. He could only do this by enveloping the purpose 
of the Stevens Mission in a fog of uncertainty, encouraging 
the British to hope that the Stevens Mission was the 
entering wedge for American reorganization of the railways.
Wilson's policy in Russia was constrained by the vital 
necessity of avoiding a rupture with the British, either
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over war aims or intervention in Russia. What is most 
remarkable about his policy after August 1917 is how far he 
was willing to oppose the British and allow the military 
situation on the eastern front to degenerate in the interest 
of shielding the Provisional Government. That Russia had to 
have peace became a certainty, it was only a question of how 
soon and what kind —  an armistice? a capitulation? a 
negotiated peace with the help of the Allies? In the 
meantime Wilson endeavored to strengthen the Provisional 
Government against its internal foes of anarchy and 
counterrevolution. This was a dynamic and constructive 
policy, aimed at mitigating a disastrous situation.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE BRITISH CALL FOR INTERVENTION
In early August 1917, delegates from Britain, France 
and Italy met in Paris to discuss transportation problems, 
including the deepening crisis on the Russian railways. No 
representatives from the Russian government were invited to 
the conference, while the Americans, standing by their 
status as an "Associated Power," declined to attend. The 
Russian railways were of growing concern to the western 
Allies. With the Russian Army breaking up and the railways 
on the point of total collapse, there seemed few obstacles 
to a deep German penetration into Russia. At this time the 
northern front, particularly the Baltic city of Riga, was 
thought to be the key to the situation. If Riga fell, it 
was widely believed, the German Army would advance like a 
juggernaut on Petrograd. Without rail traffic, Kerensky 
would be unable to organize a defense of the capital. It 
was reported at the transportation conference that 
Kerensky's train was halted four times on a recent trip 
between the northern front and Petrograd when its 
locomotives broke down and had to be replaced. The Allies 
now considered drastic measures for railroad assistance to 
Russia, anything that would keep some traffic moving and 
sustain the line of defense between the Germans and the 
Russian interior. In the longer view, it was essential to
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keep the Murman Railway operational through the winter, so 
that Russia would not be cut off from Britain and the 
Atlantic supply line when the harbor at Archangel froze. 
The conference concluded with a joint resolution directed at 
both the Provisional Government and the Wilson 
Administration. To Russia the Allies pledged all possible 
aid, both in material and personnel, for the rehabilitation 
of the railways. To the United States they continued to 
appeal for more American involvement. They dispatched a 
delegation to Washington with the urgent request that 
American railroad assistance be widened from the Siberian 
Railway to the most strategic lines in European Russia as 
well, and that American personnel, with the help of British, 
French and Italian railwaymen if necessary, supervise the 
operation of rail traffic.^"
The British had been pushing for a wider commitment of 
American railroad assistance for several weeks. The 
railroad commission had not been in Petrograd a week when 
General Poole of the British Military Equipment Section in 
Russia approached the American engineers about inspecting 
the Murman line. The British were anxious to know how much 
this new line could alleviate the backlog of freight at 
Archangel, and how well the railway would function in the 
coming winter when Archangel's harbor would be closed by 
ice. In several meetings with the railroad commission the 
British general described his view of the supply problem.
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He had inspected the port facilities of both Archangel and
Vladivostok and was bitter that the Russians did not furnish
enough labor to unload ships efficiently. He spoke
disparagingly about the poor administration of the railways
and the official inertia in facing up to the supply
problems. Disillusioned, Poole had told his superiors in
Britain that it was useless to send any more supplies to
Archangel until the port was cleared. He urged Stevens to
send one of the commission's members to inspect the Murman
line. Stevens consented, noting that an inspection of that
line would help fill out the commission's impressions of the
entire Russian railway situation, so that the commission
could more accurately assess the needs of the Siberian 
2system.
British and French officials pressured the Provisional
Government to allow an inspection of the Murman line.
Darling volunteered to make the trip, and on August 7 he set
out in a special train with representatives of the British,
French and Russian general staffs and several Russian 
3engineers.
The Murman line was an extraordinary example of the 
engineering feats that Russia accomplished during the war to 
remedy its isolation and dearth of railway lines. In 1914, 
Murmansk was a fishing village of about 4,000 inhabitants, 
located on the Arctic Coast of the Kola Peninsula, a great 
lobe of land bounded on the west by Finland and on the east
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and southeast by the White Sea. Unlike the port of Archangel 
on the White Seaf the small harbor at Murmansk remained 
ice-free all year around because it benefitted from warm 
ocean currents rounding the top of Scandinavia. The line to 
Murmansk was needed to carry Archangel's burden through the 
long winter months. It was in the first winter of the war, 
in Arctic darkness, that the government began a survey of 
the 600-mile Murman route. A hundred thousand Russian 
laborers and thousands of German prisoners had completed the 
line by November 1916, and it carried a light service 
through the winter of 1916-17. Built through swampy Arctic 
tundra, long sections of the track sank and vanished into 
the ground in the first spring thaw in 1917. When the 
Stevens Mission arrived in Petrograd in June, some 45,000 
men were employed repairing the line and enlarging the port
4facilities at Murmansk.
The journey up the Murman line was extremely slow due 
to the repairs. Their train crept along about seven miles 
per hour, Darling spending much of the time leaning out his 
window taking notes. All along the line the Russian 
laborers were restless and undisciplined. On one section 
the men were digging drainage ditches when they needed to 
give priority to the construction of tracks and buildings. 
When Darling asked why, he was told that the men refused to 
work at anything but ditching for which they were paid by 
the cubic yard. Further north, Darling encountered two
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Americans operating steam shovels; these men complained that 
there was too much work and not enough to eat. Once while 
stopped for the night, Darling heard a cluster of workers
formulating some demands outside his window. When the
workers started off toward the Russian engineers' car, the 
train suddenly pulled out. Evidently the engineers had
become frightened and did not think it was safe to stay the
• U 4 .  5night.
At Murmansk, Darling and the British and French 
officials met with the governor-general and the general 
manager of the line, who assured them that the railway would 
be fully repaired by November 1. Darling was skeptical in 
view of the poor labor productivity he had seen. 
Supervision was so lacking that nearly everywhere the
construction was proceeding in the wrong order. Ballasting
had to be completed before the winter frost or much of the 
work would be undone. To ensure that the line could carry 
traffic through the coming winter, Darling insisted that 
their efforts should be concentrated on ballasting, building 
construction and water supply. He was also critical of the 
chain of command. Ostensibly the line was divided into two 
districts, yet neither chief engineer had full control of 
his section, and to make matters worse, all heavy equipment
g
was under someone else's authority.
On their return trip they stopped at the camp where the 
workers had tried to board the train, and the railway
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officials went to the workers' committee meetings and agreed
to all their demands. Afterwards, the workers told them
that had the train not stopped, they were prepared to blow
up the tracks. This had a disquieting effect on the Russian
engineers, who prudently attended line committee meetings on
the rest of the southern leg. Darling accompanied the
railway officials and found them consenting to everything
the workers requested. He asked once why whole stretches of
track seemed deserted, with the work left incomplete. The
Russians alluded to "one or two holidays" —  there were
hundreds of religious holidays in Russia, different from
region to region, and it was impossible to keep them all
7straight. Probably the men were in camp.
Darling made a formal report of his inspection to the 
commission, but the commission was not invited to offer 
recommendations for the Murman line. The problems that 
Darling turned up —  the chief one being the risky 
postponement of ballasting before winter set in —  were not 
taken up by the -Ministry of Transport or the Railway 
Department. Stevens did not press the issue, preferring to 
concentrate the commission's efforts on the Trans-Siberian. 
By the time Darling returned to Petrograd, Stevens had 
achieved his breakthrough with Kerensky and he was 
anticipating his second trip over the Trans-Siberian 
accompanied by Ustrugov. They were to see for themselves the 
adoption of new operating methods, longer engine runs and
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rotation of shifts in the repair shops. For the time being 
the British were stymied in their efforts to involve thegStevens Mission with the rest of Russia's railways.
Stevens1 high hopes in mid-August quickly began to fade 
as Ustrugov came up with one excuse after another for 
delaying their departure. Finally, Ustrugov told the 
commission to leave without him and he would join them one 
or two days later. Stevens complained to Francis, who 
warned Foreign Minister Tereshchenko that if Ustrugov did 
not make good his promise it would be "almost a breach of 
international courtesy." Stevens, Miller and Darling and 
the remaining staff of the commission left Petrograd on the 
night of August 24. The Ambassador saw them off. He 
reported to the State Department that Stevens had been 
demoralized in recent days, threatening to disband the 
commission, but that the chairman had "left in good
9spirits."
Their eastward journey took nearly a month. Enroute, 
they spent two days in Tomsk and another day inspecting the 
nearby Taiga mines, which were now putting out a dismal 
twenty-five tons of coal per day, less than one percent of 
their capacity. They were in the Manchurian city of Harbin 
long enough to dispatch a cable to Willard. This single, 
undated cable from Stevens was almost ebullient about 
conditions on the railway. He described "a decided 
improvement...already as a result of our work and expect
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much greater results from our present trip with government 
officials.” Later dispatches in October bear this out? 
there is no doubt that the capacity of the Trans-Siberian 
improved at this time while the situation in European Russia 
rapidly disintegrated. Ustrugov joined the commission in 
Siberia, and the group proceeded methodically eastward, 
meeting with the railway officials and implementing changes 
in the operation. Stevens was carrying out the President's 
directive "to serve Russia on the ground.
Stevens was completely out of contact with Petrograd 
and Washington until his arrival in Vladivostok. In his one 
cable to Willard he stated that he had heard nothing from 
Lansing or Willard since August 17. He did not know the 
status of his locomotive orders nor how soon he could depend 
on the twelve units of operators that he had sent for. He 
wanted instructions sent to Vladivostok. For his part, 
Willard was equally anxious for word from Stevens. Two 
telegrams that he sent to Stevens at Harbin went astray. In 
the first one Willard explained the progress of raising and 
outfitting American railroadmen to go to Siberia. Samuel M. 
Felton, the director general of military railroads, was 
responsible for organizing what was now being called the 
Russian Railway Service Corps, and with his large staff was 
"giving his entire time to the matter." In addition one 
hundred mechanics were being sent to supervise the 
construction of the engine shops at Vladivostok. As always,
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there were snags. In a second cable, Willard announced that
the Russian Railway Service Corps and the one hundred
mechanics were to be paid by the Russian government through
credit in the United States. Before they could leave, there
had to be definite agreement on this. Assuming mistakenly
that Stevens was in contact with the Ministry of Transport
¥
in Petrograd, Willard called on Stevens to finalize these
arrangements.^
When Stevens finally reached Vladivostok he was given
new orders to return to Petrograd. Miller and Darling were
to stay in Vladivostok and assist with the deployment of
American personnel when they arrived, while Stevens was
needed in the Russian capital as a contact with the Ministry
of Transport. A last meeting with Ustrugov in their train at
Vladivostok reaffirmed that the Russians would provide
accomodations for the American personnel, and finalized the
layout of the engine shops for Baldwin Locomotive, which
were to be completed by November 15. After the arduous
four-week trip from Petrograd, Stevens was ill again and
weary of train travel, but following a few days rest, he set
12out once more on the 5,000 mile journey across Siberia.
Ironically, Stevens' inspection of the Trans-Siberian 
and his removal from the political crisis unfolding in 
Petrograd during the month of September gave him the most 
optimistic outlook on the railway situation that he had 
during his entire time in Russia. The commission was seeing
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real progress on the eastbound trip across Siberia, and for 
the first time they had tangible evidence that their mission 
was making a difference. Their morale was high. Meanwhile, 
the British and French were beginning to despair for the 
Russian situation. In mid-September, Colonel House was 
informed by his London contact that the British had begun to 
look on Russia as "a hopeless problem.” Once again, just as 
it had in the Ukraine in July, the Stevens Mission was 
forming a hopeful impression from the situation in one part 
of Russia while calamities were occurring elsewhere in the 
empire. The importance of the Trans-Siberian was eclipsed 
in September by the collapse of the railways in European 
Russia.^
Two significant events in early September had 
transformed the situation. On September 1, Riga was 
abandoned to the Germans. This portended a debacle on the 
Russian front. After years of exhausting stalemate, 
Europeans had become almost obsessive in their expectation 
of a "break," like a dam bursting, that would transform the 
war of the trenches back into a war of movement. Though no 
German march on Petrograd occurred, it seemed to the Allies 
in early September that the loss of Riga would unleash the 
German divisions like floodwaters across the Russian 
plain.
The other event had an enormous impact on the internal 
affairs of Russia. This was the Kornilov Affair, an
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attempted counterrevolution led by the commander-in-chief of
the Russian Army. For weeks before Kornilov's attempted
march on the capital, forces on the Right had rallied around
this intensely patriotic general. The Left, meanwhile, had
grown suspicious that Kerensky was in collusion with him.
When Kornilov finally marched, it was the Bolsheviks who
took the lead in arming the workers' militia to defend
Petrograd. On the approach to the city, Kornilov's army
melted away as the railwaymen tore up the tracks and wrecked
the engines in his path. The failed counterrevolution
destroyed Kerensky's efforts to moderate between the Left
and the Right, and increased the popularity of the
Bolsheviks. Now the latter's representation in the Petrograd
Soviet began to mount steadily toward a majority —  their
15self-proclaimed mandate for seizing power.
Significantly the British were deeply implicated in the
attempt by the Right to overthrow Kerensky. General Alfred
Knox, the ranking British military observer in Russia, led a
brigade of British armored cars in Kornilov's march on the
capital. The British had scarcely disguised their
enthusiasm for Kornilov on the eve of the attempted coup,
believing that he was their best hope for staving off a
Russian separate peace. It was an indication of the
diverging priorities of British and American policy in
Russia that the British looked favorably on Kornilov while
16Wilson stood by Kerensky.
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The Kornilov Affair compressed the timetable of
revolution. Stevens, crossing Siberia at the time, still
thought he had three to four months to produce some
improvement on the railways. Western observers generally
had assumed that the Provisional Government would face its
critical test in the winter of 1917-18; now they saw its
collapse was imminent. The British and French believed that
Stevens was cut off from the changed situation in European
Russia, ignorant of its urgency. In August, the French had
sent an engineer to Russia? in September the British sent
their own man, General A. DeCandolle, and pressured the
Provisional Government to appoint him "advisor" to the
Ministry of Transport. Even the American military attache at
the Petrograd embassy, Colonel Judson, concurred with the
British in late September that Stevens' long absence from
Petrograd had made him "out of touch with the general
situation." When the British learned in early October that
Stevens was on his way to Petrograd, they were ambivalent.
They hoped that the United States was finally preparing to
assume a greater role in the critical railway situation, yet
17they questioned Stevens' competence for the role.
The railwaymen were growing restive at the time of the 
Kornilov revolt. Sharp inflation and rising food prices had 
badly eroded their wages. Some line committees were 
becoming impatient with Vikzhel's protracted efforts to 
extract wage increases from the government. A powerful
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union of railwaymen on the Moscow-Petrograd line submitted
its own wage demands to the government in late August, and a
major strike threatened just days after the Stevens Mission
18had departed for Siberia.
The American consul in Moscow, Maddin Summers, alerted 
the State Department to this crisis on August 25. In the 
past, the Provisional Government had granted higher wages 
only to the most radical elements of the union, the yard 
workers in Moscow and Petrograd. Lacking the revenue to do 
anything else, it had responded with promises and delays to 
the rest. Now the union, acting independently from Vikzhel, 
sent a delegation to the Ministry of Transport warning that 
only the immediate approval of higher wages would avert a 
strike. Summers' initial interpretation was that the 
threatened strike was politically motivated: the union
wanted to demonstrate its power to cripple a government of 
the Right.^
Two days later, Summers had reason to reassess the 
crisis. Minister of Transport P. P. Yurenev went to Moscow 
and made an extraordinary appeal to the All-Russian Congress 
of Railwaymen. As obstructive as Vikzhel had been to the 
government's control of the railways, the Ministry of 
Transport now faced a worse spectre. Vikzhel was at least a 
moderating influence over the unions; if it could not 
control them the demands could proliferate and the strikes 
could spread. The government needed Vikzhel. Speaking to
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the Congress of Railwaymen, Yurenev denied rumors that the
government was about to "resort to repressive measures," nor
did he believe rumors that the Congress of Railwaymen
intended to assume control of the railways. The danger,
Yurenev insisted, was from those who sought to undermine the
existing sources of authority. Vikzhel and the Ministry of
Transport would continue to work together. Appealing to
their patriotism, he concluded, "Unless we shall be able to
accomplish heroic deeds in the way of repairing rolling
20stock we shall witness terrible things in Russia."
On August 30 the crisis took definite shape: the Union
of Locomotive Operating Crews on the Moscow-Petrograd line
promised to strike if they did not receive their wage
demands. Yurenev stood firm, referring their request as
usual for arbitration by a special railway commission that
had been established in April. To the union he coolly
responded, "I cannot believe that the railroad men would
decide to strike a cruel blow at their motherland at the
21moment of deadly danger."
A three-way struggle between the union's strike 
committee, Vikzhel and the Ministry of Transport followed. 
The strike committee threatened to end passenger traffic at 
midnight September 2, and official traffic at noon September 
3. Freight traffic would be suspended from September 3 to 
September 4. Only military and medical trains would be 
allowed to run. On September 1 a delegation from the
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All-Russian Railwaymen1s Union convinced the strike
22committee to negotiate, and the strike was called off.
Vikzhel halted the centrifugal forces of the local
unions in this crisis, but by late September it could no
longer prevent a spate of spontaneous strikes by various
line committees that had ceased looking to Vikzhel for
leadership. Vikzhel had compromised itself by its
cooperation with the government, and now it was virtually as
powerless as the Ministry of Transport? it was only able to
assume leadership of the critical strike along the Moscow
Central Railway by calling a general railway strike and then
bringing it to an early conclusion. Locomotive crews on the
line received wage increases, but the wage demands of the
rank and file were not granted? instead the government gave
the union control of the food supply for its workers.
Kerensky was willing to grant wage increases for the
locomotive engineers only on the condition that they come
from higher passenger fares. Some line committees continued
23the strike in defiance of Vikzhel.
In view of the railwaymen's suspicion of any attempt by 
the government to extend military control over the lines, 
the British call for intervention on the railways was
clearly unrealistic. How could the unions accept orders 
from Allied or American personnel if they were already wary 
of the Provisional Government's intentions? If the 
railwaymen had responded so effectively in obstructing the
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advance of Kornilov's army on Petrograd, how might they 
react to British or American efforts to take control of the 
railways? If Allied intervention was opposed by the Soviet, 
let alone the Provisional Government, their resistance would 
be stronger yet. Even the Russian Railway Service Corps, 
invited by the Provisional Government and bound for 
positions in Siberia far from the political turmoil in 
Petrograd, would have to proceed cautiously, for it would be 
regarded with suspicion by all the line committees that were 
accustomed to controlling their own affairs, protecting 
their jobs and striving for better wages. It was a delicate 
matter, indeed potentially scandalous, that the government 
was mustering the funds to pay the American railroadmen in 
Siberia while it could not meet the wage demands of its own 
people on the railways around MoscowI
Yet the British persisted in looking for ways to get 
hold of the railways and save as much as they could of the 
eastern front. No longer very hopeful of sustaining 
Kerensky's government through the winter, the British began 
to search for sectors of the eastern front that could be 
preserved independently of the government in Petrograd. On 
the southern end of the thousand-mile front Rumanian and 
Russian forces defended what remained of Rumania's 
territory. Rumania had entered the war on Russia's side in 
1916, only to be quickly overrun by the Germans. The 
capital, Bucharest, and the fertile plain of the Danube
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River had been lost, but the Rumanians still clung to the
northern third of their country, the government having
evacuated to the city of Jassy. The Russian army in Rumania,
with its supply lines running back into the Ukraine, was
relatively well fed and undisrupted by German and Bolshevik
propaganda. But the breakdown of the railways in the
Ukraine now threatened to starve Rumania. From Jassy, the
foreign legations sent out urgent cables in the fall of
1917. Six hundred thousand Rumanian and Russian soldiers
were largely feeding upon the country, depleting the crops
and cattle. The armies and the civilian population faced a
famine winter. The British and French embassies in
Petrograd called on the Americans to send a "good railway
man" to the Russian Black Sea port of Odessa to assist in
24rail transport from the Ukraine to Rumania.
Another front that the British hoped to support in the
event of a Russian debacle in the north was the
Trans-Caucasus front on the border of Turkey. The
deteriorating railway situation had virtually isolated this
region from the government in Petrograd, and since the
Americans were not involved with the railways there, the
British began formulating their own plans for the
25reorganization of transport.
The clearest signal that the British were preparing to 
intervene in the Russian railway situation was the arrival 
in Petrograd on September 14 of the British General A.
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DeCandolle, whom the British had forced the Provisional 
Government to accept as an "advisor" to the Ministry of 
Transport. Ostensibly DeCandolle's mission was to assess the 
railway problems and make recommendations, both to the 
Ministry of Transport and to the British Foreign Office. At 
the time of DeCandolle's arrival Stevens was out of contact 
in Siberia. DeCandolle's presence in the Russian capital put 
pressure on the United States government to send another
railroadman and increase the American involvement.
2 6Otherwise the initiative would pass to the British.
In three days DeCandolle held two interviews with 
Tereshchenko, sifted through reems of data at the Ministry 
of Transport and wrote a preliminary report to the Foreign 
Office. His preliminary report agreed basically with the 
views of the Stevens Mission: labor problems and a failure 
of administration were chiefly to blame for the crisis. 
DeCandolle absolved the railway officials in the Ministry of 
Transport. They were competent men. The source of 
disorganization was in the lower echelons, where corruption, 
demoralization and the absence of a clear chain of command 
had bred chaos. But DeCandolle's recommendations differed 
from those of the Stevens Commission on one vital matter: 
the British general believed it was useless to attempt 
reforms in methods of operation —  such as longer engine 
runs or dispatching —  until the railway divisional staffs 
were reorganized, or replaced by personnel from the United
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States or Great Britain. Essentially he recommended that
units like the ones that the United States was raising for
the Trans-Siberian should be formed quickly and sent to run
27the lines all over European Russia.
After filing this report DeCandolle departed on a
ten-day inspection of the Donets Basin. Conditions had
changed dramatically since the Stevens Mission had been over
the railways in the Ukraine in July. DeCandolle found
railway traffic almost at a standstill? the lack of movement
in the military sector was especially ominous. In the
repair shops workers were idle, or simply absent, while
locomotives were breaking down faster than they could
possibly be put back into service. Coal production in the
Donets mines was still declining, even as more men were
2 8employed in them.
Upon his return DeCandolle held several conferences at
the French and American embassies, trying to enlist support
for some broader plan of railway assistance than that now
being effected in Siberia -by the Stevens Commission. He
wanted an advisor, preferably an American, appointed
immediately who would bring to Russia a large corps of
personnel for overseeing communications along the railway
lines and labor in the repair shops and the coal mines. As
the British Foreign Office construed his recommendations,
the advisor would "direct [an] Allied intervention on [the]
29Railways of European Russia."
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DeCandolle and the British learned in early October 
that Stevens was on his way back to Petrograd, but in 
Petrograd both American and Russian officials stressed to 
DeCandolle that the Stevens Mission's work was confined to 
the Trans-Siberian Railway. Stevens, DeCandolle was led to 
think-, would not be called upon to undertake the 
reorganization of the railways in European Russia. This was 
something of a relief to DeCandolle, for the British general 
had taken a disliking to Stevens. He was critical of the 
American engineer's work before the two men had ever met and 
he readily agreed that Stevens' work on the Trans-Siberian 
was "task enough." To the Foreign Office DeCandolle 
confided doubts about Stevens' judgment and his ability to 
work forcefully with the Provisional Government. On October 
11 the Foreign Office instructed the British ambassador in 
Washington, Cecil Spring-Rice, to urge the United States to 
send a new man to Russia.^
The British discouragement with Stevens finally rubbed
off on Francis. Though the ambassador had not always trusted
Stevens' tact with the Russians, he had held the chairman's
judgment in high esteem. But in late September his
confidence in Stevens was shaken. The situation had become
so grave, he cabled Lansing, that he recommended that the
State Department send the "biggest railroad man available,
31even Willard himself."
Neither Lansing nor Willard, however, ever considered
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sending a new railroad man to Russia. In three months
Stevens had acquired a knowledge of the Russian railways,
labor problems and the personalities in the Provisional
Government. No man could step into the situation and hope to
act quickly in an informed manner. When Francis called for
a new railroad man for the railways west of the Urals,
Willard wired back that Stevens was the best man for the
job. Lansing had not yet decided whether the chairman
should assume an advisory post in the Ministry of Transport.
The British were talking of an American "Tsar of Russian
Railways" who would direct American (or Allied) control.
Lansing could not accept the British plan, nor could he
overtly disappoint them, for they had their own candidate
now in DeCandolle and they were becoming insistent that they
would act without the United States if necessary. So he was
32deliberately vague about Stevens' new assignment.
The essential conflict between the Foreign Office and
Washington at this time was whether Wilson would redefine
the purpose of the Stevens Mission. The British viewed the
commission as an entering wedge? Wilson did not. The United
States government held to the position that the
reorganization of the railways had to be a Russian
initiative. By ordering Stevens back to Petrograd, the
United States was able to appease the British, while still
avoiding deeper American involvement on the Russian 
33railways.
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Stevens arrived in Petrograd October 14. Lansing was
anxious to restore the breach between Stevens and Francis.
Through Willard, he instructed the chairman to "cooperate as
closely as possible with the American Ambassador in
Petrograd and keep him fully informed concerning [his] plans
and movements." For his part, Francis saw the direction of
policy in Washington and revised his opinion of Stevens
accordingly. He passed on to Lansing Miller's claim that
the stockpiles at Vladivostok had been reduced by forty
percent, and that the commission's recommendations were
"being put in operation rapidly." After his meeting with
Stevens at the embassy on October 15, Francis came away
satisfied that Stevens was competent. When they discussed
DeCandolle's gloomy observations of the railways in the
Donets region, Francis was impressed to learn that the
commission had tried to head off the very problems that
34DeCandolle described with recommendations m  early August.
The State Department acted as though Stevens' presence 
in Petrograd was enough to quell British demands for a new 
railroad man. Ambasssador Spring-Rice's inquiry of October 
11 was left unanswered. Lansing did not inform the British 
specifically what Stevens' new functions were, but only 
cabled a vaguely-worded message to Francis, stating that 
Stevens would act as an advisor to the Ministry of 
Transport, and that "no better selection than Stevens could 
be made for [the] particular place or duties you had in mind
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in Petrograd." Nor did the American embassy inform
DeCandolle? the British general still assumed that the
Stevens Mission was limiting its concerns to the
Trans-Siberian. Just a few weeks earlier DeCandolle had had
Francis' ear at the American embassy? now he was not even
informed of Stevens' appointment. Francis had grasped
Lansing's intent: the State Department was endeavoring
diplomatically to steer an independent course from Britain,
and forestall Allied intervention in Russia by trying to
keep the matter of railroad assistance between the Russian
and American governments. Lansing was abiding by Wilson's
desire that railroad assistance not conflict with Russia's
self-determination. Since this policy did not satisfy the
British, he could only maintain the situation by clouding it
35and keeping the British guessing.
Stevens accomodated himself to Lansing's diplomacy
equally well. He described his new position as "what the
Russian called Director-General of all railways, but knowing
the Russians, I interpreted it correctly as meaning
'advisor'." Stevens' sardonic appraisal of his role as a
smoke screen for the helpless Ministry of Transport meshed
3 6perfectly with Lansing's objectives.
As soon as Stevens accepted the post, he was told that 
he, Francis, Tereshchenko and Liverovskii would soon make a 
trip to Mogilev to confer with the army staff in charge of 
military railways. But a few days later Tereshchenko
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admitted that there would be delays; they would depart on 
October 21 or 24. On October 26 Stevens and Francis were 
still in the capital; they discussed the situation and 
decided to abandon the planned visit to Stavka. Thus for two 
weeks Stevens waited for orders from the Provisional 
Government. He understood the government's weakness and had 
abandoned his coercive policy. His inaction, however, began 
drawing sharp criticism from British officials in Petrograd. 
General Poole of the British Military Equipment Section, the 
man who had urged the commission to inspect the Murman 
Railway, goaded Stevens with a letter that questioned his 
assessments. The main issue, for Poole, was whether Stevens 
had badly underestimated the shortage of locomotives. 
DeCandolle's report had agreed with the Russians' assessment 
on this point (it was the one disturbing discrepancy between 
DeCandolle's view of the situation and that of the American 
commission), and Poole implied that Stevens' lower estimates 
were faulty and debilitating to the program of American 
railroad assistance. Stevens replied with a curt 
explanation of the basis of his estimates, and reminded 
Poole that the commission was only advisory. The United 
States government was not responsible for the Russian 
railways, he stated, and the rumors that his commission 
planned to take over operations of the railways were 
counter-productive and "entirely unfounded." He saw no need 
to exchange reports with the British military, he added,
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since his commission did not even send formal reports to 
37Washington.
DeCandolle, meanwhile, stepped up his demands on the
Minister of Transport, Liverovskii. The minister tried to
appease DeCandolle with a promise that his government would
create a special bureau for labor problems, but DeCandolle
had drawn up a comprehensive plan of his own, a virtual
blueprint for intervention, which he presented in a
"confidential note" to Liverovskii. The core of his plan was
the creation of a "Department of Relationship," staffed by
American or Allied personnel but attached to the Provisional
Government. The department would oversee such far-reaching
problems as the coal supply to the railways, the
reorganization of engine repair shops, and the improvement
of transportation on waterways, and it would include a
subordinate department for arbitrating labor disputes. To
assure Russian cooperation with his "Department of
Relationship," DeCandolle insisted that it would handle
3 8distribution of food for the railwaymen and its own staff!
DeCandolle also dispatched a memorandum to the British
General Staff, reiterating the urgent need for an American
or Allied representative. "Whoever is selected should have
great tact, character and railway experience....The vital
point is that the control should be in the hands of America
or some other Ally and preferably under the direction of one
39man and not of a commission."
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Stevens and Francis met with Tereshchenko and
Liverovskii on October 25 to request an assignment for
Stevens. The engineer suggested that he travel south and
implement his commission's recommendations on the railways
in the Ukraine. He was impatient and no doubt affected by
Poole's carping letter, which he had answered that day..
Tereshchenko, however, was reluctant and agitated, and
finally burst out that his government did not require any
assistance and was being assailed with "altogether too much
advice." Two days after this meeting, Tereshchenko changed
his mind. He summoned the "director-general of all
railways" and requested him to inspect the line from Moscow
to Omsk, with a view to increasing food supplies from
western Siberia. The foreign minister told Stevens that this
40was the most pressing railway problem in Russia.
The political situation in Petrograd was desperate at 
the end of October. A Bolshevik coup seemed imminent, and 
the disposition of the Petrograd garrison in such an event 
was in doubt. In Stevens' estimation, many of the Russian 
ministers wanted to "let go of the bear's tail." The 
railway situation placed Tereshchenko and the minister of 
transport in a vice: they were faced with paralysis and
anarchy on the one hand, and an encroaching Allied 
intervention on the other, each closing in on the middle 
ground that the Provisional Government had staked out for 
the revolution. It was part of the larger dilemma between
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war and peace that Russia faced throughout 1917: a
democratic revolution could no more survive the continuing 
war effort, and the spreading radical dissent that that 
produced, than it could survive a separate peace with 
imperial Germany and a severance of ties to the western 
democracies. Tereshchenko's extreme discomfiture with 
railroad assistance at this time can be glimpsed from his 
remarks on the eve of the Bolshevik coup, when he had to 
defend the Stevens Commission before —  of all people —  the 
minister of defense. In a closed meeting between their two 
ministries, the latter complained to Tereshchenko that 
American railroad assistance was an empty gesture, that too 
few locomotives had arrived to even offset the losses, that 
the American engineers' recommendations on the 
Trans-Siberian had yielded nothing. To this last point, 
Tereshchenko responded that according to his figures the 
Stevens Commission had increased the capacity of the 
Trans-Siberian five-fold. But through the minister of 
defense's diatribe about numbers of locomotives and rolling 
stock, Tereshchenko was silent; the record spoke for
• 4- 4 1ltself.
As Stevens left Petrograd for the Ukraine, the British 
were still uninformed about American intentions. General 
DeCandolle believed that the State Department still intended 
to send some "really big people." Confused, the Foreign 
Office sent notes to Buchanan in Petrograd and Spring-Rice
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in Washington to pin down the State Department —  had it or
had it not requested the Provisional Government to give
Stevens direction of all the Russian railways? The War
Office sent a similar message to both ambassadors on
November 7: "Failing selection of Mr. Stevens it is hoped
that United States Government will at once nominate a man of
42similar qualifications."
This flurry of diplomatic notes from the British still
drew no immediate response from the State Department. United
States railroad assistance was not delimited until November
11, when the State Department informed Spring-Rice of
Stevens' advisory capacity as director-general. The United
States was standing by its offer to cooperate and assist,
but it did not deem appropriate the proposals for
43intervention and control of the railways.
By then the Provisional Government had been swept from
power by the Bolshevik Revolution. On the night of November
7 the Bolsheviks seized the telegraph office and moved on
the Winter Palace. The next day the Bolsheviks proclaimed a
new government, arresting all the ministers of the
Provisional Government except Kerensky, who fled the city in
44disguise in a car commandeered from the American embassy.
CHAPTER SIX
WITHDRAWAL
Stevens was on his way back from Omsk, satisfied that 
he had expedited the grain shipments on the main lines from 
western Siberia to Moscow, when he heard rumors of the 
Bolshevik coup in Petrograd. His train continued west but 
got no further than Moscow, for rail traffic had ceased 
along the troubled line from Moscow to Petrograd. The 
Bolshevik insurgents were fighting for the city, and Stevens 
was unable to telephone or telegraph Francis, one side or 
the other having cut the wires. Stranded, he watched the 
street fighting intensify and heard rumors that the 
Bolsheviks had captured the Kremlin. After a few days holed 
up in his train car with his clerk and his interpreter, 
Stevens managed to reach the ambassador by telephone. He 
tried to explain the conditions in Moscow, but Francis 
seemed unappreciative, describing the Bolshevik insurrection 
as a "mere flurry" and predicting that Kerensky would soon 
"come back stronger than ever." He told Stevens to return 
to Petrograd. When the chairman explained that it was 
impossible, Francis advised him to wait in Moscow until the 
rail link was restored; he could contact Summers at the 
consulate if necessary.'*'
Even after this conversation, Stevens had no intention 
of trying to get back to Petrograd, for the fighting in
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Moscow persuaded him that the situation was "desperate" and
"looked like civil war," Later he would contend that
Francis had tried to deceive him, describing the relative
calm in Petrograd without telling him that Kerensky had left
the city and other government ministers had gone into
hiding. As soon as the railways were nominally in the hands
of the Bolsheviks, Stevens implored the Commissar of
Railways to find him a train to the east. On November 12
his car was attached to a train headed northeast to Vologda,
where it would connect with the Siberian Express. Hastily he
wired Francis that he was going east and would wait in
Harbin for the arrival of the Russian Railway Service Corps.
As it turned out, Stevens' train was the last Siberian
2Express for the next four years to make the entire journey.
News of the Bolshevik coup, though disturbing, did not 
come as a shock to the administration in Washington. The 
Bolsheviks had increased their strength in the Soviet 
steadily since the Kornilov Affair, and they had made no 
secret of their intention to seize power from the 
Provisional Government. Kerensky's government had grown 
perceptibly weaker in the last two weeks before the coup. 
Speaking to a correspondent of the Associated Press in late 
October, Kerensky had said that Russia was on the defensive 
on the battlefields and the burden of attacking Germany must 
now fall to the Allies. This prompted the alarming 
Washington Post headline, "Russia quits war." But if
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Russia's war effort appeared crippled under Kerensky's
leadership, his heir to power, V. I. Lenin, the intense,
bald-headed Bolshevik leader, went further, issuing a Decree
of Peace on November 8, the first day of the new regime. To
the American public, this was the most alarming implication
of the Bolshevik Revolution. The Bolsheviks were pledged to
take Russia out of the war. But Wilson knew that the
Bolsheviks could not deliver peace overnight, for they could
not survive politically if they simply capitulated, and if
they negotiated, Wilson was sure the Germans would try to
extract unacceptable terms. The Decree of Peace was neither
a surrender nor an olive branch to the German government,
but a call to international revolution. Reflecting on the
Bolsheviks' predicament, Wilson likened Lenin's brazen
effort to end the war by decree to "opera bouffe." Since
they had promised the impossible, it seemed as though the
Bolsheviks could not last. Various moderate socialists in
Russia predicted the Bolsheviks' imminent downfall, and the
Wilson administration saw no reason to doubt their view.
The new leaders of Russia were professional revolutionaries
without any administrative experience and they had inherited
a state of near anarchy. How could they possibly hold on
3long to the reins of power?
Even so, the Bolshevik coup raised a number of pressing 
and difficult issues. The collapse of the Provisional 
Government and the advent of an anti-democratic regime
hostile to the Allies was the very calamity that Wilson had 
been trying to avoid since August. From the outset Wilson 
presumed that the Bolsheviks did not represent the will of 
the people? he observed correctly that the Bolsheviks had 
gained power with the help of copious money and propaganda 
from the Germans. The first problem was the official 
attitude of the United States government to the new regime 
in Petrograd. Lenin made clear the attitude of his 
government to the Allies immediately by publishing and 
denouncing the secret treaties between imperial Russia and 
the western Allies. These treaties pledged the signatories 
to a long list of territorial adjustments at the expense of 
the Central Powers. Bringing to light these starkly 
imperialist war aims was calculated to sow discord in the 
legislatures and the news media of the western democracies, 
and spark revolution, for Lenin at this time was banking on 
an international revolution. The Bolsheviks showed no 
desire to assist the Allies against Germany, and as Lansing 
pointed out again and again, as internationalists they were 
"avowedly opposed to every [national] government on 
earth...they [were] as hostile to democracy as they [were] 
to autocracy." Lansing urged a policy of non-recognition 
and Wilson agreed. For Lansing it was the Bolsheviks' 
ideology which made recognition unwise. "I cannot see how 
this element which is hostile to the very idea of 
nationality can claim that they are the Government of a
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nation or expect to be recognized as such," he wrote.
Wilson took the view that the Bolshevik regime was too
unstable and had too little popular support to be considered 
4"legitimate."
Another political issue raised by the Bolshevik
Revolution was. whether a belated revision of Allied war aims
could affect the internal situation in Russia. This question
could not be separated from another one, whether the Allies'
refusal to discuss war aims in October had contributed
decisively to Kerensky's downfall. A mood of
self-recrimination, even a desire for atonement, weighed
heavily on the western Allies after the Bolshevik takeover.
Wilson stirred these sentiments when he told Congress on
December 4 that if the Allies had revised their war aims in
the summer, he believed the Provisional Government could
have been saved. Socialists in Britain's Parliament seized
on the President1s words and charged their government with a
"grave and terrible blunder" in refusing to redefine war
aims. It was clearly an auspicious time for Wilson to push
his own liberal war aims in Britain and France? the public
5mood m  Russia, however, was mscrutible.
Colonel House believed that the Bolshevik leaders 
themselves could be lured back into the coalition against 
Germany. Lansing did not think so, but if war aims revision 
would not influence the Bolsheviks, it would strengthen the 
position of the moderate socialists against the ruling
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Bolsheviks. This appealed to Wilson, who still had 
confidence in the democratic forces in Russia. Thus House 
and Lansing might have differed widely on their views of the 
Bolsheviks, but there was a consensus in the administration 
that the most promising way to influence Russia was through 
a conciliatory approach of war aims revision. Vital to this 
policy was a continuing respect for Russia's 
self-determination. It dictated continuing restraint in the 
railway situation. Wilson believed that whatever an Allied 
intervention could accomplish for the Russian forces on the 
eastern front, it would be debilitating to the forces ofgdemocracy in Russia.
The Allies took up the question of intervention as they 
convened in Paris to organize a much needed unified command, 
a Supreme War Council. This conference had been planned for 
months; it was happenstance that it brought together the 
leaders of Britain, France and Italy just as the Bolsheviks 
took power in Russia. Now the Allies considered a new 
vehicle for intervention; instead of taking over operation 
of the railways, they would give financial assistance to the 
opponents of the Bolsheviks who were coalescing on the edges 
of the Russian empire, particularly in the Ukraine. Colonel 
House was attending the conference as an "observer," and 
notified Wilson of their deliberations. Apparently the 
Russian general, A. M. Kaledin and his army of Cossacks were 
opposed to the Bolsheviks and had declared they would carry
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on the war against Germany with Allied backing. Wilsonf
however, thought the situation was too chaotic to give them
recognition or material support. It was unclear whether
Allied support would be used against the Germans or against
another faction in Russia, and he would not support any
government in Russia unless it possessed more than local 
7support.
Though the conference was mainly concerned with 
military strategy, House went to Paris with instructions to 
get a major Allied statement on war aims. The Allies had 
pressed for American participation at the conference since 
October, and Wilson's concession to send House was a sign 
that the United States was moving away from its status as an 
"Associated Power;" indeed, Wilson was feeling his way 
toward assuming leadership of the Allied coalition. After 
the Bolshevik Revolution House was able to increase the 
pressure for a discussion of war aims. He wrote his chief 
that he was introducing a resolution declaring that the 
Allies were waging war neither for aggression nor 
indemnities. This was a deliberate echo of the Petrograd 
formula, "no annexations, no indemnities." House believed 
it would strengthen the moderate socialists in Russia and 
dissuade Lenin from making a separate peace. The British 
were supportive, but the Italians adamantly refused to give 
up their claims to Austrian territory. No Allied agreement 
on war aims emerged from the conference, and in December
gHouse went back to Washington empty-handed.
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Wilson was persuaded that he would have to project his
liberal war aims not through quiet coalition diplomacy, but
by going directly to the people. Already he had
commissioned some of the best minds in the United States,
his "Inquiry," to formulate peace terms that would secure
the borders in Europe while embodying the main goals he had
enunciated the previous January: open diplomacy,
disarmament, freedom of the seas, self-determination. Now
Wilson planned to draft his own principles of peace based on
the Inquiry's research and announce them to the world
himself. This became the famous Fourteen Points speech,
which he presented in January 1918. His sixth point, bearing
on Russia, is worth quoting in full:
VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and 
such a settlement of all questions affecting 
Russia as will secure the best and freest
cooperation of the other nations of the world in
obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed 
opportunity for the independent determination of 
her own political development and national policy 
and assure her of a sincere welcome into the 
society of free nations under institutions of her 
own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance 
also of every kind that she may herself desire.
The treatment accorded Russia by her sister
nations in the months to come will be the acid 
test of their good will, of their comprehension of 
her needs as distinguished from their own 
interests^ and of their intelligent and unselfish 
sympathy.
Whether or not the situation in Russia was Wilson's 
overriding concern as he wrote the speech, clearly an
important thrust of Wilson's Fourteen Points address was
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this bone thrown to the Bolsheviks and the Russian people. 
Lenin called the speech "a great step ahead towards the 
peace of the world." Through its agent in Russia, and with 
the assistance of the Bolsheviks, Wilson's Committee on 
Public Information distributed a million translations of the 
speech in handbills and posters in Petrograd and Moscow. It 
was the preparation of this momentous address on war aims 
that formed the background for Wilson's decisions on Russia 
through November and December. He pinned his hopes on the 
redeeming influence that his war aims speech would have in 
Russia.^
As the Allies continued to press for intervention in 
November and December, Wilson procrastinated. In Woodrow 
Wilson and World Politics, historian N. Gordon Levin Jr. 
describes the President's response to the Allies' queries as 
"erratic." He attributes Wilson's ambivalence to his divided 
counsels. "Two broad approaches towards Russia emerged 
within the Administration," Levin writes, Colonel House 
urging accomodation and Lansing pushing for "an overtly 
anti-Bolshevik p o s i t i o n . B u t  both House and Lansing 
agreed with the President that a large scale intervention 
would only rally the Russian people behind the Bolsheviks. 
There is no evidence that Wilson ever deviated from this 
view. The President's ambivalence stemmed not from the 
question of intervening but from the dilemmas of coalition 
diplomacy. To oppose categorically American involvement
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would only prompt the British and French to intervene
without the United States. He could no more afford a rupture
with Britain and France over intervention in November and
December, on the eve of his Fourteen Points address, than he
could in October, when he was trying to support the
Provisional Government. Wilson was preparing to assert
American leadership of the Allies: he wanted to strengthen
the coalition, not weaken it. So the State Department
continued with the same policy it had followed in October,
answering the Allies' call for intervention with evasions
and apparent indecision, while maintaining its leadership of
12railroad and financial assistance to Russia.
The Bolshevik Revolution threw into doubt the whole 
program of railroad assistance and Treasury loans. McAdoo 
first raised the issue in a cabinet meeting on November 9. 
He wanted to know if he should loan Russia more money to 
expedite the locomotive shipments. Wilson thought they must 
wait and see. The situation in Petrograd was still unclear; 
the Bolsheviks controlled the city, but Kerensky had gone 
for loyal troops. As bad as the situation appeared, Wilson 
decided, it was wrong to assume that Russia would 
collapse.^
The Bolshevik Revolution checked the flow of railroad 
material to Russia but it did not stop it. The day after 
this cabinet meeting Lansing consulted Baker on the schedule 
of locomotive shipments. The secretary of state thought
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that the railroad assistance should be contingent on
Russia's continuance in the war, and the locomotive
shipments should be suspended until Lenin's plans became
more clear. Lansing acknowledged that he was also
influenced by a November 2 message from Francis, which
stated that both Stevens and Miller were reporting
mismanagement and poor use of motive power in Siberia? he
suggested a "short delay pending word from Stevens," because
Stevens had indicated the "possibility of modified
recommendations," given the unfolding events. Apart from
the uncertain leadership in Russia, the locomotive shipments
were held up by the same obstacles that had hindered them
through the summer and fall —  real doubts that the
locomotives were being used effectively in Russia and the
14belief that they would be more valuable somewhere else.
Meanwhile Willard had pushed ahead Stevens' plans to 
reorganize the Trans-Siberian with American personnel. The 
director general of railroads, Felton, raised the Russian 
Railway Service Corps (RRSC) and appointed George Emerson, a 
former engineer of the Great Northern, as the Corps 
commander. The RRSC comprised 213 men. All the railroadmen 
in the Corps were given commissions and Emerson took the 
rank of colonel. The Corps sailed from San Francisco 
November 18, accompanied by 137 mechanics and interpreters 
employed by the Baldwin Locomotive Company. The dispatch of 
the RRSC revealed the administration's hope to continue its
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policy of cooperation, either with the Bolsheviks or another 
15regime.
Stevens was encouraged to preserve contact with the 
Bolsheviks. One cost of non-recognition was the isolation 
that it imposed on the embassy staff. Francis, with 
Lansing's approval, issued a gag order to his diplomatic 
corps, cutting it off from official contact with Russia's 
new leaders. This was strictly enforced; when Judson 
ignored the gag order and met with the Bolsheviks' foreign 
commissar, Leon Trotsky, he was reprimanded. But Stevens, 
as an advisor to the Ministry of Transport, now the 
Commissariat of Railways, was free to communicate with 
them. The Bolsheviks, for their part, were none too anxious 
to sever this slender contact with the American government, 
and the material assistance it might provide. According to 
a State Department press release in mid-December, the 
Stevens Mission was continuing its work on the 
Trans-Siberian and was in "constant contact" with the 
Bolsheviks' department of railways. When Stevens reached 
Vladivostok, disspirited and physically exhausted, and 
learned that Miller and Darling had left for the United 
States, he shot off another of his "hot" cables, requesting 
permission to go home. Willard promptly answered him, "Your 
work is appreciated but it is not finished." Stevens was a 
valuable emissary and his advice would be needed in deciding 
what to do with the RRSC.
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The administration's decisions on loans to Russia 
showed the same overriding concern with Russia's 
self-determination which constrained its efforts at railroad 
assistance. Secretary Lane had informed the President in 
August that credit, not shipping, had become the limiting 
factor in getting locomotives to Russia. In late September 
Ambassador Bakhmatev requested another loan. McAdoo balked, 
alarmed by the hopeless state of Russia's finances and the 
"enormous pressure on [the] Treasury from all sides." 
Increasingly, credit, like railroad assistance, was becoming 
so entangled with demands for intervention that it was no 
longer consistent with a policy of self-determination. A 
Navy Intelligence report, filed on October 31 while Kerensky 
was still in power, outlined United States naval operations 
in the event of an Allied intervention in Russia. The report 
recommended American involvement first and foremost to 
ensure repayment of loans. Clearly the Provisional 
Government's growing indebtedness was a menace to Russia's 
independence.^
More insidious was the Provisional Government's use of 
American loans to pay its mutinous soldiers and sailors in 
the border regions of the Russian empire, where the paper 
ruble had become useless currency. A precedent was set in 
July when the Russian finance minister asked Root to 
intercede with McAdoo and get a special, emergency 
$75, 000, 000 loan with which to buy Finnish marks to pay the
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striking sailors in the Russian Baltic Fleet stationed at
Helsingfors. In late October Francis conveyed a
"confidential" request from the minister of finance for
another $75,000,000 "for the same object as previous $75
million loan." This second loan was never made. The
earlier credit had already involved the State Department in
a complicated scheme to prevent mutiny in two Russian corps
on the Turkish front in the Caucasus. From August through
October the State Department sanctioned shipments of
American silver to Persia for the purchase of Persian
crowns, which had replaced paper rubles as unofficial
currency in the Caucasus. Over the course of three months
one million crowns were supplied by Persian banks for the
payment of Russian soldiers. Ostensibly this arrangement
was deemed a short term loan while the Russian government
shipped its own silver from the mint in Petrograd, but the
state of the railways made it impossible to get the silver
bullion from the capital to the Caucasus. Thus the separate
credit for a so-called "specific purpose" had gone into
18other channels.
As news of the political disorders in the capital 
spread to the Caucasus, the soldiers increased their 
demands. The American consul in Tiflis, F. Willoughby 
Smith, believed he had the situation well in hand. He had 
arranged the supply of Persian crowns in the fall, and he 
now estimated that the two Russian corps could be kept in
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the field at the cost of about eighteen million crowns 
monthly. Nearly a quarter of this expense could be met by 
shipping sugar and petroleum from Trans-Caucasia to northern 
Persia; the rest would have to come from the United States 
through Persian banks. Smith informed Lansing in November 
that both the Caucasus population and the army refused to 
accept the Bolshevik government, but without financial 
assistance he did not think the army could hold together for 
more than five days. He requested authorization to "draw 
$10,000,000 by telegraph." Lansing replied that such 
financial support would "tend to encourage sectionalism or 
disruption of Russia or civil war," and the State Department 
could not "encourage tendencies in any of these 
directions."^
Smith disclosed that the British had become involved in
financing the anti-Bolshevik government in Tiflis; the
British were supplying $13,500,000 for payment of the army
and planned to provide another $15,600,000 monthly. Lansing
sent Smith's cables to Colonel House in Paris, asking House
to find out what the British were up to. The British and
the French, House learned, were sending missions to Tiflis
and were inclined to intervene. "I consider it dangerous,"
House wrote, "for the reason that it is encouraging internal
20disturbances without a definite program m  mind."
Other pleas for intervention in the Ukraine were coming 
from the Rumanian government in Jassy: a Russo-German
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armistice would seal off the Rumanian Army. There were
suggestions that Allied assistance to the anti-Bolshevik
General Kaledin and his army in the Ukraine could be
combined with efforts to supply the Rumanians. One
memorandum circulating in the War Department in early
December estimated the cost of supplying the Rumanian Army
at $60,000,000 monthly, split between the United States,
Britain and France. The plan was to supply Rumania by way of
the Trans-Siberian Railway —  after deploying 13,000
Japanese and American troops in Siberia 1 The memorandum's
author concluded that the plan appeared "most chimerical"
21and "might start civil war."
Proposals for sending troops to Siberia had been 
circulating since August; their original intent was not 
anti-Bolshevik but pro-Kerensky, to give moral support to
the Russian war effort. American troops in the Philippines 
were readily available. The British were enthusiastic. 
Wilson raised this possibility in a cabinet meeting at the 
end of October, and though he did not reach a decision, he 
informed the press that the plan was under consideration. 
Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, Judson wrote from 
Petrograd that "many Russians" were recommending an American 
division be sent to Russia by the first available 
transport. The Army General Staff drew up a plan for 
deploying an expeditionary force in Russia, including 
details on the use of ice-breakers and the railways. But in
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late November Lansing quashed the plan, calling it
"unfeasable," and Baker too made up his mind that
22non-intervention was the only practical course.
The anti-Bolshevik forces coalescing in Siberia were 
even more motley than the Cossacks and camp followers of 
General Kaledin in the Ukraine. Wilson was looking for some 
faction in Russia which could galvanize the Russian populace 
and pull together the forces of democracy. In the Far East 
the population was so sparse and so remote from the 
government in Petrograd that the anti-Bolshevik forces were 
at first mere tools of international intrigue. The Chinese, 
the Japanese and the British all had an interest in 
disrupting Russian dominion in the Far East? the British 
wanted either the Japanese or the Americans to get control
of the Trans-Siberian in order to maintain the Allied
lifeline to the eastern front. (Incredibly, the British 
would soon entertain lively hopes of a large Japanese army 
deploying on a reconstituted eastern front at the end of
this 5,800 mile long supply line across Siberia.) The 
familiar problem arose: how could the United States
discourage, or at least temporize, an Allied intervention? 
But in the Far East the problem was more critical, due to 
the plainly imperialist intentions of Japan.
Through November the situation in Siberia was quiet but 
tense. When Stevens journeyed east the Bolsheviks' control 
extended only to the Urals; throughout Siberia there was no
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government other than the local authority exercised by each
town's soviet, few of which were Bolshevik. Along the
railway the operating methods introduced by the commission
in September had all been abandoned and the worker's
committees were in complete control. Stevens felt that
23fighting could erupt any day.
In Vladivostok the Soviet now exercised complete 
control over the city and port facilities. With Stevens 
approaching from the west and the RRSC on its way across the 
Pacific, rumors were rife that the Americans planned to 
occupy the port and seize the railway, in order to ensure 
repayment of Russia's loans. The arrival of an American 
warship, the U.S.S. Brooklyn, on November 25 increased 
suspicion. Actually the visit of the warship had been 
planned for some time with a view to lifting the morale of 
the Russian sailors in the port. When the U.S.S. Brooklyn 
arrived shortly before a local election for the Soviet, 
however, it appeared as though the warship's visit was 
intended .to prevent a Bolshevik takeover. The Bolsheviks 
did not yet command a majority in the Soviet, probably 
because the inhabitants did not want to provoke a Japanese 
or American occupation. Caldwell, the American consul, 
tried to assure the Soviet that United States railroad 
assistance and financial assistance were unconnected; the 
United States had no intent of extracting concessions for 
the loans it made. Meanwhile, Stevens conferred with the
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American consul in Harbin and decided that it would be
dangerous for the RRSC to disembark in Vladivostok. He
requested that Colonel Emerson of the RRSC be ordered not to
24land until he advised it.
As the Bolshevik Revolution spread from city to city 
along the Trans-Siberian in early December, the Bolsheviks' 
enemies (White Russians, as they came to be known) fled 
east, gathering across the Manchurian border in the towns 
along the Chinese Eastern Railway. From here the White 
Russians harried the Bolshevik forces and plotted against 
the government. The Bolsheviks sent two regiments into 
Manchuria against the Whites; they seized Harbin, ousted 
General Horvat and gained control of the Chinese Eastern. At 
the behest of the Allies, the Chinese sent 3,000 troops 
against the Bolsheviks, disarmed and deported both 
regiments, and occupied the Russian barracks along the 
railway. Horvat was reinstated as the governor-general, but 
once the Japanese had disclosed the concessions they wanted 
in return for their support, Horvat refused to form an 
independent government. Another anti-Bolshevik government 
sprang up under a leader more amenable to Japanese 
influence, and Horvat was deposed. Far from promising a 
nucleus for anti-Bolshevik support in Russia, this puppet 
government was only an entering wedge for the Japanese in 
Manchuria. A State Department memorandum concluded that none 
of the factions there "could make any claim to be
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. . 25representative of any large body of Russian opinion."
Stevens reached Vladivostok just as the U.S.S. Brooklyn
was weighing anchor for Nagasaki and Manila. The discipline
of the American sailors had had a stabilizing effect on the
city, and after their departure on December 11 the situation
in Vladivostok worsened. Now there were rumors that Japan
was about to send large numbers of troops to Vladivostok.
The Japanese reportedly had 800 soldiers already in
Vladivostok, disguised as civilian laborers, with their
weapons stowed. Another report indicated that the Japanese
had three divisions prepared for deployment at Vladivostok
and Harbin. The British and French supported a Japanese
occupation —  they made that clear at the Allied conference
in Paris —  and it seemed that the Japanese were sending
rumors to feel out the American attitude. The effect at
Vladivostok was to create an atmosphere of almost unbearable
tension. Stevens and Caldwell met with the Allied consuls
December 11 and they decided collectively that a "foreign
force" (preferably American but even a small Japanese one)
was desirable until the Allies had agreed on a common policy
2 6and could dispell the rumors.
It is hard not to impute an element of fear behind this 
request for foreign troops. Until then Stevens had 
consistently opposed military intervention; indeed he would 
have many occasions in the months ahead to caution against 
military confrontation with the Bolsheviks. Stevens had been
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badly shaken by his experiences over the past months. Even
after he had escaped the fighting in Moscow, his train car
was repeatedly broken into by soldiers on the arduous trip
across Siberia, and he was mystified that there were not
"general wholesale massacres" where the Bolsheviks were
trying to take power. Moreover his health was failing; he
had never fully recovered from the blood poisoning in June.
If he did not get out, he sometimes thought, the Russian
winter would likely do him in. The ice now forming around
the rim of the Golden Horn would not only seal up the
27harbor, it would probably entomb this old man in Russia.
Lansing was surprised by Stevens' and Caldwell's
message urging intervention. He happened to be meeting with
Root that day and discussed with him the situation at
Vladivostok. Root opposed intervention and reinforced
Lansing's view that the United States could not sanction a
large Japanese presence there. Considering Root's prior
difficulties with Stevens, Root probably was inclined to
discount some of the urgency in Stevens' message, while
Lansing, familiar with Stevens' habit of letting off steam
over the wires, had cause to agree. The secretary of state
sent a cautioning reply:
In view of importance of avoiding hostility it 
would seem wise to refrain from discussing or 
considering in any way the question of the 
advisability of presence of foreign force in 
Vladivostok at the present time and you may so 
advise9your colleagues if they bring up the matter 
again.
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On December 14 the transport Thomas arrived in the
harbor with Colonel Emerson and the RRSC. Stevens told
Emerson that a landing was currently out of the question.
Only a week earlier the crew of the U.S. S. Brooklyn had
enjoyed extensive liberty on shore, mingling with the
Russian population without incident. The situation had
changed abruptly; the Bolshevik press was stirring up the
populace against the RRSC and the Soviet was not about to
provide accomodations on land for the 350 men aboard the
Thomas. Stevens wired Willard, "Conditions make it
absolutely imperative to delay decision as to landing for
some time. It may be necessary to sail quick." He advised
him to "cable instantly placing ship Thomas under my orders
29for any port in Japan we may select. Lose no time."
The next day the situation grew more complicated. Many 
of the interpreters sent over by Baldwin Locomotive turned 
out to be radical Russian exiles who had signed on to get 
free passage and evade the Allied passport control 
authorities. Emerson had decided that these agitators 
should not be allowed to disembark, but the Bolsheviks were 
demanding their release. ̂
Stevens dispatched another cable to Willard, suggesting 
that he and the RRSC should sail to Japan until the 
situation cleared. It was "a serious error not to have 
brought rations," he wrote. "Emerson should be provided 
with plenty of money. A great good can be accomplished with
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right government in full power but worse than folly to
31undertake at the present moment."
On December 17 Colonel Emerson finally received
instructions from Washington: the ship was to wait in port
until further notice. Stevens was in a quandary.
Washington did not understand the situation: it was useless
to think of disembarking while the Bolsheviks were in power
in Petrograd. The Commissariat of Railways had offered no
funds, had no authority over railway operations in eastern
Siberia. Telegraph communications were out from Chita west.
Stevens was no longer in contact with Petrograd. The local
Soviet barely exercised control over the soldiers, who had
so intimidated the railwaymen that they were no longer
attempting to ship out freight traffic; only troop trains
moved between Vladivostok and First River. What made the
situation urgent was the ice. The ice breakers were in the
hands of the Bolsheviks and could not be relied upon to keep
the harbor open. Without ice breakers the Thomas at any
time might become stuck in the harbor. Stevens discussed
the situation with Caldwell and both agreed that the Thomas
must leave, despite the orders from Washington. Stevens
boarded the ship that night. The Thomas steamed out of the
32Golden Horn at midnight, heading for Nagasaki.
The Stevens Mission was over. Without a government in 
Petrograd that the United States would recognize, and as yet 
no centralized government control in Siberia, it was no
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longer possible for Stevens to "serve Russia on the
ground." For some time it was hoped that the mission could
be resuscitated. Some anonymous sources in Petrograd deeply
regretted the withdrawal of the Stevens Mission, arguing
that American railroad assistance was a valuable way for the
United States to maintain cordial relations with the Russian
people. Stevens himself told the press that he "fully
expected to return to Russia to continue the work of
reorganization." Even the Bolsheviks, in the desperate days
of March 1918 after submitting to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk
with Germany, appealed for the return of the Stevens
Mission. Trotsky asked for assistance from American
engineers in the reorganization of the railways, and urged
Stevens to come to Russia immediately, promising that the
new Commissar of Railways would be able to dictate policy
over the objections of all local soviets and railwaymen1s 
33organizations.
When Stevens did go back to Siberia with the RRSC and 
the Siberian Expedition in 1918, it was in a new capacity, 
as chairman of the Inter-Allied Railway Committee for the 
supervision of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and as a 
watchdog on Japanese ambitions.
Despite his lapses in tact and judgment, Stevens 
persevered in extremely trying circumstances. At the age of 
sixty-four, poorly nourished and living out of a train car 
for months on end, his body still ravaged by his bout with
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blood poisoning in June, Stevens stayed in Russia at 
considerable risk to his life. At one time he admitted that 
he did not want the assignment, "but in war time there is no 
room for excuses." Whenever he grew despondent or bitter, 
dashing off some rash remarks to Willard or the secretary of 
state, it was as if a part of him hoped that his 
impertinence would get him recalled from Russia. Perhaps he 
subconsciously dwelled on that other point in his career 
when the stress and hardship had become unbearable, in 
Panama, when a terse and caustic letter sent to President 
Roosevelt had brought back the jolting news that the 
President had accepted his resignation. His sudden removal 
from Panama in 1907 had shamed him, but it had brought 
relief too. Yet each time that Stevens shot off an angry 
cable, his better half seemed to be drawing itself together 
to forge ahead.
There is no better example of this pattern than in 
Stevens' actions in late December after arriving safely in 
Japan. A short message to the secretary of state, sent over 
the wires the day after his arrival, so contradicts his 
later recommendations it can only be understood as an almost 
involuntary release of tension: "We should all go back
shortly with man-of-war and 5000 troops. Time is coming to 
put the fear of God into these people." After a week's 
rest, Stevens made a long statement to the press. His tone 
was utterly different. He described sympathetically the
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situation in Russia, and said that American "influence"
there was stronger that that of any of the other Allies and
"should be exerted to the utmost." He warned against "the
application of force in any degree," but urged the United
States to "quadruple its efforts" in showing its concern for
35the Russian people.
It is in this latter statement, counseling restraint 
coupled with determination (a trying combination indeed), 
that Stevens showed himself to be a faithful servant of 
Wilson's policy. Influence, not force, was the basis of 
Wilson's aims in Russia. The principle of self-determination 
kept the goals of American railroad assistance on course, 
guiding the Stevens Mission through the shoals of economic 
interest and political and military intervention.
Wilson had little direct personal involvement in the 
Stevens Mission, yet it is a measure of his effective 
leadership that his idea of the spirit of the mission, which 
he explained to Lansing in May, permeated the cabinet, the 
Council of National Defense, the embassy in Petrograd, and 
the railroad commission itself. At every level Wilson's 
moral vision met with resistance. Stevens, on the scene, 
involved in the protracted negotiations with the Russian 
Ministry of Transport, was inclined to put real movement on 
his recommendations ahead of all other considerations; 
McAdoo tried to use railroad assistance as a weapon for 
bashing Britain's financial grip on the Allies; Baker wanted
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locomotives and rolling stock to go wherever they would 
bring the best results on the battlefield; Francis had his 
nose to the ground for commercial opportunities in Russia, 
while Willard was vigilant for the railroad interests at 
home; Lansing and House disagreed on the staying power of 
the Provisional Government. With so many conflicting 
viewpoints and sources of input, the program of railroad 
assistance to Russia might easily have gone astray. Yet the 
President's original conception of the mission prevailed and 
gave the program coherence.
The Stevens Mission was making real progress on the 
Trans-Siberian Railway by September. Had the morale of the 
Russian people held up, had the army not disintegrated after 
July, American railroad assistance might have had an 
enormous influence in stabilizing the military and political 
situation in 1918. Stanley Washburn had proposed the mission 
with the year 1918 in view. When the Russian situation 
began to deteriorate rapidly in the fall of 1917 much of the 
commission's work became irrelevant. Still, the commission 
played a constructive and valuable role in staving off 
Allied intervention. When the Allies did intervene in 
Russia in 1918, the intervention carried the tragic results 
that Wilson had foreseen. Opposed by the mass of the 
Russian people, it sacrificed the fruits of influence for 
the chimerical gains of force.
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